

Research Note 2012-01

**Negotiation Performance: Antecedents, Outcomes,
and Training Recommendations**

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
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Negotiation Performance: Antecedents, Outcomes, and Training Recommendations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

Negotiation is an important skill at all echelons of U.S. Army leadership, and the ability to negotiate with diverse people and organizations is increasingly becoming a critical competency. Recent stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in the Middle East have accelerated the need for Soldiers to demonstrate robust negotiation skills. Negotiations in these contexts are often complicated by the inclusion of multiple parties from different organizations, nations, and/or cultures, and the differences between U.S. Army culture and the cultures of the other parties in the interaction. These interactions can have strategic implications for the military, yet there is very little negotiation training provided in the formal education and training that Soldiers receive during their careers. Given the importance of negotiation skills to current operations, the Army must develop a thorough understanding of the individual knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs) that affect negotiation performance. Of particular interest is the role of psychological processes such as the negotiator's motivation, emotion, and cognitions. Understanding these factors can ensure an appropriate training structure is developed to build negotiation skills. This report describes research to gain a more complete understanding of the negotiation process, and the skills and psychological influences that underlie effective negotiations, as well as the factors that affect success.

Procedure:

In order to better understand the components of negotiation in the Army, the negotiation literature was reviewed and a series of semi-structured focus groups with Active Duty Army personnel were conducted. The review examined the literature on negotiation performance and outcomes, as well as antecedent variables, including individual differences and psychological processes (cognitive, motivational, and emotional). Because the conditions and context of negotiation are also important, culture was examined as a variable of interest for SSTR operations. On the basis of this review, we developed a preliminary model of the impact of these individual and contextual factors on the negotiation process and outcomes. Based on the components of this model, we developed a protocol to conduct semi-structured focus groups with Active Duty Soldiers. The goal of these discussions was to understand the perspective of Soldier subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding key components of the proposed model. Results from the literature review and focus groups were integrated and used to provide recommendations for training Army leaders in negotiations.

Findings:

A model was developed that examines the negotiation process from beginning to end for mixed-motive negotiations that involve *both* distributive (parties attempt to maximize their share

of the negotiation pie) and integrative (parties work collaboratively to increase the size of both parties' joint gain) elements. The model describes how various individual characteristics influence negotiation processes, performance, and outcomes throughout the typical negotiation, as well as which elements of this process model are amenable to improvement through training. Linkages in the model are highlighted and discussed in a review of the literature.

Results of the literature review on negotiation performance and outcomes introduced the core features of every negotiation, and the terminology required to understand the typical negotiation process. We examined different tactics one can employ (e.g., distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining), and how these affect a variety of “proximal” outcomes. Our review identified various ways the latter have been measured and conceptualized, from economic outcomes such as bargaining surplus or joint gain to social-psychological outcomes such as feelings about the self, the negotiation process, and negotiation partner. We also examined the linkage between these proximal outcomes and a more distal set of outcomes, including willingness to honor the terms of a negotiated agreement, desire to negotiate again with the same negotiation partner, and future negotiation success.

Our review revealed that the factors that impact whether a negotiation is successful are also both distal and proximal in nature. The latter are represented in the proposed model by declarative knowledge (e.g., principles of bargaining) and procedural knowledge (e.g., bargaining skills). In terms of more distal antecedents, the effect of certain “person” variables on negotiation performance was reviewed, paying particular attention to cognitive ability, demographic factors, and personality as key individual difference antecedents of negotiation. Because these variables are less amenable to change compared to other antecedents, and also because a primary goal of this report was to recommend training interventions that will improve Soldier negotiating performance, more attention was focused on the role of several psychological processes – namely cognitive, motivational, and emotional. Together, these three processes represent a fascinating direction in negotiation research that has greatly expanded the realm of both relevant research questions explored as well as practical interventions considered. Research in this area originated with a consideration of cognitive processes involved in negotiations, and was closely followed by the study of social perception and attribution phenomena. From the perspective of motivation, research suggested that it is informative to view the negotiator as a social actor and examine the motives, drives, and goals that affect behavior and outcomes in negotiation situations. Most recently, the negotiator has been cast as not only driven, but also both emotional as well as subject to the emotions of others. In combination, these psychological influences affect how people search for and process information to make sense of their situation and the counterpart(s) with whom they are negotiating. As such, these processes are critical to achieving integrative, or mutually beneficial, negotiation agreements.

The role of culture as an important distal context variable was discussed and the theoretical as well as empirical research on culture and negotiation was specifically examined. Research findings suggest that during cross-cultural negotiations, different parties may construe the same situation in different ways, may process information differently, and may ultimately pursue different goals. Moreover, aspects of culture interact with proximal negotiation conditions to affect cognitions, which can further affect negotiation tactics and strategies used. All of these

differences represent hurdles to achieving integrative agreements. In addition to the information provided in the literature review, focus groups conducted with military commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) provided a number of themes pertaining to Soldier experiences with negotiation in cross-cultural settings. These included issues regarding: (1) working with an interpreter, (2) building trust, rapport, and relationships, (3) knowledge as power, (4) tenuous transitions, (5) knowing the parameters of leverage, (6) power in flux, and (7) conditions for clouded judgments.

Based on the literature and focus groups, recommendations were made regarding training needs that should be addressed throughout the leader development lifecycle, using the proposed model of negotiation performance as a foundation for the recommendations. The training needs were categorized as KSAs that would be either trainable or not easily trained. Six training needs categorized as trainable were highlighted: (1) declarative knowledge of the negotiation process depicted in the model, (2) declarative knowledge of negotiation-relevant facts, concepts, principles, and contextual elements, (3) procedural knowledge of how to apply negotiation-relevant knowledge and skill, (4) motivation to negotiate, (5) declarative and procedural knowledge of techniques for debiasing cognitive and motivational biases, and (6) declarative and procedural knowledge of techniques for regulating emotion. Training design issues were considered and suggestions were made for next steps.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

Results from this report organize the empirical and theoretical literature on negotiation performance, outcomes, and antecedents and provide a model that links key negotiation variables. This model creates a foundation for future efforts to develop negotiation training interventions, in particular, guiding the selection of KSAs that are most likely to benefit from training. Once the current general training needs are translated into specific training objectives, training modules can be developed and integrated into the leader development lifecycle.

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Negotiation Performance: Antecedents, Outcomes, and Training Recommendations

Introduction

The current stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in the Middle East require that U.S. Army leaders at all levels interact with civilians and local leaders to resolve daily conflicts through effective communication and negotiation (Tressler, 2007). Negotiations in this context are often complicated by the inclusion of multiple parties from different organizations, nations, and/or cultures, and the differences between U.S. Army culture and the cultures of the other parties in the interaction. These interactions can have strategic implications for the military, yet there is very little negotiation training provided in the formal education and training that Soldiers receive during their careers (Beckno, 2006).

While negotiation is an important skill at all echelons of leadership, the ability to negotiate with diverse people and organizations becomes increasingly critical as Army leaders move up in their careers. As their career progresses, officers will need to interact in increasingly complex roles across a wide array of contexts with a multitude of diverse organizations such as OGAs, NGOs (Ferro, Cracraft, & Dorsey, 2006). As these skill requirements become more complex, they become more difficult and time-consuming to develop. Therefore, the Army can benefit from providing leaders with early and frequent learning opportunities to develop negotiation-related knowledge and skill.

Although a great deal of research has examined which strategies and associated behaviors are most effective in different negotiation contexts, very little research has examined the role of important cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes in influencing the negotiation process and important negotiation outcomes. However, recent negotiation research emphasizes the importance of considering the cognitive, motivational, and emotional biases that drive an individual's thinking and behavior in negotiations (Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004; Neale & Fragale, 2006). All individuals, regardless of culture, rely on certain information processing heuristics in order to make sense of novel, complex situations. This has led researchers to consider such things as types of information negotiators look for, how much information they need before making a decision, and how thoroughly new information that becomes available during negotiation is processed and integrated into existing knowledge structures (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & van Kleef, 2007). This research, more than ever, reveals that (1) negotiations are frequently described as being cognitively taxing, and (2) individuals must strive to *make sense* of their social environment in the course of a negotiation.

This social psychological study of negotiation is quite different from the analyses of game theory and behavioral economics that preceded it. As De Dreu et al. (2007) point out, while the latter are “mathematically sophisticated and logically comprehensive” they are nevertheless “weak in truly accounting for human judgment and strategic choice” (p. 612). Sense-making in particular is a key element of negotiations, which are not only complex, but also replete with uncertainty. This aspect of negotiations is what has led researchers like De Dreu et al. (2007) to refer to them as “fuzzy, ambiguous, and messy situations” (p. 611). Neale and Fragale (2006) similarly describe negotiations as being inherently ‘uncertain’, highlighting

negotiators' limited knowledge of others' skills, preferences, and strategies, as well as their less than full insight into their own capabilities, goals, and preferences.

As such, the reality of negotiations, according to Neale and Bazerman (1991), is that they are rarely straightforward and tend not to play out according to the predictions of rational choice models. This observation lies in direct contradiction to the economic perspective on negotiation, which assumes that negotiators have stable, well-defined preferences that they strive to fulfill by maximizing gains and minimizing losses (Neale & Fragale, 2006). The economic perspective also assumes that negotiators are fully informed participants. But research reveals that more often than not negotiators must operate under conditions of imperfect information about the situation, their counterpart(s), and even themselves. This leaves them highly susceptible to errors and biases associated with cognition, motivation, and emotion.

Consequently, while negotiations *should* proceed as entirely rational transactions guided by the principle of utility maximization, they routinely fall short of this goal. To understand why, it is helpful to examine how cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes manifest themselves in useful, but (often) error-prone mental strategies for making sense of the complexity and ambiguity inherent in negotiations. As this statement suggests, the influence of these mental strategies on negotiation processes and outcomes is double-edged. On the one hand, they aid negotiators by simplifying situations and making them less cognitively taxing. But in doing so, these strategies can lead to information-processing errors that impact strategic choice and negotiation outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2007). Information-processing and strategic choice (e.g., distributive vs. integrative behavior) are key negotiation processes (De Dreu, 2004). The study of psychological influences on these two processes reveals a great deal about how negotiators think in negotiations, and how their behavior is affected by this thinking (Thompson et al., 2004).

To the extent that company-grade officers receive negotiation instruction at all, it primarily takes place during pre-deployment training. However, there is limited time during this period to devote to comprehensive training, and it typically focuses on cultural generalizations and lists of things to do or not to do. Given the importance of negotiation skills to current operations, leaders could benefit from: (1) knowledge of and practice implementing core, foundational negotiation knowledge and skills, and (2) alternative approaches that develop or leverage the individual negotiator's motivation, emotion, and cognitions. We believe that building capability in these two areas will enable the individual Soldier to adapt to different negotiation contexts rather than simply relying on a list of appropriate negotiation behaviors. Gaining a more complete understanding of negotiation skills, the psychological processes that underlie effective negotiations and the factors that impact success can provide the foundation for high-impact interventions that maximize learning within time and resource constraints.

The purpose of this report is three-fold: First, we present a literature review that documents the individual-level characteristics, skills, and psychological processes related to effective negotiation behavior. We also recognize that the conditions and context of negotiation are important. Culture in particular is a variable of interest for SSTR operations, and we take its role in negotiation into account in our discussion. Second, on the basis of this review, we present a preliminary model of the impact of these individual and contextual factors on the negotiation

process and outcomes. Third, we make several recommendations for training Army leaders for the complexities they will encounter in negotiation situations. Specifically, we present a set of recommendations for developing all of the trainable components of our model. These components include declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge (i.e., skill in applying declarative knowledge), attitudes, and other components that are predicted to affect negotiation performance and/or negotiation outcomes. We target our recommendations toward efforts that will contribute to preparation through a focus on the individual negotiator in context, rather than on the complex conditions themselves.

This report is divided into eight sections: Section 1 provides an overview of our proposed model of negotiation performance, antecedents, and outcomes. This model serves as the organizing framework for the remaining sections, showing the proximal and distal antecedents and outcomes of negotiation performance. Many of the linkages in this model are further discussed in subsequent sections of the report, which review the literature as it pertains to key variables highlighted in the model. Sections 2 and 3 introduce foundational ideas and terms related to negotiation performance (Section 2) and outcomes (Section 3). These two sections help to lay out the basic structure of negotiations and identify the range of possible behaviors and outcomes. They also identify the knowledge and skills that are required for successful negotiation. In Section 4, we briefly discuss several individual difference antecedents of negotiation performance. For the purposes of this report, however, we place more emphasis on a discussion in Section 5 of the cognitive, motivational, and emotional psychological processes that influence negotiation. Section 6 explores negotiation in context, focusing in particular on research that examines the intersection of negotiation and culture. We expand this discussion in Section 7 by documenting actual Soldier experiences negotiating in SSTR contexts. In this section we summarize findings presented by others, as well as our own first-hand accounts of interviews with Soldiers. Lastly, in Section 8 we provide recommendations for enhanced Soldier negotiation training. These recommendations draw together the various threads highlighted in the course of the literature review, model development, and Soldier interviews.

A Model of Negotiation Performance, Antecedents, and Outcomes

Historically, at least three separate approaches to the study of negotiation have predominated. The micro-level, or psychological approach, focuses on the study of conflict among individuals on the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and small group behaviors that affect the causes, processes, performance, and outcomes of conflict. In contrast, the macro-level, or sociological approach, focuses on groups, departments, divisions and even entire organizations as units of analysis. The third approach applies economic analysis, or analysis of economic models of rationality to individual decision making (Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992). Since our primary goal in this project is to determine the individual characteristics that impact negotiation processes and outcomes, our approach most closely resembles the micro-level approach to negotiation research. Our approach focuses on the negotiation behaviors of individuals, and how intrapersonal and interpersonal processes affect the negotiation process, negotiation performance, and negotiation outcomes.

Our interest in the processes within negotiation also affects our operating definition of negotiation. The literature has produced many different definitions of negotiation. For instance, Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) define negotiation as “individuals’ attempts to acquire organizational privileges and resources” (p. 653). Kimmel, Pruitt, Mageneau, Konar-Goldband, and Carnevale (1980) define it as “symbolic communication between two or more parties aimed at reaching agreement on an issue where there are initial differences in preference”, while Thompson (1990) defines it as “the process whereby people attempt to settle what each shall give and take or perform and receive in a transaction between them” (1990, p. 516). Although all of these definitions are valid and offer unique insights, our goal of understanding the nature of effects on negotiation processes resonates well with a classic definition of negotiation offered by Bazerman and Carroll (1987), which seems to summarize all of the key elements of the negotiation process. According to Bazerman and Carroll, negotiation is the process by which parties with non-identical preferences allocate resources through interpersonal activity and joint decision-making. Although negotiation situations vary, all negotiations typically possess the following characteristics: (a) people believe that they have conflicting interests; (b) communication is possible; (c) intermediate solutions or compromises are possible; (d) parties may make provisional offers and counteroffers; (e) offers and proposals do not determine outcomes until they are accepted by both parties (Thompson, 1990).

In an attempt to better understand the negotiation process, researchers have created a variety of negotiation models. Walton and McKersie’s (1965) seminal negotiation model examined three distinct processes they believed take place in every negotiation: (1) distributive bargaining, in which parties attempt to maximize their share of the negotiation pie, (2) integrative bargaining, in which parties work collaboratively to increase the size of both parties’ joint gain, and (3) attitudinal bargaining, in which both parties work to influence the quality of their personal relationships. Since that time, negotiation researchers have focused on the “distributive” and “integrative” processes as distinct types of negotiations. Some researchers have focused on the processes that characterize distributive negotiations, such as the impact of initial offers (e.g., Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Kiefer, 1968), the timing, frequency, or magnitude of concessions (e.g., Lim & Munighan, 1994), or the phases of the negotiation process over time (e.g., Holmes, 1992; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996). In contrast, other researchers have focused on integrative processes, such as the role of problem-solving and cooperative orientation

(e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), types of integrative solutions, such as expanding the pie, logrolling, cost-cutting, and bridging (e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1999), and the role of communication in reaching integrative solutions (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990).

Rarely, however, have researchers attempted to create negotiation models that account for both distributive and integrative processes. In addition, negotiation models have not typically examined the entire negotiation process holistically, from the beginning to the end of the process. Such a holistic approach to studying the negotiation process would examine the role of both individual and contextual factors on the acquisition of negotiation-relevant knowledge and skill, or the negotiation strategies and behaviors chosen, and the short- and long-term outcomes achieved. Instead, it has been much more common for researchers to focus on one specific aspect of the negotiation process, such as the effect of negotiator emotions on the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes (Barry & Oliver, 1996), the effect of individual difference characteristics on other bargainers' perceptions of the level of collaborative negotiation (Mintu-Wimsatt & Graham, 1998), the effect of concern for one's own outcomes and others' outcomes on the negotiation strategies chosen (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), the effect of self- and other-party negotiator dependence on concession activity (Rinehart & Thomas, 1992), and how personality affects negotiation outcomes (Hermann & Kogan, 1977; Rubin & Brown, 1975).

In this project, our aim is to create a negotiation process model that examines the negotiation process from beginning to end for mixed-motive negotiations that involve *both* distributive and integrative elements. In developing this model, the focus is on (1) the influence of various individual characteristics on negotiation processes, performance, and outcomes throughout the typical negotiation, and (2) the elements of this process model that are amenable to improvement through training. The process model is presented in Figure 1.

Conceptually, the development of our negotiation model began with the proposition that performance in any domain is a function of both direct and indirect determinants. Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager (1993) argued for three kinds of direct determinants of performance in any domain: declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge (i.e., skill), and volitional choice behavior. In our model, these direct determinants are similar: declarative knowledge (e.g., negotiation terms, principles, and concepts), procedural knowledge (e.g., communication skills, problem solving skills), and motivation to negotiate. Campbell et al. (1993) theorized that individual differences in each of the direct determinants are a function of multiple indirect determinants. Our model hypothesizes that these indirect determinants include various person characteristics (e.g., cognitive ability, personality), context variables (e.g., structure of the negotiation situation, the cultural affiliation of the other negotiators), and psychological processes (e.g., cognitive biases, motivational biases, emotional processes). The model hypothesizes that two of the distal determinants (i.e., person variables and psychological processes) directly affect the proximal determinants of negotiation performance. It also hypothesizes that the distal determinants either directly or indirectly (through their influence on the proximal determinants) affect negotiation performance.




Figure 1. Model of Negotiation Performance Antecedents and Outcomes in Mixed-Motive Negotiations.

Note. N1 = Negotiator 1; N2 = Negotiator 2

Consistent with Campbell et al.'s (1993) general performance model, negotiation performance is conceptualized as the set of observable, measurable, behaviors negotiators engage in to achieve their negotiation objectives. These observable, measurable behaviors are the behavioral manifestations of negotiator knowledge and skill. For distributive negotiations, they may include such basic behaviors as making high initial demands, making concessions slowly, imposing deadlines, making threats, providing arguments in support of your position, and the like (Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Olekalns, Smith & Walsh, 1996). For integrative negotiations, they may include behaviors such as requesting information about the other party's position, indicating your own interests in the situation, making systematic concessions, exploring various options at one level of value before proceeding to a lower level, and the like (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Pruitt, 1981).

Negotiation performance in turn is hypothesized to have direct and indirect effects on important proximal and distal outcomes. Proximal outcomes include the purely economic outcomes of negotiations, such as joint gain, or bargaining surplus achieved, as well as social-psychological outcomes, such as the individual negotiator's perception of how he or she performed, whether the process was fair, and whether the relationship developed with the other negotiator was a positive one. The addition of social-psychological outcomes to the list of more economically determined outcomes stems from the recognition that subjective feelings about the negotiation process play an important role in determining the perceived legitimacy of the negotiated settlement, one's reputation as a negotiator, and more importantly, the desire to participate in future negotiations (Croson & Glick, 2001; Fortgang, Lax, & Sebenius, 2003; Thompson, 1990; Greenhalgh and Kramer, 1990). This reality is captured in the linkages between the proximal and distal outcomes of the negotiation process. The model hypothesizes that both the economic and social-psychological outputs of a negotiation have direct effects on more distal outcomes, such as the other party's willingness to implement an agreement and negotiate in the future. Especially in the context of Soldiers' negotiations in SSTR contexts, which are frequently of long duration, and are ongoing, these more distal outcomes take on added importance.

Although the overall architecture of this model is based on Campbell et al.'s (1993) general performance model, the specific hypothesized linkages are the product of empirical research. In the ensuing sections, we summarize the empirical evidence sustaining these linkages. In sum, we offer here a model that posits the key linkages between negotiation antecedents, performance, and outcomes. In the next few sections of the report we will examine these in further detail, integrating and summarizing the empirical literature in support of the linkages shown. Then, we will examine which elements of this model are amenable to a training intervention, and make a comprehensive set of training recommendations to improve negotiator performance.

Before proceeding with this review, we note a few limitations of the model presented here. First, unlike some other negotiation models which focus on the recursive processes *between* negotiators in a negotiation (e.g., Gelfand & Dyer, 2000), our model focuses on the individual negotiator, and how the traits and psychological processes he or she possesses impact declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition, negotiation performance, and subsequently, negotiation outcomes. Although a full appreciation of the negotiation process requires an understanding of

the interplay of processes between negotiators, we reasoned that a micro-level approach was appropriate in light of the overarching goal of this project to create training recommendations for improving individual negotiator performance. In taking a micro-level approach, we also note that it is unclear whether the dynamics of negotiations between individual negotiators, as modeled here, would adequately represent negotiations between two groups or organizations. Finally, this model, like all negotiation models, assumes that all types of problems are negotiable, and that all parties want to negotiate or are able to negotiate. In many instances, these last two assumptions may not be valid (Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992).

Negotiation Performance

In this section, we discuss the bargaining process in distributive and integrative negotiations. In terms of our process model, the focus is on negotiation performance itself, and how negotiation performance affects a variety of “proximal” outcomes, from economic outcomes such as bargaining surplus or joint gain to social-psychological outcomes such as feelings about the self, the negotiation process, and negotiation partner. We also examine the linkage between these proximal outcomes and a more distal set of outcomes, including willingness to honor the terms of a negotiated agreement, desire to negotiate again with the same negotiation partner, and future negotiation success. This review is meant to serve three purposes. First, it introduces the core features of every negotiation, and the terminology required to understand the typical negotiation process. Second, it provides important empirical evidence for some of the key hypothesized linkages in our process model. Third, it lays the groundwork for the exploration of how individual difference characteristics affect the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes.

Basic Structure of a Negotiation

The core features of a negotiation include the parties, their interests, the process, and the outcome (Thompson, 1990). In this section, we focus on the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes. The negotiation process is the interaction that occurs between *both* parties before a negotiation outcome. It includes the behavioral enactments of relevant bargaining strategies and communication processes by both parties, and especially the interplay of these behaviors between the parties in their effort to achieve an optimal outcome for themselves and their constituents (Thompson, 1990). As mentioned earlier, although a complete understanding of this process is necessary to understand any two-party negotiation, our conception of negotiation performance does not focus on the interplay of negotiation behaviors as performed by both negotiators, but on the negotiation-relevant behaviors as performed by any one negotiator. As is true in any domain, the enactment of performance-relevant behavior depends on previously learned declarative knowledge and procedural skill. One cannot perform negotiation-relevant behaviors effectively without knowledge of what the correct strategies are (declarative knowledge) and knowledge of how to perform them skillfully (procedural knowledge). This truism is captured in our model, which hypothesizes that negotiation-relevant declarative and procedural knowledge have direct effects on negotiation performance. The negotiation “outcome” is the product of the bargaining situation. Negotiations may end in either mutual agreement or impasse. When negotiations end in mutual agreement, negotiation performance may be measured using a variety of economic and/or social-psychological measures.

Before discussing the negotiation process, negotiation performance, and negotiation outcomes in more depth, it is important to understand how the “structure” of the negotiation influences the negotiation process. As will become clear shortly, the negotiation structure determines the “type” of negotiation in play, and the type of negotiation in play has an important bearing on the strategies selected and outcomes desired. The structure of a negotiation is determined by the *degree of conflict* in interests, which are the needs, concerns, or fears that a party wishes to satisfy in a negotiation. In any given negotiation, some interests are obvious (e.g., the financial interest in the negotiation for the sale/purchase of a house) while others may lie

hidden beneath a party's stated position (e.g., the desire to be treated with respect during the negotiation process) (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1999).

So-called 'pure conflict' situations exist when interests are perfectly negatively correlated – any outcome that increases one party's utility (i.e., gains) decreases the other party's utility in a fixed sum fashion. For instance, a negotiation over the purchase of a vehicle, when price is the *only* interest of both parties, is a pure conflict situation because the interests of both parties are perfectly negatively correlated. What one party gains in price the other party necessarily loses. Pure conflict situations are known as 'fixed sum' or 'distributive' negotiations.

At the other extreme, 'pure coordination' situations exist when interests are perfectly compatible; increasing one party's utility also increases the other party's utility. An example of a purely coordinative negotiation is two people attempting to divide up an orange, when one party only wants the rind, and the other party only wants the fruit inside (Follett, 1940). In this situation, there is no conflict of interests, as each party wants only what the other party does not want.

Finally, variable sum or *integrative* situations exist when interests are neither completely opposed nor completely compatible. Many researchers contend that most negotiation situations are integrative in nature (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Walton & McKersie, 1965). In integrative negotiations, the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices of the other. Rather, there is the potential to exchange interests that have different values for both parties. Pruitt (1986) provides an example of a husband and wife who are trying to determine where they should go on vacation. The husband would prefer a cabin in the mountains; he is primarily interested in location. In contrast, the wife would prefer a luxury hotel on the seashore; she is primarily interested in accommodation. An integrative solution is reached when these parties decide to vacation in a luxury hotel in the mountains.

The structure of the negotiation has important implications for the negotiation process. For instance, the strategies likely to succeed in distributive and integrative situations differ substantially (Putnum, 1990; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996). In distributive situations, negotiators use strategies that have the best chance of obtaining a favorable distribution of the limited value at hand. In integrative situations, negotiators will also use strategies that create greater value (Allred, Mallozi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). As several commentators have pointed out, recognizing the negotiation situation for what it is, and knowing which strategies to use in that situation, is one of the most important challenges facing negotiators.

In subsequent sections, we outline the different strategies, skills, and communication styles likely to be successful in both situations. However, we note that for the purpose of model development, we proceeded on the assumption that most military negotiations will have both distributive and integrative elements, since the typical military negotiation involves both maximizing one's share of limited resources and expanding the available resources to create win-win solutions for both parties. Accordingly, as indicated in our process model in Figure 1, negotiation performance includes both distributive and integrative negotiation behaviors.

Distributive Bargaining

Distributive bargaining refers to the process of dividing limited resources. It occurs in situations in which what one party wins the other party loses. It is the process whereby each party attempts to maximize his own share in the context of fixed-sum payoffs (Walton & McKersie, 1965).

All negotiations have a distributive component. The distributive component reflects the primary motivation of bargainers: to maximize their utility, or gains. A fundamental task in this context is to divide resources in such a manner that the bargainer keeps most of the bargaining surplus, understood as the difference between one's reservation price (the very minimum a party will settle for) and the final settlement (Raiffa, 1982; Walton & McKersie, 1965). When distributive negotiations reach a final settlement, that settlement will be within the zone of agreement, defined as the interval between each negotiator's reservation price (Raiffa, 1982).

The basic stages of distributive negotiations include first offer, which may serve as an anchor biasing the other party's judgments of the structure of the negotiation, and counteroffer. Research indicates that offer and counteroffer account for a significant portion of the variance in distributive negotiations (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). At a more molecular level, offers and counteroffers can be broken down into discrete events such as proposal frequency, message frequency, concession frequency, and average concession size (Lim & Munighan, 1994).

Phase models of negotiation (e.g., Holmes, 1992) suggest that the bargaining process is one of decreased flexibility with the passage of time. Early in the process, concessionary cues and rejection responses signal flexibility, firmness, and a desire to define the bargaining zone, while later they are used to reach settlement. In the middle and latter stages of the negotiation, the key means of challenging limits is positional cueing and responding cueing (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996).

To achieve the highest surplus in distributive negotiations, a negotiator's ultimate goal is to affect an opponent's perception of what each stands to gain and lose from the agreement (Walton & McKersie, 1965). By affecting these perceptions, a negotiator can affect the opponent's reservation price as well as the opponent's perception of the negotiator's reservation price. In addition, by affecting these perceptions, a negotiator can affect the opponent's perception of his or her BATNA, or 'best alternative to a negotiated settlement'. In distributive environments, affecting the opponent's perception of your BATNA is important because it can directly affect the opponent's reservation price.

Perhaps because of the fixed-sum nature of resources in these situations, distributive negotiations are characterized by a competitive, rather than a cooperative, orientation (Deutsch, 1973). Behaviorally, a competitive orientation may involve the use of tactics such as: (1) making threats, (2) imposing penalties with the understanding they will be withdrawn if the opponent concedes, (3) taking preemptive actions to resolve a conflict without the other's consent, (4) using persuasive arguments, (5) making demands that exceed what is acceptable, (6) committing oneself to an unalterable position, and (7) imposing a deadline (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986).

Success in distributive environments may also involve the use of bargaining heuristics. For instance, Raiffa (1982) encourages negotiators to know yourself (e.g., think about what you want and need, and what will happen if no deal is struck; assign a value to your BATNA and assess your reservation price), know your adversaries (e.g., consider what will happen to them if no deal is struck; speculate about their alternatives; examine your perceptions of their reservation price), and give thought to opening gambits (e.g., beware of opening so conservatively that your offer falls within adversaries' acceptance region; don't get locked in by talking about your opponent's extreme first offer; avoid disclosing information that betrays your reservation price).

An important part of the second bargaining heuristic mentioned by Raiffa (1982), knowing one's adversaries, is being able to understand the perspective of the other negotiator. This is an important and useful skill in negotiation. Cognitive perspective taking involves intuiting, as accurately as possible, another person's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, interests, or concerns in a given situation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Davis, 1983, Epley, Savitsky, & Gilovich, 2002). In a distributive environment, Neale and Bazerman (1983) showed that the ability to take the perspective of one's opponent led to better distributive outcomes – it made the opponent more likely to make concessions.

Recently, researchers have also investigated the use of displays of emotion as a bargaining strategy. Research examining the role of emotion in negotiation is a relatively new and fascinating area. In this section we will briefly review research that focuses on the *interpersonal* effects of using emotions specifically in a bargaining situation. In a subsequent section exploring emotion-based psychological processes we will discuss the *intrapersonal* effects of emotion in negotiation.

Emotions are a communication of one's feelings and intentions towards others (Van Kleef, DeDreu, & Manstead, 2004a) and may therefore be expected to have effects on the other party's behavior. Negative emotions are particularly useful cues in regulating social interactions and can have several strategic uses. For instance, anger may be used to induce fear, or compliance (Averill, 1982). Several studies have demonstrated that being angry or tough is advantageous, as the other party often uses this information to infer the other has high limits (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Karasawa, 2001; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). This is known as *tracking* (see Pruitt, 1981), and suggests that the interpersonal effects of anger are mediated by cognitive processes that require some degree of information processing (e.g., strategic decision making) on the part of the emotion-perceiving negotiator. Behaviorally, several studies have shown (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a) that bargainers make low demands and high concessions to an angry opponent. People may do this because they reason that agreement can only be reached if they concede.

However, the consequences of using anger as a bargaining strategy are not straightforward. It appears that the utility of anger as a bargaining strategy may depend on the structure of the bargaining situation. Van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, and Beest (2008) demonstrated that communication of anger can backfire if bargainers can deceive their angry opponent, or if the consequences of rejection are low. In addition, Van Kleef and Cote (2007) showed that the effectiveness of the use of anger as a strategy may be affected by the amount of power possessed by the victim of the anger, as well as the appropriateness of the anger. Results

indicated that negotiators concede to angry opponents when they have no power, retaliate when they have high power and deem the expression inappropriate, and remain unaffected when they have high power and deem the expression appropriate.

Although the strategic use of anger may, in certain circumstances, lead to better short-term outcomes, the use of anger may have deleterious effects on long term-relationships. Past research has shown that individuals who are confronted with an angry opponent tend to develop a negative impression of the opponent (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a), become angry themselves (Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and may be unwilling to interact with the opponent again (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b).

Less research has investigated the strategic use of emotions other than anger in negotiations. Interestingly, the research by Van Kleef et al. (2004a), cited earlier, indicated that displays of happiness have the opposite effect as displays of anger. In response to displays of happiness, negotiators tend to make higher demands, and grant fewer concessions. Reactions to displays of guilt and disappointment have also received limited attention. Based on social-psychological behavioral correlates of these emotions outside the negotiation realm, Van Kleef, DeDreu, and Manstead (2006) hypothesized, and found support for the proposition that negotiators faced with an opponent who appears to be guilty will expect a concession from the other, and stand firm to get it. In contrast, those faced with a negotiator who displays emotions of sadness or disappointment make more concessions. This study reinforces the communicative value of emotions. That is, guilt signaled to the other that one has taken too much, and is willing to compensate for this; disappointment signals one has received less than expected, and is in need of compensation.

Overall, distributive negotiations are associated with mainly coercive processes aimed at influencing opponents' resistance points while maximizing personal gain (Deutsch, 1973; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki and Litterer 1985). They are characterized by positional commitment and argumentation (Lewis & Fry, 1977; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), personal attacks (Lewis & Fry, 1977), and high demands and concessions (Bateman, 1980; Hammer & Harnett, 1975; Smith, Pruitt & Carnevale, 1975). Increases in positional argumentation are associated with more false information, pressure tactics, demands for concession (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) and the possibility of deadlock (Roloff et al., 1989). These tactics result in decreased information exchange and increased hostility (Carnevale & Lawler, 1987).

In distributive contexts, information exchange is purely tactical (Putnam & Jones, 1982; Wilson & Putnam, 1990), with negotiators interested in maximizing the information they receive while minimizing what they give (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In distributive contexts, information exchange is used as a means to control the process. Increased argumentation, threats, and the assertion of needs all signal an attempt to gain power.

One danger in using argumentation and threats in a negotiation is that they may lead to conflict spirals. Previous research has found that reciprocation of communications is common in dyadic communications and in negotiations (Axelrod, 1984; Boulding, 1962; Deutsch, 1973;

Putnam & Jones, 1982). Negotiators reciprocate their partners' integrative communications, distributive communications (e.g., threats), procedural statements, and affective statements (Donohue, 1981, Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). Conflict spirals occur when a negotiator initiates a contentious communication, the other negotiator responds with a contentious communication, and the first negotiator continues in a self-consistent manner with a contentious communication (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998). Effective strategies for avoiding conflict spirals include conscious decisions not to reciprocate aggressive communications, reciprocating with a contentious and then a non-contentious communication, and labeling the process unproductive (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998).

In sum, the empirical literature indicates that a constellation of bargaining tactics are likely to affect many types of outcomes in distributive negotiations. To influence the occurrence and magnitude of concessions, negotiators use an array of competitive tactics such as persuasive argumentation, making threats, imposing penalties, imposing deadlines, making positional commitments, using anger, making personal attacks, and the like. In its totality, this literature suggests that while these tactics are frequently successful at winning concessions, and thus improving economic outcomes, many of them may negatively affect the prospects for achieving an agreement at all, or may negatively affect important social-psychological outcomes such as the other negotiator's willingness to bargain in the future. This multiplicity of possible effects is captured in our process model, which shows linkages between negotiation performance and all of the proximal outcomes. As the Van Kleef and Cote (2007) study indicated, whether these tactics have a positive or negative effect on economic outcomes in particular may depend on the relative power of the negotiators. Whereas some of the competitive tactics may yield concessions, and thus improved economic outcomes, when wielded by powerful negotiators, they may have the opposite effect when attempted by weak negotiators. This possible moderating effect of power on the relationship between negotiation performance and economic outcomes in distributive contexts is reflected in the negotiation process model.

Integrative Bargaining

In contrast to distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining is a variable sum situation where a wide range of total values is available to the parties depending on the quality and creativity of their decision making. Integrative bargaining situations are those that integrate interests in ways that create greater value, increasing the size of the pie to be divided among the negotiators. Integrative bargaining situations are non-zero-sum encounters in which there is a possibility for joint gain from the negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965).

One of the most important strategies in integrative bargaining contexts is problem solving (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Raiffa, 1982; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Negotiations characterized by an integrative, problem-solving orientation have as their aim the identification of common goals. The overarching goal is to maximize the resource pool, and use information exchange to establish trust, understand opponents' needs, and retain flexibility until the close of negotiations (Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh, 1996). Behaviorally, a problem-solving or cooperative orientation involves using tactics such as: 1) conceding with the expectation of receiving a concession, 2) mentioning possible compromises as talking points, 3) revealing one's underlying interests, 4)

communicating one's own underlying interests, and 5) inventing options for mutual gain (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1999).

A problem-solving orientation can lead to a variety of integrative solutions. One solution may be 'expanding the pie', or increasing the available resources. This outcome is useful when both parties accept the proposals mentioned, but reject them because they pose opportunity costs. Another solution is 'nonspecific compensation'. In this outcome, one party gets what he/she wants, and the second is repaid in some unrelated way. 'Logrolling' is where each party concedes on issues that are of low priority to it and high priority to the other party. This is possible only when there are several issues under negotiation and each party has different priorities among them. In 'cost-cutting', one party gets what he/she wants, and the second party's costs are reduced or eliminated. Lastly, for 'bridging', neither party achieves its initial demands, but a new option is devised that satisfies the most important interests (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).

While some competitive tactics may have a place in integrative contexts (e.g., vigorous advocacy of your position may help the other party understand your motives) most contentious tactics, such as issuing threats, or other communications designed to intimidate the opponent, are unhelpful in integrative situations, and can actually diminish negotiators' chances of reaching integrative agreements (Ben-yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Lewis & Fry, 1977).

Many theorists posit that integrative negotiations move from a competitive to a coordinative stage. In the competitive stage, an effort is made to demonstrate firmness, and persuade the other party to move towards them. Parties also seek information during this stage, clarify goals and priorities, and seek to narrow the range of possible outcomes. During the competitive stage, one party may make a concession, which signals a change to a coordinative stage. During the coordinative stage, both parties work together to reach a mutually acceptable agreement (Pruitt, 1981).

On a more molecular level, negotiations may involve the following elements: 1) offers (including counteroffers), 2) information provision, 3) substantiation of position, 4) understanding of other parties, 5) delayed reciprocity suggested, 6) mutuality of concerns, 7) procedural comments, 8) questions, 9) agreements, and 10) disagreements (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett 1993).

Communication takes on added importance in integrative situations. The likelihood that both parties will discover each other's needs are enhanced when parties display their true needs and concerns, and if they remain engaged with each other, exchanging information and exploring options (Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Barry & Friedman, 1998). Past research has indicated, however, that parties may fail to ask for relevant and necessary information because they assume they know the preferences of the other party (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995). One strategy that enhances communication is heuristic trial and error. With heuristic trial and error, parties make a series of offers that would allow for an exchange of interests, and note the response from the other party (Pruitt & Lewis, 1977).

Another reason communication is so important in integrative negotiations is that it provides information about the priority of interests. Priority information is crucial because it allows for logrolling to occur (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Distributive and integrative situations are associated with differing levels of priority exchange information. Distributive situations have less priority exchange information and the reverse is true for integrative situations (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996). Research indicates that in situations with logrolling potential, integrative solutions are reached more readily, and joint benefits are greater, if issues are considered simultaneously rather than sequentially (Pruitt, 1981; Erickson, Holmes, Frey, Walker, & Thibault, 1974; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Kelley, 1966; Pruitt, 1981).

As is the case with distributive negotiations, the ability to understand the perspective of an opponent is crucial to reaching an optimal agreement. Misunderstanding the perspective of an opponent can lead to erroneous attributions about their preferences (Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999), a failure to maximize joint gain (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996), and impasses (Thompson, 1990). In both distributive and integrative negotiations, perspective taking aids in reaching agreements by helping individuals to consider information that may oppose an already formed expectancy, reducing the confirmation bias (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), diminishing the accessibility of stereotypes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and recognizing the constraints that direct behavior.

In summary, the empirical literature indicates that a variety of problem solving and communication-related behaviors are apt to positively affect negotiation outcomes. These behaviors include providing information about one's own interests, soliciting information about the other party's interests, exchanging information about the priority of interests, making concessions with the expectation of reciprocal behavior, and problem solving using a variety of techniques. Effective use of these behaviors can be expected to affect the level of joint gain achieved, whether agreements are reached, and how negotiators feel about the other negotiator and the negotiation process itself.

The foregoing review has highlighted a wide range of behaviors performed by negotiators in distributive and integrative contexts. As previously indicated, these behaviors represent negotiator performance, and are manifestations of a pre-existing set of declarative and procedural knowledge. The key declarative knowledge required in mixed-motive negotiations is knowledge of negotiation terminology, principles, and concepts for both types of negotiations. This set of declarative knowledge is highlighted in Table 1. Perhaps more importantly, effective negotiation performance requires that negotiators know how to effectively *perform* the behaviors required to achieve optimal outcomes. To perform these behaviors, and achieve optimal outcomes, negotiators must possess a wide range of skills. As Table 2 illustrates, these skills include analytical skill, problem solving skill, persuasion, communication, ingratiation, and the ability to *resist* the use of competitive tactics. Since our focus is on mixed-motive negotiations involving both distributive and integrative elements, we highlight the skills required to effectively perform negotiation-relevant behaviors in both type of negotiations. To help illustrate the link between a negotiator's mastery of a skill and the behavioral enactment of that skill, we offer several examples of how performance of a skill manifests itself behaviorally in negotiations.

Table 1. Declarative Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations

	Negotiation-Relevant Terminology, Principles, and Concepts	Definition
Context Variable Terminology	Negotiation Structure	The degree of conflict in interests, which are the needs, concerns, or fears that a party wishes to satisfy in a negotiation (Thompson, 1990)
	Pure Conflict Situations, Fixed-Sum or “Distributive” Negotiations	A type of negotiation situation in which interests are perfectly negatively correlated. Any outcome that increases one party’s utility (i.e., gains) decreases the other party’s utility in a fixed-sum fashion (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Pure Coordination Situations	A type of negotiation situation in which interests are perfectly compatible. Increasing one party’s utility (i.e., gains) also increases the other party’s utility (i.e., gains) (Thompson, 1990)
	Variable Sum, Mixed Motive, or “Integrative” Negotiations	A type of negotiation situation in which interests are neither purely opposed nor completely compatible (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Principles	Analyzing Interests	Using questions and other strategies for determining all of the other party’s interests in a negotiation, as well as the priority among interests (Pruitt, 1981)
	Appearing Firm	A negotiator’s efforts to convince the other party he or she is unwilling to make concessions (Pruitt, 1981)
	BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Settlement)	A negotiator’s perception of his or her best alternative to a negotiated settlement (Fisher & Ury, 1981)
	Bridging	A means of expanding the range of possible solutions in an integrative negotiation in which neither party achieves its initial demands, but a new option is devised that satisfies the most important interests underlying those demands (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Collaboration	A negotiation situation characterized by many proposals and counterproposals, problem solving, discussions about the workability of solutions, high level of agreement with opponents’ proposals, and systematic concessions (Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh (1996)
	Coordination	Negotiators’ efforts to work together towards a mutually acceptable agreement (Pruitt, 1981)
	Commitment	The taking of a bargaining position with some implicit or explicit pledge concerning a future course of action. Commitments can range from minimal, indicating flexibility, to maximal, indicating firmness (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Competitive Behavior	Efforts to elicit unilateral concessions from the other party (Pruitt, 1981). It is associated with more coercive processes aimed at influencing opponent’s resistance points while maximizing one’s own gain
	Concession	A change of offer in the supposed direction of the other party’s interests that reduces the level of benefit sought (Pruitt, 1981)
	Concession Exchange	A situation in which negotiators move towards one another on a single dimension or swap concessions on different dimensions in an effort to achieve an integrative agreement (Pruitt, 1983)
	Concession Rate	The speed at which demand level declines over time (Pruitt, 1981)
	Concession Timing	The point in the negotiation at which a concession occurs (Kwon & Weingart, 2004)

Table 1. Declarative Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (con't)

	Negotiation-Relevant Terminology, Principles, and Concepts	Definition
Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Principles	Cost Cutting	A means of expanding the range of possible solutions in an integrative negotiation in which one party gets what he or she wants, while the other party's costs are reduced or eliminated (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Deception	The transmission of information that implicitly encourages another party to make incorrect conclusions (Murnighan, 1991)
	Demand level	The level of benefit to a negotiator associated with the current offer or demand (Pruitt, 1981)
	Distributive Bargaining	The process of dividing limited resources. More precisely, the process whereby each party attempts to maximize his own share in the context of fixed-sum payoffs (Walton & McKersie, 1965).
	Expanding the Pie	A means of expanding the range of possible solutions in an integrative negotiation by increasing the resources available (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Feather Ruffling	Inducing a state of upset or unrest that has the effect of lowering the other party's resistance to yielding (Potter, 1948, as cited in Rubin & Sander, 1988)
	Heuristic Trial and Error	A means of expanding the range of possible solutions in an integrative negotiation in which parties make a series of offers that would allow for an exchange of interests, and note the response from the other party (Pruitt & Lewis, 1977)
	Imposing Time Pressure	Attempts to persuade the other party to concede by enhancing the risk or cost of continued negotiation (Pruitt, 1981)
	Information Exchange	Exchanging information about interests and their priority. In integrative negotiations, information exchange is used as a means of establishing trust, understanding opponent's needs and preferences and retaining flexibility until the close of negotiations (Wilson & Putnam, 1990)
	Ingratiation	A class of strategic behaviors designed to influence a negotiator concerning the attractiveness of his or her personal qualities (Jones & Wortman, 1973)
	Interests	The needs, concerns, or fears that a party wishes to satisfy in a negotiation (Thompson, 1990)
	Limit	A negotiator's ultimate fallback position, the level of benefit beyond which he or she is unwilling to concede (Pruitt, 1981)
	Logrolling	A means of expanding the range of possible solutions in an integrative negotiation in which both parties concede on issues that are of low priority to itself and high priority to the other party (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Negative Bargaining Zone	The state that exists in a negotiation when negotiators' reservation prices do not overlap (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In such a state, both bargainers do not gain from mutual agreement
	Nonspecific Compensation	A means of expanding the range of possible solutions in an integrative negotiation in which one party gets what he or she wants, while the other party is paid in some unrelated coin

		(Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Pareto Frontier	The complete set of pareto-optimal solutions (Raiffa, 1982)

Table 1. Declarative Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

	Negotiation-Relevant Terminology and Principles	Definition
	Persuasive Argumentation	The art of inducing the other party to lower his or her aspirations through a series of logical appeals (Pruitt, 1981)
	Perspective Taking	Intuiting, as accurately as possible, another person's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, interests, or concerns in a given situation (Epley, Savitsky, & Gilovich, 2002)
Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Principles	Positive Bargaining Zone	The state that exists in a negotiation when negotiators' reservation prices overlap (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In such a state, both bargainers gain from mutual agreement
	Problem Solving	A situation in which negotiators share information about goals and priorities to reach an agreement that will satisfy both parties' needs (Pruitt, 1981).
	Promise	A message of intention to behave in ways that are beneficial to the interests of the other party, depending on what the other party does or does not do (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Reducing Resistance	Attempts to reduce the other party's resistance to making concessions, usually by shifting the other's limit in the direction favored by the actor or lowering the other's level of aspiration (Pruitt, 1981)
	Reservation Price	The very minimum a party will settle for in a negotiation (Raiffa, 1982)
	Resistance Point	The value of an offer above the reservation price where a negotiator will agree to the offer rather than continue further negotiations (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Resistance to Threats	Matching the other's use of threats or heavy-handed tactics to avoid image loss and deter further competitive behavior (Pruitt, 1981)
	Responding Cueing	BLANK??
	Sequential vs. Simultaneous Consideration of Issues	In sequential bargaining, time is divided into discrete periods and bargainers alternate in making offers and counteroffers for specific issues (Srivastava, 2001). In simultaneous bargaining, all issues are considered at the same time.
	Threat	A message of intention to behave in ways that are detrimental to the interests of the other party, depending on what the other party does or does not do (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Zone of Agreement	The interval between each negotiator's reservation price (Raiffa, 1982)
Types of Negotiated Agreements	Compromise Agreement	A suboptimal agreement in which the parties fail to divide the available resources. Such an agreement is suboptimal in that a solution or set of solutions exists that would be better for both parties than the solution adopted (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Impasse	A failure to come to an agreement
	Lose-Lose agreements	An agreement that is less optimal than what both parties specifically desire
	Mutual Agreement	An agreement between all parties to a negotiation concerning the allocation of the available resources (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Rational economic bargaining models suggest negotiators should reach a mutual agreement if the alternative is worse than what they could have achieved through agreement

Table 1. Declarative Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

	Negotiation-Relevant Terminology and Principles	Definition
Economic Outcomes	Bargaining Surplus	The difference between one's reservation price and the final settlement (Raiffa, 1982). It is most useful as an outcome measure in distributive environments, since it is easy to compare whether one has achieved better outcomes
	Joint Benefit	In integrative bargaining, a general term for how "integrative" a given negotiated settlement is. Joint benefit includes "joint profit," "pareto optimality" and inferiority of the outcome
	Joint profit	The sum of the group members' gains (Tripp & Sondak, 1992)
	Pareto optimality	Agreements from which no additional joint gains are possible. More technically, a situation in which no agreement other than the one achieved is possible that would be preferred by both negotiators, or which would be preferred by one and to which the others would be indifferent (Nash, 1950)
	Inferiority Index	The number of agreements that are superior to the one chosen by the parties to a negotiation (Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993)
Social-Psychological Outcomes	Perceptions of the Bargaining Situation	Judgments and feelings about the negotiation process, for instance, norms for appropriate behavior, communication and information sharing, bargaining structure, and fairness and justice (Thompson, 1990)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feelings About the Instrumental Outcome 	A negotiator's degree of satisfaction with the economic outcome, the balance between the outcomes of both negotiators, and subjective judgment whether the terms of the agreement are consistent with common standards of fairness, precedent, industry practice, and legality (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feelings About the Self 	A negotiator's judgment concerning whether he or she acted in accord with personal principles during the negotiation, and whether the negotiation made him or feel more or less competent as a negotiator, and positively or negatively affected self-image (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feelings About the Process 	A negotiator's judgment about whether the other negotiator listened to his or her concerns, wishes, opinions, and needs, whether the negotiation was fair, degree of satisfaction with the ease or difficulty of reaching an agreement (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feelings About the Relationship 	A negotiator's judgment about the impression the other negotiator made, how satisfied he or she is with his or her counterpart as a result of the negotiation, whether the negotiation engendered trust in the negotiation counterpart, and whether the negotiation built a good foundation for a future relationship with the counterpart (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006)
	Perceptions of the Other Party	Attributions one negotiator makes about the other negotiator based on the basis of his or her behavior, and trait inferences such as the expertise, cooperativeness, friendliness, and resulting reputation of the other negotiator. It also includes the social relationship, trust, respect, liking, and concern for the other party (Thompson, 1990)
	Perceptions of the Self	A negotiator's judgment of his or her own traits (e.g., self-efficacy and self-esteem), performance, and worth, on the basis of his or her interactions with the other negotiator (Thompson, 1990)

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations			
Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
Analytical Skill	Analysis of Your Own Negotiation Position	Consideration of what you need, want, and aspire to in the upcoming negotiation and how you will achieve it (Raiffa, 1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amass arguments for the negotiations: facts, data, arguments, rationalizations, including arguments about what is fair and how an arbitrator might settle the dispute (Raiffa, 1982) • Consider what will happen if the deal is not struck (Raiffa, 1982) • Analyze your other alternatives, and assign a value to your BATNA (Raiffa, 1982) • Assess your reservation price for each round of negotiations (Raiffa, 1982) • Set a target aspiration level that is a reasonable distance from your bottom-line price (Raiffa, 1982)
	Analysis of the Other Party's Negotiation Position	Consideration of what the other party needs, wants, and aspires to in the upcoming negotiation and how he or she plans to achieve it (Raiffa, 1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examine your perceptions of the other party's reservation price, scrutinizing the possible uncertainties in those perceptions (Raiffa, 1982) • Consider what will happen to your adversary if no deal is struck, and speculate about their alternatives (Raiffa, 1982) • Investigate the other party's credentials and integrity, and how he or she has negotiated in the past (Raiffa, 1982) • Find someone to role play your adversary and give careful thought to what their tactics might be (Raiffa, 1982)
	Analysis of the Negotiation Context	Consideration of relevant contextual factors (e.g., culture) that could influence negotiation outcomes (Raiffa, 1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider the cultural background of the other negotiator and how that affects your level of openness and trust (Raiffa, 1982) • Consider how many iterations of the negotiation dance are customary in the given negotiation context, and whether the negotiation can be done in stages (Raiffa, 1982) • Consider how each stage of the negotiation will affect your relationship with the other party (Raiffa, 1982)
	Analysis of the Logistics of the Negotiation	Consideration of how the negotiation ought to be structured to achieve an optimal outcome (Raiffa, 1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider <i>who</i> should negotiate (Raiffa, 1982) • Consider whether roles should be assigned to negotiators on your side (Raiffa, 1982) • Consider which language is appropriate, and who should supply the translators if necessary (Raiffa, 1982)

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
Persuasion	Persuasive Argument	The art of inducing the other negotiator to lower his or her aspirations through a series of logical appeals (Pruitt, 1981)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide arguments in support of your position (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996) • Frame arguments in terms of values attributed to the other party (Pruitt, 1981) • Deny the relevance of the other party's arguments (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996)
	Appearing Firm	Efforts to convince the other party you are unwilling to make concessions by appearing firm (Pruitt, 1981)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make high initial demands (Pruitt, 1981) • Make concessions slowly (Pruitt, 1981) • Decouple concessions from implications of future weakness by persuading the other party these moves are not a sample of things to come (Pruitt, 1981) • Repeat an initial offer (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996)
	Making Positional Commitments	Making an irrevocable commitment to a position, preferably close to the other party's resistance point (Walton and McKersie, 1965)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide evidence for why your lack of flexibility makes sense (e.g., provide evidence you can get a better deal through another source) (Pruitt, 1981) • Provide evidence you will incur costs by breaking your commitment (Pruitt, 1981) • Point out that other attractive agreements are available to you if no agreement is reached (Pruitt, 1981) • Tie the position to an ethical principle (e.g., you cannot be expected to accept a lesser outcome than others have previously enjoyed) (Pruitt, 1981) • Provide evidence of your accountability for your position (Pruitt, 1981)
	Imposing Time Pressure	Using time pressure to create the appearance the negotiation is likely to break down, or to heighten the perceived cost of continuing to negotiate, or to drag out the negotiation (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impose a deadline • Threaten to turn to an alternative negotiation partner (Pruitt, 1981) • Make preparations to leave the negotiation (Pruitt, 1981) • Express a need to consult with higher-ups (Pruitt, 1981)
	Making Threats	Using threats or promises to change the other party's position (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communicate an intent to punish the other party if he or she fails to concede (Pruitt, 1981) • Manifest a willingness to fulfill a threat (e.g., by acting irrationally and attaching great emotional importance to little things) (Walton

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
			& McKersie, 1965) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make overt preparations to fulfill a threat (e.g., in a management/union conflict, prepare union members for a strike vote) (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Carry out a minor threat to show you mean business (e.g., adjourn a negotiation without suggesting another meeting, and then wait for the other party to take the initiative in resuming negotiations) (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Making Promises	Attempts to persuade the other party to concede by offering a reward for doing so (Pruitt, 1981)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer to return a favor in a future negotiation (Pruitt, 1981)
Communication	Making Personal Attacks	Attempts to force the other party to concede by attacking his or her character	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attribute bad faith to the other side (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996) • Reject the other party's argument with a personal insult (Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, 1996)
	Strategic Use of Emotion	Intentionally displaying emotions such as anger, sadness, disappointment and the like to obtain concessions from the other party, or increase the rate of concessions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In distributive negotiations, use anger to imply you have high limits (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Karasawa, 2001) • Display sadness or disappointment to induce concessions (Kleef, DeDreu, and Manstead (2006) • In integrative negotiations, display happiness to induce cooperative behavior (Barry, Fulmer, & van Kleef, 2004)
	Lying or Using Deception	The transmission of information that implicitly encourages another party to make incorrect conclusions (Murnighan, 1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Misrepresent the set of outcomes that are acceptable (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2002) • Bluff, such as promising or threatening an action that you will not enact (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2002)
	Information Exchange	Requesting and sharing information as a means of establishing trust, understanding the other party's needs and preferences and retaining flexibility until the close of the negotiation (Wilson & Putnam, 1990)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Request information about the other party's position (Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh, 1996) • Request information about the value of an issue (Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh, 1996) • Provide information about the value of an issue (Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh, 1996) • Introduce a new topic for discussion (Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh, 1996)

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
	Appealing to Interests	Once another party's full range of interests is known, using that information, and information about your own interests, to achieve an integrative solution (Fisher & Ury, 1981)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propose “win-win” solutions in which you satisfy as many of your own interests as possible while simultaneously satisfying as many of the other party's interests as possible (Fisher & Ury, 1981) • Discuss how your proposal satisfies the other party's interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981)
	Focusing the Discussion on Interests	Focus the discussion in interests, not positions (Fisher & Ury, 1981)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indicate your own interests in the situation, including all obvious and non-obvious interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981) • Inquire what the other party's interests are in the situation (Fisher & Ury, 1981) • Draw inferences about interests from the other party's behavior outside the negotiation situation (Pruitt, 1981)
Ingratiation	Influencing Perceptions of Commonality of Likes and Dislikes	Attempts to influence the perceptions of the other party so that he or she perceives both parties have common preferences (either likes or dislikes) for goals, behavior, third parties, or the like (Walton & McKersie, 1965)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discuss a favorite topic, such as baseball, or fishing (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Use language the other negotiator is accustomed to and reasoning that he or she trusts (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Influencing Perceptions of Commonality of Experiences	Attempting to influence the perceptions of the other party so that he or she perceives both parties have common associations, such as problems, or experiences (Walton & McKersie, 1965)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage the other to engage in role reversal (Pruitt, 1981) • Discuss a mutual dislike of an outsider to the negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Define the problem facing each party as a common one (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Discuss a experience you know the other negotiator has experienced (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Emphasize that both parties share a common fate in the negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
	Influencing Perceptions of How You Can Benefit the Other Party	Attempting to influence the perceptions of the other party so that he or she perceives you are associated with some object that benefits him or her (Walton & McKersie, 1965)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Express appreciation for what the other party has done so far (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Express a degree of dependency on the good will of the other party (Walton & McKersie, 1965)

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
	Influencing Perceptions of How You will Not Hurt Other Party	Attempting to influence the perceptions of the other party so that he or she perceives you are disassociated from an object which harms him or her (Walton & McKersie, 1965)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Place the blame for some matters in dispute on members of your own organization (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Dissociate yourself from bad past behavior by apologizing for it (Walton & McKersie, 1965) • Place the blame for having to take a hard line on circumstances beyond your control (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
Problem Solving	Expanding the Pie	Attempts to reach an integrative solution by increasing the available resources (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inquire if the conflict hinges on a resource shortage (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) • Explore how the critical resource shortage can be expanded (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
	Concession Exchange	A situation in which negotiators move towards one another on a single dimension or swap concessions on different dimensions in an effort to achieve an integrative agreement (Pruitt, 1983)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use information about each party's priority among interests to make concessions that are beneficial to both parties (Pruitt, 1983) • Make concessions on points of low priority to you but high priority to the other negotiator in exchange for concessions of low value to the other negotiator but of high value to you (Pruitt, 1983)
	Heuristic Trial and Error	Attempts to reach an integrative solution by systematically making offers, noting the other party's reactions to offers, and adjusting offers in response to those reactions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frequently change one's offer, and note the other party's reaction to each offer (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) • Make larger concessions on items of lower priority (Schulz & Pruitt, 1978) • Make systematic concessions, exploring various options at one level of value before proceeding to a lower level (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975)
	Nonspecific Compensation	Attempts to reach an integrative solution by exploring how the costs of one party making a concession can be addressed through repayment in some other way (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seek information about one or more realms of value to the other party (Pruitt, 1981) • Seek information about how badly the other party is hurt by making concessions (Pruitt, 1981) • Focus questions to locate a means of compensation (Pruitt, 1981)
	Logrolling	Attempts to reach an integrative solution by conceding on issues of lower priority to oneself and high priority to the other party (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ask yourself questions to determine which issues are of higher priority and lower priority to yourself • Ask the other party questions to determine his or her priority among interests (Pruitt, 1981) • Use a process of trial and error to determine priorities by systematically offering a series of possible packages, and noting which may be acceptable to the other party (Pruitt, 1981)

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
	Cost Cutting	Attempts to reach an integrative solution by identifying how one party's costs can be eliminated or reduced in exchange for agreeing to a proposed solution (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asking questions to determine which costs are posed for the other party by a proposal (Pruitt, 1981) • Asking questions to determine how the other party's costs can be mitigated or eliminated (Pruitt, 1981)
	Bridging	Attempts to reach an integrative solution by exploring how the most important interests of each party can be met (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reformulate the issues based on an analysis of each party's underlying interests • Explore ways of maintaining high-priority interests while abandoning low-priority interests
Resisting Use of Competitive Tactics	Demonstrating Resistance to Threats	Resisting the other party's use of threats to obtain concessions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Match the other party's use of threats or heavy-handed tactics to avoid image loss and deter further competitive behavior (Pruitt, 1981) • Avoid surveillance by the threatener (Pruitt, 1976, as cited in Komorita, 1977) • Arrange with third parties for protection from the threatener (Pruitt, 1976, as cited in Komorita, 1977) • Reduce dependence on the threatener so that he or she is not able to manipulate your outcomes (Pruitt, 1976, as cited in Komorita, 1977) • According so much status, attention, and affection to the threatener that he or she feels guilty about making further threats or enforcing penalties (Pruitt, 1976, as cited in Komorita, 1977)
	Resistance to Other Party's Attempts at Persuasion	Resisting the other party's attempts to persuade you to make concessions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remain silent in the face of a proposal you do not favor (Fisher & Ury, 1981) • Appear firm yourself (e.g., repeat the same phrases over and over to indicate an unwillingness to budge (Fisher & Ury, 1981) • Bring up similar situations you are aware of that increase your bargaining power (e.g., "You've offered me a starting salary of \$\$50,000, but I have a friend with the same credentials that was offered \$60,000. How Come?") (Fisher & Ury, 1981)
	Resistance to Displays of Emotion	Resisting the other party's attempts to strategically use emotion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allow the other side to let off steam (Fisher & Ury, 1981) • Acknowledge displays of emotion and make them legitimate by responding in a respectful manner (e.g., "I see you are very angry by what I have said") (Fisher & Ury, 1981)

Table 2. Procedural Knowledge Required for Mixed-Motive Negotiations (Continued)

Higher-Order Skill	Facet-Level Skill	Definition	Examples of Behavioral Enactments of Skill
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Control your own emotions, so that you do not reveal more than you care to reveal (Fisher & Ury, 1981)
	Resistance to Tricks or Ploys	Resisting the other party's use of ploys or tricks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Question tactics directly (e.g., "Is there a reason why I'm sitting in the lower chair with my back to the door?") (Fisher & Ury, 1981) Refrain from attacking the personal integrity of the other negotiator (Fisher & Ury, 1981) Discuss how the tactic makes you feel (e.g., "I've noticed you're becoming quite anxious. I don't think I can focus under such circumstances. Perhaps we can take a break to cool off.") (Fisher & Ury, 1981)
	Responding to Criticisms	Resisting the other party's use of attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If the other party criticizes your position, do not criticize their position, as this will make you seem cool and collected (Fisher & Ury, 1981) Don't defend your ideas. Instead, invite criticism and advice, by asking them what is wrong with it, and how it can be improved (e.g., "You've made it clear you won't support our Date Night fundraiser. We do need to raise money for our Spring trip, however. What would you do in our position?") (Fisher & Ury, 1981)

Negotiation Outcomes

Negotiation outcomes have been measured and conceptualized in various ways. Measures of negotiation outcomes can be grouped into two categories: economic and social (Thompson, 1990). Frequently in the negotiation literature, these outcomes have been labeled “negotiation performance.” However, as indicated earlier, we agree with the theoretical position advocated by others (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Campbell & Kuncel, 2002) that performance should be construed as the relevant set of observable, measurable behaviors enacted in a performance domain, not the outcomes of those behaviors. The reason is that, while the behaviors of an actor in a performance domain are under his or her control, the outcomes frequently are not. To take one example, consider a distributive negotiation in which there is a power differential between negotiators such that one negotiator (negotiator A) feels it must reach an agreement with the other party specifically, but the other negotiator (negotiator B) has other negotiation partners with whom it can fruitfully bargain, and may be content to not reach an agreement if the terms are not to its liking. In such a situation, although negotiator A may effectively use all relevant negotiation behaviors, and therefore “perform” well in the negotiation, he or she may still receive an economic outcome that is less than optimal.

Accordingly, we treat the economic and social outputs of a negotiation as outcomes rather than performance. In our process model of negotiation (Figure 1), these economic and social-psychological outcomes are called *proximal outcomes*. In this section, we will discuss both economic and social-psychological outcomes, starting with the former. We will conclude with a brief discussion of how the proximal outcomes may affect equally important, but more distal outcomes, such as the willingness to uphold the terms of a negotiated settlement, the desire to negotiate in the future, or future negotiation success.

Economic Measures

Economic outcome measures are based on normative models of negotiation behavior that specify how fully-informed, rational individuals *should* behave in competitive situations (Morgenstern & von Neumann, 1947). Pioneered primarily by economists and game theorists (Cross, 1965; Harsanyi, 1956; Nash, 1950), economic measures have their genesis in the axioms of individual utility derived from Bayesian Decision Theory (Morgenstern & von Neumann, 1947; deGroot, 1970). Early game theorists devised mathematical models of how resources ought to be allocated in fixed sum negotiations. For instance, Nash provides a mathematical treatment of a purely distributive bargaining context in which each negotiator’s interests are diametrically opposed. He argues that fully-informed, rational negotiators with equal power will always reach a ‘fair’ division of resources at the optimal ‘solution point’ at which utility gains are equal for both partners. In a subsequent mathematical model, Nash (1953) describes that solution point in distributive situations where interests are not completely opposed.

Normative models of negotiation behavior resulted in the creation of five key economic outcome measures: 1) mutual agreement, 2) bargaining surplus, 3) joint gain, 4) pareto optimality, and 5) inferiority of the outcome. According to economic bargaining models, negotiators should reach a mutual agreement if the alternative is worse than what they could have achieved through agreement with the other party. The utility of a mutual agreement is

determined by the zone of agreement defined by negotiators' reservation prices (Raiffa, 1982). As mentioned earlier, a reservation price is the minimum price that a negotiator will settle for; it is the point at which the negotiator can achieve greater or equal utility by engaging in another course of action (e.g., such as dealing with another party, or maintaining the status quo). Bargaining zones may be positive or negative (Walton & McKersie, 1965). A positive bargaining zone exists if negotiator's reservation prices overlap; a negative bargaining zone exists if negotiators' reservation prices do not overlap. When a positive bargaining zone exists, both negotiators gain from mutual agreement; when a negative bargaining zone exists, negotiators do not profit from mutual agreement.

Even when their interests overlap, rational negotiators may sometimes not come to an agreement, or reach impasse. Moreover, even if they do come to an agreement, they may achieve a "lose-lose" agreement that is less optimal than what both parties specifically desire. It appears that the frequency of impasse or lose-lose agreements is greater than had previously been thought (Tripp & Sondak, 1992; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). As Tripp and Sondak (1992) point out, impasse rates must be carefully recorded and treated in the analysis as differences in impasse rates across conditions may bias other measures of negotiator outcomes. For instance, assigning dyads who failed to reach agreement a score of zero may introduce heterogeneity of variance into the analysis of outcomes, while deleting data may introduce a selection bias into the analysis of dependent variables.

The bargaining surplus is the difference between one's reservation price and the final settlement. The bargaining surplus is most relevant as a measure of performance in purely distributive contexts. In such contexts, it is easy to determine whether one party achieved better outcomes; one need simply compare the values, or expected utilities, achieved. However, when negotiators' interests are not purely competitive, negotiation involves not just dividing resources but identifying additional value, benefits, and resources. Between any two alternatives, one can be said to be more 'integrative' than the other if it provides greater 'joint benefit'. Joint benefit includes joint profit, pareto optimality, and inferiority of the outcome.

Joint profit is the sum of the group members' gains. Because it is easy to calculate and does not rely on any economic theories beyond 'more is better,' joint profit is the most popular measure of economic benefit (Tripp & Sondak, 1992). A related outcome measure in integrative contexts is pareto optimality. According to economic theories of negotiation behavior, negotiators should reach agreements that are 'pareto optimal' (e.g., ones from which no additional joint gains are possible). When negotiators reach pareto optimal agreements, no agreement is possible that would be preferred by both negotiators or would be preferred by one and to which the other would be indifferent. The Nash bargaining solution can be identified by finding the unique agreement that maximizes the product of the two negotiators' profits over the no-agreement alternative (Nash, 1950).

Interestingly, there are frequently many solutions that are pareto optimal. The set of pareto optimal solutions is the pareto frontier (Raiffa, 1982). Pareto efficiency is the extent to which the agreement approaches that frontier. An agreement is pareto superior if both parties would prefer that solution, or at least one would prefer the first solution and the other is

indifferent to it. A pareto inferior agreement would make both parties worse off, or at least one party worse off and the other indifferent.

Although joint profit is the most commonly used economic measure, it has been criticized because it confounds distributive choice with rational norms, such that in many cases it seems to advise acting against individual interests in favor of maximizing joint gain. For instance, when the goal of negotiators is to maximize joint profit, action that is normatively optimal may be suboptimal for any one person, and therefore economically irrational (Clyman, 1995). Moreover, some authors argue that using measures of joint profit and pareto efficiency can lead to different conclusions, and that no measure of joint performance exists that resolves the criticism. Clyman (1995) purports to show that for every measure of joint performance created, a negotiation setting always exists where use of that measure implies that negotiators should sometimes act against their self-interest for the sake of the measure.

Finally, the inferiority index identifies the number of agreements that are superior to the one chosen by the group (Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993).

Social-Psychological Measures

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in investigating some of the more subjective outcomes of negotiations, rather than purely economic outcomes. One reason for this shift in emphasis is the difficulty in evaluating economic outcomes. Although economic measures of negotiation outcomes are clearly relevant, parties often do not have the requisite information or ability to perform a full, accurate, rational analysis of their negotiation outcomes (Curhan, Elfffenbein, & Xu, 2006).

For this reason, individuals may have perceptions of negotiation outcomes that differ appreciably from the economic realities. Importantly, these perceptions may have negotiation-related effects that are independent of the economic measures. First, perceptions of an opponent or the process of a negotiation may influence the desirability of negotiating with another party in the future (Greenhalgh & Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Messick, 1995). Second, the subjective value resulting from a negotiation may feedback, positively or negatively, into future economic outcomes. Those who increase the subjective value of their counterparts may be able to reap the benefits of more favorable reputations (Croson & Glick, 2001; Fortgang et al., 2003; Goates, Barry, & Friedman, 2003). Finally, many of these subjective measures are more important to the negotiators themselves than the actual economic result. For instance, negotiators may place concerns for respect during the process above the economic outcome (Tyler & Blader, 2003).

In a comprehensive review, Thompson (1990) described three key social-psychological measures of negotiation outcomes: 1) negotiators' perceptions of the bargaining situation, 2) negotiators' perceptions of the bargaining opponent, and 3) negotiators' perception of themselves. In contrast to economic measures of negotiation performance, which focus on the outcomes of negotiations but do not specify the processes or methods to achieve those outcomes, social-psychological measures focus on both the processes and the outcomes of a negotiation. Unfortunately, negotiation theorists have not yet agreed on the methods and standards for measuring subjective outcomes (Kurtzberg & Medvec, 1999; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995).

As a result, measures of these subjective outcomes abound, making comparisons of results problematic (Thompson, 1990).

Perceptions of the bargaining situation involve the judgments people make about the bargaining process. Such perceptions may include judgments about norms for appropriate behavior, communication and information sharing, bargaining structure, and fairness and justice (Schelling, 1960; Thibault & Walker, 1975; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001, Pinkley, 1990). Individuals' perceptions of the bargaining situation may be influenced by their implicit theories and scripts for bargaining.

Recently, Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu (2006) expanded this first category by focusing on the negotiator's feelings about the final terms of the settlement. Many commentators have argued that this is an extremely important outcome in negotiations, as it has direct implications for a negotiator's willingness to continue the relationship with one's counterpart. Using a combination of inductive and deductive methods, Curhan et al. (2006) set out to investigate the question: "What do people value when they negotiate?" Results indicated there are four broad factors of subjective value, including feelings about the instrumental outcome, the Self, the negotiation process, and the relationship.

Perceptions of the other party include judgments about the other party, as well as judgments of a negotiator's relationships with the other party. As such, these perceptions include liking and attraction, judgments about trustworthiness and fairness, as well as trait inferences about intelligence, sociability, expertise, skill, ability, cooperativeness, and competitiveness (Thompson, 1990; Fortgang, Lax, & Sibenius, 2003; Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999; Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). These perceptions also include trust, concern for the other party, and willingness to bargain with the other person in the future.

Perceptions of the self include many dimensions relevant to the opponent, including skill, cooperativeness, fairness, and the like. It also includes perceptions of self-efficacy and self-esteem. Self-efficacy, in particular, can influence future negotiation performance (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993).

In sum, the negotiation literature discloses a wide range of outcomes of potential interest to negotiators in mixed-motive settings. These outcomes range from purely economic indicators of negotiation success, including mutual agreement, bargaining surplus, joint gain, pareto optimality, and inferiority of the outcome, to a very broad array of perceptual variables, including negotiator's perceptions of the bargaining situation, the bargaining opponent, and themselves. This review also indicates the important effect that the social-psychological outcomes, in particular, may have on (1) whether an agreement is negotiated at all, and (2) more distal outcomes, such as the willingness to uphold the terms of a negotiated settlement, desire to negotiate with the same partner in the future, and future negotiation success. Based on this literature, our model hypothesizes that poor subjective feelings about the bargaining process, bargaining partner, or oneself as a bargainer may influence whether an agreement is reached, and the nature and duration of future negotiation relationships with that partner. Although little research has substantiated the link between poor economic outcomes and the context for future negotiations, we hypothesize on rational grounds that poor economic outcomes will also have a

negative effect on the distal outcomes in our model. What is unclear at this stage is whether a good economic outcome can “offset” a set of negative feelings on the social-psychological measures, or vice versa. Future research should investigate the relative influence of these two proximal outcomes on the set of distal outcomes in the negotiation process model.

This completes our review of the negotiation process, negotiation performance, and negotiation outcomes. This review has provided insight into several aspects of the negotiation model in Figure 1, including the proximal and distal outcomes, negotiation performance, and proximal determinants such as negotiation knowledge and skill. At this point, we turn to an examination of the distal determinants section of the model, beginning with the person variables, which are individual difference antecedents of the model.

Individual Difference Antecedents of Negotiation

The factors that impact negotiation success are both distal and proximal in nature. In the last section, we discussed the effect of two proximal factors on the negotiation process and negotiation performance (i.e., declarative and procedural knowledge). In this section, we discuss the effect certain “person” variables have on these aspects of a negotiation. As illustrated in Figure 1, the person variables include such things as cognitive ability, personality, internal motives, and demographic variables. Because (a) the predictors described in this section are less amenable to change compared to other antecedents, and (b) a primary goal of this report is to recommend training interventions that will improve Soldier negotiating performance, the influence of these person variables on negotiation processes and negotiation performance will be addressed, but not explored to the same extent as other factors - in particular the psychological processes discussed in the next section. We will reserve our discussion of motivational factors for the next section, and focus here on cognitive ability, demographic factors, and personality as key individual difference distal antecedents of negotiation.

Cognitive Ability

Cognitive ability is a significant predictor of performance in many domains (Hunter, 1986). Citing research showing positive relationships between cognitive ability and job performance and cognitive ability and problem solving, Barry and Friedman (1998) suggest that cognitive ability is a potentially relevant predictor of performance in negotiations because of the information-processing requirements associated with negotiating. Furthermore, cognitive ability may be a stronger predictor of performance in negotiations that are structurally complex because of the amount of information that has to be acquired and interpreted in such situations (Fulmer & Barry, 2004).

Initial empirical research examining cognitive ability and negotiation type suggests that cognitive ability has a significant positive effect on joint gain and utility of the agreement reached in an integrative negotiation, but no significant effect on gains achieved in a distributive negotiation (Barry & Friedman, 1998). However, in this research the integrative negotiation scenario was more complex than the distributive negotiation scenario, which does not allow for a clear interpretation of the results. While integrative negotiations may typically be more complex than distributive negotiations, it could be that regardless of the type of negotiation scenario, individuals with greater cognitive ability perform better than those with less cognitive ability in complex negotiations due to information processing demands. Consistent with this hypothesis, Cullen, Muros, Rasch, & Sackett (2009) recently found that cognitive ability, as measured by ACT scores, was strongly correlated with both short- and long-term negotiation-related declarative knowledge acquisition and retention and procedural knowledge acquisition and transfer. These results mesh more generally with the training literature indicating a strong positive correlation between cognitive ability and training outcomes (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Levine, Spector, Menon, Narayana & Cannon-Bowers, 1996).

There is relatively little empirical research on the impact of other cognitive variables on negotiation success. Theorists have suggested that cognitive complexity may influence performance in a negotiation given that individuals with greater cognitive complexity are able to

consider a greater number of alternative conceptions of a situation, and integrate a greater amount of information into their understanding of a situation (Pruitt & Lewis, 1977). This ability may prove useful in a negotiation in which one is trying to interpret the other party's priorities and identify alternatives that will result in a positive outcome for oneself or both parties. While there is theoretical support for this relationship, the one empirical study examining cognitive complexity in negotiations found no support for a relationship between cognitive complexity and negotiation success in a highly complex, context-specific negotiation situation (Santmire et al., 1998). Nevertheless, given the interest in examining cognitive processes in negotiation settings (e.g., biases, information processing demands), additional research examining cognitive variables that may have a direct influence or moderate the influence of other skills on negotiation performance would be valuable.

Our process model of negotiation recognizes the effect of cognitive ability on negotiation performance. Formally, it conceptualizes it as an indirect determinant of performance. Consistent with the training literature, cognitive ability is hypothesized to enhance declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition, both of which affect negotiation performance.

Demographics

Relatively little research has examined the influence of demographic variables on negotiations. This is due, in part, to arguments that using characteristics such as gender to predict performance in negotiation is an atheoretical approach (Kray & Babcock, 2004). However, demographic variables such as gender, age, and race are relevant in a negotiation setting because they are salient characteristics that can impact perceptions and behavior. The effect can be at a general level in terms of emphasizing a lack of similarity among parties and adding to perceived differences or, more specifically, stereotypes can impact the strategy a negotiator chooses.

When salient differences among negotiating parties emphasize a lack of similarity, the difficulty of overcoming certain barriers to effective communication or collaboration may be magnified. Research indicates that when individuals perceive they are different, trust is lower and motivation to work together is diminished (Wu & Laws, 2003). Negotiation research examining this issue indicates that salient differences contribute to perceived differences in attitudes and liking of the other party. This, in turn, contributes to a lack of concern for the other parties' outcomes and results in less collaborative behavior by the negotiator (Gregory, 1995). Awareness of this phenomenon and the ability to recognize and facilitate patterns of behavior and types of interactions between negotiators that build trust or highlight perceived similarities between the negotiators may help mitigate the negative consequences that sometimes occur with perceptions of salient differences. Minimizing perceptions of dissimilarity among parties may encourage the negotiators to focus on substantive issues.

In addition to highlighting dissimilarity among parties, demographics may affect negotiations because of expectations and assumptions made about how certain individuals typically perform in a negotiation setting. Meta-analyses examining gender differences in negotiation find that men typically achieve better negotiation outcomes than women (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Stereotype threat is one possible explanation for this difference. Characteristics associated with being successful in a negotiation are typically seen as more

masculine than feminine. In mixed-gender negotiation situations that participants consider to be diagnostic of their negotiation skills, women perform worse than men, especially when the gender stereotype is implicitly activated (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). Stereotype threat operates by inducing concern about confirming the stereotype, which can take away from one's focus on the task or diminish expectations for how one will perform. Indeed, studies confirm that when a negative stereotype is activated, women go into a negotiation with lower expectations and this results in women providing a lower opening offer (Kray et al., 2001). Such stereotypes and negative consequences can be mitigated by providing women with information about how their skills are beneficial prior to entering a negotiation (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002).

Together, these studies suggest that demographic variables can influence negotiators' perceptions and behaviors in a way that shifts one's focus from the substantive issues in a negotiation. Within the negotiation process model, this fact is captured by the arrow linking the person variables to the psychological processes. Research that has explored ways of mitigating this effect suggests that priming negotiators to think differently about themselves (Kray et al., 2002) or building awareness of how perceptions affect behaviors in a negotiation setting may reduce the impact of the psychological processes underlying perceptions of salient differences. We will explore these psychological processes further in the following section.

Personality

Research on personality variables as predictors of negotiation performance has produced inconsistent findings (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Barry and Friedman (1998) suggest that extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness are the three major facets of personality that are most relevant in a negotiation context. Extraversion is associated with gregariousness and a tendency to engage others. This could be a liability in a distributive negotiation if the individual shares too much information with the other party, but beneficial in an integrative negotiation. Agreeableness is associated with cooperation and generosity – two attributes that may backfire in a distributive negotiation but lead to joint gain in an integrative context. Conscientiousness is associated with being organized, task focused, and planning ahead (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Although it is reasonable to theorize that conscientious characteristics such as planning would be advantageous in a negotiation, whether it is distributive or integrative, this relationship has not been supported in empirical studies.

Barry and Friedman (1998) argue that individuals who are high on extraversion and agreeableness exhibit tendencies toward engaging others and feeling concern for others, making it more likely that these individuals will make concessions during a negotiation. These characteristics may also influence the biases different parties exhibit during a negotiation. An initial offer can bias the other party's assessment of what values should be placed on the negotiation table. The initial offer 'anchors' the perception and the other party is less likely to make a counteroffer that greatly varies from the initial value (Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004). A party's susceptibility to anchoring may depend on their level of concern for the other party (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Therefore, individuals who are high on extraversion and agreeableness may engage in this bias and start the negotiation with a less demanding counteroffer in addition to making more concessions throughout the negotiation. Empirical research supports this hypothesis. Individuals who are high on extraversion and those who are

high on agreeableness are more susceptible to anchoring, and lower gains are achieved during a distributive negotiation when a single issue is at stake (Barry & Friedman, 1998). However, extraversion and agreeableness do not appear to result in joint gain during integrative negotiations.

Based on their findings, Barry and Friedman (1998) suggest that perhaps personality alone is not enough to bring about the problem solving required to find integrative solutions. Other studies examining personality have found no effect or weak effects of personality on negotiation performance, leading reviewers of the research to conclude that personality variables do not have a clear impact on negotiations (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Thompson, 1990). Some theorists suggest, however, that the equivocal findings from research on the Big Five personality factors may indicate a need to examine more specific facets of personality in negotiation settings (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008) or to explore links between personality factors and specific cognitive interpretations that affect behavior in negotiation settings (Ma, 2008).

Amanatullah et al. (2008) considered specific facets of personality that may impact negotiations. They point out that agreeableness has several facets that may counteract each other in a negotiation setting. While the altruistic aspect of agreeableness may have a negative effect on achieving one's goals in a negotiation, the perspective-taking aspect of agreeableness may lead to better performance. Therefore, exploring specific facets may illuminate whether aspects of personality have a direct impact on negotiation processes and outcomes.

As an initial step, Amanatullah et al. (2008) explored the effects of Unmitigated Communion (UC), a facet of agreeableness, on negotiation performance. UC is a personality construct involving high anxiety about one's relationship with others and a low concern for the self. It was hypothesized that this personality characteristic would be detrimental to negotiation success because individuals high on this trait may be overly accommodating in a negotiation setting. Results indicated that in a distributive negotiation, individuals high on UC achieve lower outcomes and that this effect is due to the fact that they set lower reservation points before going into a negotiation. In integrative negotiations, dyads in which both individuals were high on UC created less joint gain but relational satisfaction was higher. These findings suggest that individuals high on UC exhibit greater concern for the relationship between the two parties than achieving economic gains in a negotiation.

Theoretical work on the effect personality variables may have on cognitive interpretations and negotiation processes suggests that cognitive frames such as a win-lose orientation, face-saving, and willingness to trust may be impacted by personality (Ma, 2008). For example, individuals high on neuroticism may exhibit a tendency to operate with a concern for face-saving in a negotiation. In addition, individuals high on extraversion may show a greater concern for face-saving because of the positive value they attach to social interaction. Individuals high on agreeableness may exhibit a greater tendency to develop trust in a negotiation while those who are high on openness may have less of a win-lose orientation in a negotiation. These propositions suggest a need for more empirical research into personality and its effects on negotiators' thoughts and behavior that may result in positive or negative outcomes.

Historically, personality has been considered an ambiguous or weak influence on negotiation processes and outcomes. The recent research presented here suggests that more specific links between personality and negotiation behaviors may reveal clearer relationships. While some empirical research examining specific facets of personality exists, more research is needed to delineate effects of other facets and to explore links among personality variables and cognitive aspects of negotiations.

Based on the limited empirical research regarding the relationship between personality and negotiation processes, performance and outcomes, we hypothesize that personality variables could impact negotiations through at least two avenues. First, we hypothesize that many personality variables directly influence the acquisition of negotiation declarative and procedural knowledge. Three meta-analyses indicate that most, if not all, of the Big Five personality factors are valid predictors of training outcomes (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp and McCloy, 1990; Salgado, 1997). Second, we hypothesize that various personality traits may impact certain psychological processes, such as concern for the other party, anchoring biases, or biases regarding the intentions of the other party. These hypotheses are captured in the negotiation process model by the arrows linking person variables to declarative and procedural knowledge, and to the psychological processes. Although the empirical literature suggests a number of direct links are possible between personality variables and negotiation performance, research into these linkages is in its infancy. Accordingly, we do not hypothesize a direct link between personality and negotiation performance.

Psychological Influences on Negotiation

Prior to the 1980s, the focus of negotiation research was primarily on the bargaining process, with an emphasis on the study of moves and countermoves, as well as aspirations and goals (Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004). The question of whether and how psychological processes influence behavior did not become a focal concern until sometime into the maturity of the field. A chapter published by Bazerman and Neale (1983) on the subject of cognitive heuristics in negotiation, however, signaled what Thompson et al. (2004) call a “new era of negotiation research” (p. 7). As a result, the last 25 years has witnessed a wealth of research on negotiation that explores how psychological processes influence the quality of agreements that people reach. These influences include not only those of a cognitive nature, but also those relating to social perceptual, attributional, motivational, and affective processes.

This ‘new era’ of negotiation research can be divided into three major stages (Thompson et al., 2004). Each represents a departure from the assumptions of behavioral economics and game theory, which were introduced above in the report section on the basic structure of the negotiation. Thompson and colleagues highlight the cognitive era as the first foray into psychological influences on negotiation. This was closely followed, if not pre-dated in some respects, by the study of social perception and attribution. The next stage was exemplified by an intense interest in the negotiator as a social actor, one with clear motives, drives, and goals. Most recently, the negotiator has been cast as not only driven, but also emotional as well as subject to the emotions of others. In combination, these psychological influences affect how people search for and process information to make sense of their situation and the counterpart(s) with whom they are negotiating. As such, these processes are critical to achieving integrative, or mutually beneficial, negotiation agreements.

The next three sections of this review take each of the major sets of psychological influences in turn: cognitive, motivational, and emotional. This is roughly the order in which negotiation researchers adopted these various perspectives. We review the current state of knowledge about each, and survey key research findings and implications for training in relation to negotiation performance.

Cognition

The cognitive perspective has focused primarily on the types of biases and effects associated with negotiators’ use of heuristics. Several cognitive biases have been examined in relation to negotiation. This, in part, reflects the course taken by research into the psychological influences on negotiation, beginning first with an interest in cognition before expanding to also consider motivation and emotion. Thompson et al. (2004) note that the research literature on cognitive biases in negotiation has its foundation in findings related to individual information processing. These have been extended to include social perception and attribution processes which are important to the interdependent interaction that lies at the very core of negotiation.

Table 3 lists the primary cognitive biases, and further divides them into two major categories: (1) decision-making biases, and (2) social perception biases. The former reflect an individualistic approach to judgment and decision-making and, as such, represent an

intrapersonal perspective on cognitive influences. This represents possibly one of the most pervasive theoretical lenses for the study of negotiation behavior. However, negotiation is not a solo endeavor, but rather it is inherently socially interdependent. The study of social perception biases highlights that negotiation processes are subject to potentially flawed attributions and perceptions made about oneself and others, both of which fundamentally shape how negotiations unfold. These biases are *interpersonal* in nature. Thompson et al. (2004) define self-perception biases as beliefs and judgments about oneself or one's behavior that deviate from what an objective observer would report. Other-perception biases are beliefs and judgments made about another party that also deviate from those made by an objective observer. Of key importance is that both sets of biases (self and other) are inherently interpersonal and have their roots in the perception of social entities and social situations. In other words, the nature of social perception biases is that they are centered on the perception of social objects, events, and people.

Table 3. Cognition-Based Psychological Processes Relevant to Negotiation		
Psychological Process	Definition	Example Biases/Effects
Decision-Making	In order to make sense of situational ambiguity, negotiators rely on decision-making heuristics that provide simplified views of the negotiation. Reliance on heuristics often speeds up efficient decision-making, but it also undermines the quality of the negotiated agreement.	Framing
		Anchoring
		Availability
		Representativeness
		Optimistic Overconfidence
Social Perception	In order to make sense of situational ambiguity, negotiators assume that others, including their counterpart, view and think like them. This tendency, compounded by social perception heuristics, leads them to make erroneous assumptions about counterparts and fail to have insight into their own preferences.	False Consensus effect
		Fixed-Pie Perception
		Fundamental Attribution Error
		Coercion Bias
		Confirmatory Information Search
		Knowledge of Other Party; Ignoring Cognitions of Others
		Reactive Devaluation
		Increased Valuation of Own Offers
		Perspective Taking

A consistent observation in negotiation research is that negotiator judgment systematically falls short of rationality. Research into cognitive biases exemplifies and helps to explain these departures from the assumptions of behavioral economics. Most negotiations, even relatively simple ones, are cognitively taxing. This leaves negotiators open to mental shortcuts that enable them to quickly and efficiently make sense of the situation. Known as *cognitive heuristics*, these shortcuts can be thought of as simplifying strategies. They are useful in the

context of complexity and ambiguity because they speed up the efficient processing of information, which leads to quick perceptions and decisions. But they also have the potential to undermine the quality of the negotiated agreement by leading to faulty information processing (Bazerman, 2005; Bazerman & Chugh, 2006). Further, heuristics not only lead negotiators to make quick but erroneous assumptions about their counterparts and the situation at hand, but also to lack true insight into their own preferences (Neale & Fragale, 2006). As a whole, cognitive heuristics represent barriers to optimal information-processing. These barriers get in the way of constructive negotiation and prevent people from reaching mutually beneficial, integrative agreements (Neale & Fragale, 2006).

Decision-making biases. We begin first by discussing examples of decision-making biases, followed by a discussion of social perception biases. Table 3 shows five examples of the former, all of which have been examined extensively in the context of negotiation: (1) anchoring, (2) framing, (3) availability, (4) representativeness, and (5) optimistic overconfidence. We will explain each in turn, highlighting key research findings from the empirical literature.

Kahneman and Tversky (1973) identified three types of heuristics that people use to make sense of their complex, ambiguous environments: (1) anchoring, (2) availability, and (3) representativeness. All three have garnered significant attention in negotiation research. We begin first with anchoring, which is the tendency to rely too heavily on an arbitrarily chosen reference point. A negotiator may give too much weight to an initial piece of information (e.g., starting offer) and, given the initial anchor, will fail to adjust his or her assessment of value. (Thompson et al., 2004). De Dreu et al. (2007) note that anchoring leads to inadequately high or low aspirations, which can deadlock or forego personal or joint gain. Anchoring and adjustment effects have been replicated across several studies, all of which highlight how negotiators tend to be inappropriately affected by anchors in negotiation (Kahneman, 1992; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Ritov, 1996; Thompson, 1995). This applies equally well to negotiation between large groups because groups tend to adopt either majority rule or consensus rule (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997).

Framing is related to anchoring and it occurs when people simplify a negotiation by coding (1) prospective outcomes above a reference point as *gains* and (2) outcomes below that anchor as *losses* (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Depending on the anchor (e.g., aspiration goal vs. no-settlement outcome), the same negotiation concession can be seen as an increase in one's losses or a decrease in one's gains. A framing 'effect' refers to the observation that people typically prefer guaranteed gains rather than gambling for equal or greater expected value. In contrast, when people think about losses, they prefer a gamble rather than a certain outcome of something of equal or greater expected value (Thompson et al., 2004). As De Dreu et al. (2007) explain, because the negative utility of losses exceeds the positive utility of gains, 'loss framing' in particular increases resistance to concession making (Pruitt, 1998), produces smaller concessions (De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1994), and increases the likelihood of an impasse (Bottom, 1998; Kristensen & Garling, 1997). On the other hand, Neale and Bazerman (1985) found that positively framed negotiators (i.e., payoff schedule indicated payoffs) adopted less risky bargaining strategies, and preferred an agreement to holding out for a better, more uncertain settlement. Therefore, while a positive frame contributes to more successful performances over the short run, these negotiators are more likely to agree to less

favorable terms than those with a negative frame. Thompson et al. (2004) cite research which suggests that if negotiators have different frames, the one with the negative frame may gain a greater share of the available surplus (see Bottom & Studt, 1993).

The availability bias refers to the tendency to rely too heavily on information that is salient in memory. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that the availability of past and present information affects how negotiators evaluate their alternatives. Moreover, all information relevant to a particular negotiation is rarely recalled in an equivalent manner. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1986) found that concrete information is more likely to affect decision-making during negotiations. Similarly, Borgida and Nisbett (1977) reported that not only concrete, but vivid and emotionally rich information is more likely to impact a negotiator's thinking, compared to abstract, pallid, and emotionally poor information. Also, negotiators for whom negotiating costs are highly salient have been found to behave in a less concessionary manner (Neale, 1984). Research suggests, therefore, that information saliency has the potential to influence the process and outcomes of a negotiation.

The representativeness bias refers to the tendency to make judgments based on the most obvious features of a stimulus (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In the context of negotiation, this bias often manifests itself as stereotypes, which help people to predict and interpret a counterpart's behavior (e.g., cooperative or competitive). For example, De Dreu, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1995) showed that information about a partner's group membership was used by participants in their study to decide whether to engage in cooperative behavior. Specifically, participants made less cooperative choices with partners from groups comprised of business majors than from groups comprised of religion majors. The former were stereotypically viewed as more opportunistic and competitive, while the latter were viewed as more moral and cooperative.

The final decision-making bias, optimistic overconfidence, refers to people's unfounded confidence in their judgment of their own abilities. Specifically, people incorrectly judge positive events to be more likely than negative events, resulting in inaccurate judgments that do not reflect reality (Thompson et al., 2004). Examples of such overconfidence have been observed in final offer arbitration. In this situation, negotiators have been found to both consistently overestimate the chances that an arbitrator will side with their case, as well as the chances that their side's final offer will be accepted (Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 1983). This effect can lead negotiators to forego attempts at settlement since overconfident negotiators are less concessionary and reach fewer agreements than more realistically confident negotiators (Neale & Bazerman, 1985).

In sum, relying on cognitive decision-making heuristics such as the ones discussed above is a natural response to sense-making in complex and uncertain situations. These heuristics are helpful in providing simplified views of a negotiation by speeding up decision-making and increasing the efficiency of the negotiation process overall. However, as underscored by the research findings cited above, this efficiency can significantly undermine the quality of the negotiated agreement (De Dreu et al., 2007). In terms of the negotiation process model in Figure 1, the studies indicate that the cognitive biases have a direct impact on information processing mechanisms. As we have seen, these cognitive biases may cause negotiators to give too much

weight to information, simplify a negotiation situation, give too much weight to situations that are salient in memory, or induce stereotypes. These changes in how information is processed subsequently affect negotiation performance. For example, resistance to concession making or the riskiness of the bargaining strategies chosen may be affected. These linkages between psychological processes and information processing on the one hand, and information processing and negotiation performance, on the other hand, are traced in Figure 1.

Social perception biases. Similar conclusions to those drawn for decision-making biases are warranted for related research examining social perception biases. This work, which has its basis in findings from social cognition theory and research, further exemplifies how negotiator judgment falls short of rationality in systematic ways. Table 3 shows eight examples of the types of social perception biases that have been examined in the context of negotiation: (1) false consensus, (2) fixed-pie perception, (3) reactive devaluation, (4) increased valuation of own offers, (5) confirmatory search, (6) fundamental attribution error, (7) coercion bias, and (8) perspective taking. As was the case in the discussion of decision-making biases, we will explain each in turn, highlighting key research findings from the empirical literature.

Neale and Fragale (2006) discuss several of these biases in terms of how preference uncertainty can lead to inaccurate social perceptions. Preference uncertainty refers not only to the understandable lack of insight a negotiator has about a counterpart's preferences, but also to the uncertainty they may have about even their own preferences. Examples of biases relating to the former kind of uncertainty (other preference) include false consensus, fixed-pie perception, confirmatory search, reactive devaluation, and fundamental attribution error. We will discuss these first, followed by one bias resulting from own preference uncertainty (increased valuation of own offers), and conclude with a discussion of the remaining two biases (coercion bias and perspective taking).

De Dreu et al. (2007) refer to effects associated with uncertainty about counterparts' preferences as demonstrating the *naïve realism principle*. This principle summarizes negotiators' tendencies to assume that their counterpart views the world and thinks about it as they do. This heuristic can simplify an otherwise complex state of affairs (i.e., not truly having insight into others' perspectives on the world), but it also can lead to inadequate assumptions and inaccurate conclusions about specific negotiation situations. In particular, biases associated with the naïve realism principle promote distributive behaviors such as contending, as well as diminish problem-solving abilities. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the false consensus effect, wherein individuals assume that their own preferences and opinions are widely shared by others (see Marks & Miller, 1987, for a review). As Neale and Fragale (2006) point out, this assumption is not necessarily incorrect, but more often than not it leads negotiators to make erroneous assumptions (Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984). Lacking real information about others' preferences and behaviors, negotiators fill in the gaps by assuming that a counterpart cares about the same issues as they do.

Naïve realism manifests itself most notably in the fixed-pie bias (De Dreu et al., 2007; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Incorrect assumptions due to a reliance on own preferences as a cue to others' preferences (i.e., the false consensus effect) lead to a further and equally incorrect assumption that the negotiation is win-lose in nature. In other words, negotiators perceive the

size of the negotiated ‘pie’ to be fixed, which renders both sets of interests to be necessarily and diametrically opposed (Bazerman & Neale, 1983). Having made a fixed-pie assumption, negotiators tend to proceed by engaging in distributive strategies (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995). This affects the quality of outcomes negotiators are likely to obtain (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Pinkley et al. (1995) suggest that failing to identify compatible interests or opportunities to logroll may occur through two different, independent mechanisms: (1) biased information search, and (2) biased processing of available information.

A biased or confirmatory information search is what De Dreu et al. (2007) regard as yet another manifestation of naïve realism. It occurs when negotiators seek out information that confirms preexisting beliefs about a counterpart, while ignoring or failing to pay attention to information that would contradict their beliefs. Paired with the false consensus effect, and ensuing (incorrect) assumptions about a counterpart’s preferences, confirmatory information search can lead a negotiator to ask questions that confirm the accuracy of the original assumption. As such, individuals may only learn from their counterpart what they explicitly seek to find out. For example, Van Kleef and De Dreu (2002) found that negotiators with a cooperative or competitive social value orientation were more likely to ask questions, respectively, about their counterpart’s intention to cooperate or compete. Thus, according to Neale and Fragale (2006), even when negotiators make a good faith effort to learn about their counterpart’s interests and preferences, a biased information search can nevertheless result in them drawing erroneous conclusions about shared preferences. This further perpetuates fixed-pie perceptions.

The assumption that negotiators share preferences can also affect how they react to offers proposed by a counterpart during the negotiation (Neale & Fragale, 2006). Known as reactive devaluation, this bias occurs when negotiators dismiss or discount concessions made by a counterpart purely on the basis of who is offering them (Ross, 1995; Ross & Ward, 1995; Thompson et al., 2004). In other words, receptivity toward an idea or proposal decreases when it is offered by a counterpart. This is further heightened if negotiators believe the interaction is what Neale and Fragale (2006) refer to as a “zero-sum” activity in which one party’s loss represents the other’s gain. Such perceptions contribute to a proposal by a counterpart being considered a bad deal, which creates a barrier to a successful and integrative agreement.

While reactive devaluation relates to uncertainty about others’ preferences, it is also possible that negotiators are less than insightful about their own preferences. This lack of self-knowledge contributes further to the inherent uncertainty in the situation. In addition to devaluing offers made by a counterpart, negotiators also demonstrate a tendency to increase the value attributed to their own offers (Curhan, Neale, & Ross, 2004). Interestingly, research suggests this can be overcome by asking negotiators to rank their preferences for all possible outcome packages prior to the negotiation. Doing so makes negotiators less likely to ascribe greater value to the proposals they make during the negotiation (Curhan et al., 2004).

A final judgment bias that arises in relation to uncertainty about others’ preferences is the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). This bias has more to do with *why* a counterpart has a particular preference than *what* that preference actually is (as was the case with several of the aforementioned social perception biases). The fundamental attribution error has its origins in the

fact that people are deficient at understanding the situational forces that shape behavior. In the context of negotiation specifically, it is common for desires and behaviors to be largely situationally determined (Neale & Fragale, 2006). Yet negotiators tend to believe that these forces contribute substantially more to their own behavior than to that of their counterpart, which they attribute to stable personality characteristics. This tendency to regard others' behavior as driven by chronic dispositions is highly relevant to the process and outcomes of negotiations. Morris, Larrick, and Su (1999) found that negotiators incorrectly attributed tough bargaining behaviors to 'difficult' personalities rather than to situational factors. For example, haggling behavior in their study was attributed to a counterpart being uncooperative or quarrelsome, yet in reality this behavior was better predicted by factors in the situation (e.g., the value of a negotiator's alternative offer) than by aspects of their personality. Further, these dispositional attributions affected the negotiators' predicted future behaviors such that negotiators facing a supposedly 'disagreeable' counterpart were more likely to prefer that a third party handle any future disputes.

Thompson et al. (2004) note that research on differential attributions is related to the coercion bias (Rothbart & Hallman, 1988). This is the tendency for people to believe, erroneously, that coercive tactics will work better to generate concessions when applied to others than to the self. Moreover, people believe that if applied to oneself, these tactics will actually serve to reinforce their resolve not to concede. Rothbart and Hallman (1988) found that in-group and out-group members differed in the extent to which they thought the social influence strategies of coercion and conciliation would be effective. Out-group members perceived coercion to be more effective than conciliation when applied to others, while in-group members perceived coercion to be less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.

In sum, the social perception perspective on negotiator bias is based on the psychological principles of cognition, with an emphasis on attributional processes (Thompson et al., 2004). Understanding both the intrapersonal and interpersonal biases associated with cognition in negotiation goes a long way toward shedding light on the nature of faulty information processing and its impact on negotiation processes and outcomes. As was the case for the decision-making biases, the social perception biases appear to directly affect the way negotiators process information about a negotiation. For instance, these biases lead negotiators to assume their counterparts view the world the same way that they do, ignore information that fails to confirm their initial biases about the preferences of the other negotiator, and attribute the other negotiator's behavior to a difficult personality rather than situational constraints. In turn, these distortions to information processing can affect negotiation performance, such as promoting distributive behaviors, dismissing or discounting concessions made by the other party, and reducing the likelihood of using problem solving behaviors.

Although researchers have gained considerable insight into cognitive biases and how they can hamper achieving integrative outcomes, negotiators themselves are scarcely aware that these influences are at work. Indeed, most heuristics are applied effortlessly and subconsciously, which suggests it will be challenging to remedy via a training intervention their effects on information processing and strategic choice. As we will argue in the training recommendations section, however, there is considerable evidence that these biases can be overcome through a

strategy known as debiasing training. In addition, these unconscious biases may be overcome by increasing negotiator motivation to think deeply and thoroughly about the negotiation process, and their vulnerability to heuristic biases. We will further consider this avenue of thought in the next section, which examines negotiator motivation. Certainly, cognition alone does not fully account for negotiator behavior, especially in mixed-motive negotiations. What is needed, according to Thompson et al. (2004) is a “meaningful account of the goals and motivations that drive negotiators” (p. 22). As such, the study of motivational biases, building on knowledge of negotiator cognition, has added substantially to our understanding of the psychological influences on negotiation. We will turn to a discussion of these biases next.

Motivation

Motivation features prominently in negotiation research because it is difficult to imagine anyone entering into a negotiation that does not have some goal they are motivated to achieve. By their very nature, negotiations arise from a discrepancy between the current situation and a desired goal, and this motivates negotiators to engage in certain activities. Although motivation is multifaceted, in its essence it is the focused and persistent energy that drives cognition and behavior toward achieving a particular goal or goals (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu, 2004). Information processing and strategic choice, two key negotiation processes, can both be said to vary as a function of motivation (De Dreu, 2004). Because we are primarily concerned here with the psychological influences on negotiation, we will focus our discussion on how motivation affects cognition, noting implications for negotiator behavior where appropriate.

According to De Dreu (2004), motivation affects information processing in two key ways, by driving: (1) the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information, and (2) the depth of information processing. In other words, motivation affects what is attended to and recalled, as well as how deeply that information is processed. For example, if a person is motivated to save face, they are more likely to attend to aspects of the situation or recall information that supports this goal. Similarly, if someone is engaged in a high stakes negotiation, they are more likely to scrutinize information, both by searching for it as well as by analyzing it.

Research findings support these illustrations. De Dreu and Boles (1998), for example, found that social value orientation affected recall of decision heuristics that reflected either cooperation or selfishness. Negotiators motivated by pro-social values were more likely to recall heuristics such as “share and share alike,” while selfishly motivated negotiators were more likely to recall heuristics such as “never trust your neighbor.” These results are consistent with the previously cited study by Van Kleef and De Dreu (2002) in which negotiators, lacking goal information about their counterpart, engaged in a confirmatory information search based on their own social motives. Findings such as these highlight that the motivational perspective on biases provides a compelling account of the conditions under which certain cognitive processes, including the use of thoughtful information processing, will be engaged (Thompson et al., 2004). This is especially true in terms of what information negotiators search for and recall, as well as how deeply they interpret this information.

Whereas social perception biases are thought to be chronically present, motivational biases can be “turned on” with the presence of particular goals (Thompson et al., 2004).

Economic models tend to assume that negotiators are motivated by a single goal: to maximize utility. However, in reality, negotiators usually have multiple goals, some of which may be contradictory (Neale & Fragale, 2006). These goals range from those based mainly in self-interest (e.g., impressing an audience or constituency, building a reputation) to those reflective of the negotiator as a ‘social animal’ (De Dreu et al., 2007) concerned with the distribution of outcomes. Motivation has also been studied in terms of the depth with which information is sought out and processed, which can greatly impact the process and outcomes of a negotiation.

Which goal or goals one pursues is influenced by both the person and the situation. Chronic goals include dispositional preferences like social value orientation and need for closure (both discussed below). Situational goals are relatively temporary and include things like accountability prompted by salient factors in the situation. While goals and motives ultimately guide overt behavior, it is their interplay with the cognitive system that mediates behavior generation that makes them truly influential. Indeed, as Carnevale and De Dreu (2006) suggest, “how the situation is construed by the perceiver, *and how goals and motives shape this construal process* [italics added], is the central focus of much current social psychology and much of the modern social psychology of negotiation” (p. 55). Therefore, the choice of goals is important because whether they are based on chronic dispositions or a specific situation, they affect cognition, behavior, and outcomes (Neale & Fragale, 2006).

To date, a general and widely-accepted taxonomy of negotiator motives does not exist (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006). However, a review of the literature suggests at least five core motives: (1) social, (2) aspiration, (3) accountability, (4) identity, and (5) information-processing (see Table 4). Other motives have been considered, such as Carnevale and De Dreu’s (2006) initiation motivation, but the five listed here have been the focus of most of the research into negotiator motivational biases and, therefore, constitute the majority of our discussion. We will explain each in turn, highlighting key research findings from the empirical literature.

Social Motives. Of the five motives discussed here, social motives are by far the most thoroughly researched. Social motives refer to a preference for a particular distribution of outcomes (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006). Insights from research into such preferences have drawn the field to question the long held assumption that negotiators are necessarily self-interested and ignorant of others’ interests (De Dreu et al. 2007). Social motives can be dispositional, as in the case of social value orientation, or more situationally based. Examples of motives include altruism, competition, individualism, and cooperation (McClintock, 1977).

Table 4. Motivation-Based Psychological Processes Relevant to Negotiation

Psychological Process	Definition	Example Biases/Effects
Social Motives	Negotiators have or adopt preferences for a particular distribution of outcomes, such that a prosocial (<i>cooperative</i>) or a proself (<i>competitive</i>) motivation makes them more or less likely to see negotiation as a collaborative or competitive game, respectively. Prosocial/proself motivation also affects information processing.	Social Value Orientation (Cooperative, Individualistic, Competitive)
		Conflict/Cooperation Expectations
		Future Interaction Expectations
Aspiration Motives	Negotiators adopt different goals depending on what constitutes an acceptable outcome from the negotiation. They may focus on the upper bound of their outcome range (<i>aspiration price</i>) and attend to the ideal outcome, or they may focus on their lower bound (<i>reservation price</i>) and think about the minimum outcome they must obtain to reach a deal.	Promotion Focus
		Prevention Focus
Accountability	Negotiators are often accountable to their constituents, either for the outcomes they achieve or for the process of making decisions. Negotiators who are accountable to their constituents make higher demands and are less willing to compromise, whereas negotiators who are accountable for their actions are more vigilant in considering relevant information and alternatives.	Outcome Accountability
		Process Accountability
Identity Motives	Negotiators desire to maintain a particular and, usually, positive self-view. In the face of negotiation-based opposition and conflict, individuals can develop hostile and/or competitive (i.e., ego defensive) reactions to their counterpart, especially if this view is threatened.	Egocentrism and Self-Serving
		Self-Identity and Affirmation
		Impression Management
Information Processing Motives	Negotiators are more or less motivated to develop a rich and accurate understanding of their situation and therefore engage in more or less deep, systematic, and deliberate search for, and processing of, information.	Epistemic/Accuracy Motivation
		Need for Closure

A more crude distinction is often made between pro-self and pro-social motives (De Dreu, 2004; De Dreu et al., 2007). Pro-self motivation is generally selfish and involves maximizing outcomes that benefit the self. Power and personal success are central to this orientation, which is primarily concerned with competitive and individualistic goals. Pro-social motivation seeks to establish joint welfare and the equitable distribution of outcomes. As such it reflects cooperative and altruistic goals. Neale and Fragale (2006) suggest that negotiators often experience difficulty balancing between cooperation and competition. This is because personal preferences, in addition to wanting to simplify the complexity of the negotiation, lead negotiators to categorize their interactions as either primarily cooperative or competitive, and behave accordingly.

This is borne out by empirical research, which finds that social motives affect both information processing (e.g., information search and flexibility of thought) and strategic choice. We first discuss research relating social motives to cognitive processes. De Dreu & Boles (1998), mentioned above, found that social value orientation influences choice and recall of heuristics in individuals preparing for negotiation. Similarly, Van Kleef and De Dreu (2002) showed support for a confirmatory information search motivated by one's own social motives orientation. Other empirical support for the influence of motives on cognition comes from Carnevale and Probst (1998) who found that expectations of conflict can result in a 'freezing' of cognitive schemas. People expecting to enter a conflict-laden negotiation were less likely to see relationships among items presented in material prior to the negotiation. Further, they were less creative in cognitive tasks associated with this material. These results suggest that the expectation of conflict can produce rigidity of thinking and render the negotiator unable to effectively problem-solve (De Dreu, 2004). All this suggests that negotiators search, encode, and retrieve information consistent with their pro-self or pro-social motivation. De Dreu (2004) goes so far as to suggest that social motives actually moderate ego defensiveness, such that pro-self negotiators are vulnerable to motivational biases that strengthen their egocentric tendencies, while the motivational biases of pro-social negotiators make them more amenable to equality, consensus, and joint gain.

Beyond information processing, several studies have demonstrated that social motives such as social value orientation influence strategic choices and subsequent negotiator behavior. For example, studies have shown that cooperatively motivated negotiators exhibit lower levels of demand and make more conciliatory offers, are more trusting of counterparts, and perceive their counterparts to be more fair (De Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Olekalns, Smith, & Kibby, 1996).

Two theories provide the basis for many negotiation studies examining the effect of social motives on strategic choice. The first is the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1973), which makes predictions about what sort of interactions will occur between negotiating parties as a result of their different styles. In the context of this theory, De Dreu et al. (2007) describe pro-self negotiators as developing distrust, hostile attitudes, and negative interpersonal perceptions. Moreover, they tend to use threats, bluffs, and coercive power to get their way. The interactions of pro-self negotiators are more likely to be competitive in nature. In contrast, pro-social negotiators develop trust and positive attitudes/perceptions. They exchange information in a constructive manner, actively listen, and try to understand their counterpart's perspective. As such, pro-social negotiators promote cooperative interactions. Goal

interdependence is central to this theory, with positive and negative interdependence referring to the correspondence of interests and the likelihood of each party achieving its goals. Because of their cooperative orientation, pro-social negotiators are more likely to identify opportunities for trade-off and to fulfill integrative possibilities.

A second theoretical tradition corresponds to dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), which views strategic choice as the product of two elements: concern for one's own outcome, and concern for the other side's outcome. In negotiations in which concern for both self and other is high, problem solving is predicted to be the more likely strategic choice. Where concern for both self and other is low, inaction is more likely. High concern for one's own outcome and low concern for the other is predicted to lead to contending strategies. Lastly, low concern for oneself and high concern for the other is likely to result in yielding strategies. Dual concern theory further predicts differences in behavior and outcomes based on negotiators' level of resistance to yielding, which is independent of social motives. The latter represent a desired distribution of outcomes, whereas the former refers to concession making as a means of achieving such an end state. For example, a pro-social negotiator with high resistance may have considerable concern for a counterpart's outcomes, but simply cannot make any more concessions. Similarly, a pro-self negotiator with low resistance may have no regard for a counterpart's outcomes. Yet, fearing an impasse and no outcome at all, may selfishly offer another concession (De Dreu et al., 2007).

De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 28 studies to examine support for dual concern theory as well as the theory for cooperation and competition. They looked in particular at the effects of social motives (pro-social vs. pro-self) and resistance to yielding (high vs. low vs. unknown) on contending, problem-solving, and joint outcomes. Results suggested that dual concern theory makes valid predictions about negotiator behavior, such that people with pro-social motives are less contentious, engage in more problem-solving, and achieve higher joint outcomes. This was especially the case when counterpart resistance to yielding was high (or unknown).

Based on research examining social motives, information processing, and strategic choice in negotiation, De Dreu et al. (2007) propose the *social motives principle*. It is comprised of three elements and summarizes current insights about the role of social motives in negotiation. First, negotiators have or adopt either a pro-social or pro-self motivation. Second, this motivation drives confirmatory sense-making processes. As such, pro-social negotiators are more likely to view a negotiation as a collaborative game and their counterpart as trustworthy, while pro-self negotiators are more likely to see the same situation as competitive and their counterpart as untrustworthy. Lastly, this motivation leads pro-social negotiators to engage in more problem-solving when there is high resistance to concession making, and more yielding when there is low resistance.

Aspiration motives. Beyond whether to cooperate or compete, negotiators must decide on an acceptable outcome (Neale & Fragale, 2006). Aspiration motives refer to preferences for a particular outcome or level of benefit (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006). Tietz and Bartos (1983) identified more than a dozen forms of aspiration in negotiation. Most negotiators have a range of acceptable outcomes in mind, bounded by upper and lower limits. Within this range, there are likely to be different sets of goals. For example, a negotiator may focus on the upper bound of

their outcome range, which Neale and Fragale (2006) refer to as *aspiration price*. This particular focus calls attention to the ideal negotiation outcome. Alternatively, the lower bound may be the more salient target, referred to as a *reservation price*. In this case, a negotiator focuses on the minimum outcome necessary to reach an agreement. Due to the complexity of most negotiations, it is likely that negotiators will adopt only one of these two goals at a time, rather than seek to satisfy both simultaneously (Neale & Fragale, 2006).

Research indicates that negotiation outcomes are influenced by the degree to which negotiators are motivated to achieve their aspirations or beat their reservations. Galinsky, Mussweiler, and Medvec (2002) found that negotiators achieve better outcomes for themselves when they focus on their aspiration price than when they focus on their reservation price. Further, chronic differences in negotiators' self-regulation tendencies contribute to the choice of goal pursued. In his review of self-regulation strategies, Higgins (1997) suggests that people differ in the extent to which they adopt a *promotion focus* and pay attention to aspirations and accomplishments, or adopt a *prevention focus* and pay attention to responsibilities and safety. These two foci lead people to be driven by quite different negotiation goals, to display different behavior, and to achieve different outcomes. Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, and Mussweiler (2005) found that individuals with promotion-focused goals were more likely to zero in on the goal of achieving their aspiration price. These negotiators systematically out-performed more prevention-focused negotiators who were more conservative and focused instead on the goal of beating their reservation price. Findings such as these can in part be explained by the nature of the goal setting involved: a more difficult goal (e.g., focusing on aspiration price) produces higher demands, smaller concessions, and slower agreements than does focusing on a less challenging goal, such as beating a minimum standard (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006).

Identity motives. Identity motivation refers to the desire to have a particular image of self in the negotiation (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006). Although many problems in negotiation are associated with heuristics-driven thinking, De Dreu et al. (2007) note that still more problems result from the human tendency to be motivated to develop, maintain, and protect a positive self-concept. Moreover, evaluations people make about themselves tend to be positively biased. Research findings provide support for this self-serving bias at work in negotiation. For example, De Dreu, Nauta, and van de Vliert (1995) found that negotiators tend to make self-serving evaluations of conflict behavior such that they view their own conflict behavior as more constructive and less destructive than that of their counterpart. De Dreu et al. (2007) speak more generally of ego defensiveness and highlight its role in hampering conflict resolution by leading negotiators to view themselves as better and more cooperative than average. Based on empirical research findings such as these, Thompson et al. (2004) speculate that self-enhancement may be a central motivational antecedent of conflict escalation.

Identity motivation can be dispositional or vary according to the situation. Regarding individual differences, individuals high in self-monitoring are more concerned with impression-management than are individuals low in self-monitoring (Snyder, 1992). A key negotiation situational cue is accountability to constituents (see below). Accountability for outcomes as well as constituent surveillance both lead negotiators to be more competitive (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979). Concerns about winning and impressing probably account for relationships such as these (De Dreu, 2004).

De Dreu (2004) laments that few studies have to date focused on the links between identity motivation and the cognitive processes in negotiation. One exception is a study by Jordan and Roloff (1997), which found that, compared to low self-monitors, high self-monitors engaged in more impression management planning (e.g., “be friendly so he’ll think I’m giving him a good deal”), as well as designed a greater variety of tactics and strategies. These findings suggest that high self-monitors may benefit from greater flexibility in thought. Impression management and identity motives in general are important to negotiation, but more systematic research is needed to further substantiate the notion that such motives relate to flexibility of thought and strategic choice (De Dreu et al., 2007).

Accountability motives. Another important aspect of motivation in negotiation is whether, to whom, and to what degree someone is accountable to others. Negotiators are often accountable to one or more constituents in at least one of two ways. They can be accountable, for example, to constituents for the outcomes achieved (outcome accountability) and/or the process of making decisions (process accountability). In cases where accountability is a salient concern, negotiators tend to make higher demands and are less willing to compromise than those who are not accountable (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale, et al., 1979).

Thompson et al. (2004) suggest that two motivational processes may explain findings associated with accountability motivation: (1) evaluation apprehension and (2) decision-making vigilance. Findings related to evaluation apprehension suggest that negotiators are often concerned with how they are perceived by others, especially constituents to whom they are accountable. Research suggests that face-saving strategies come into play when negotiators are accountable, such that in wanting to save face, negotiator behavior becomes more aggressive and uncompromising in nature (Neale, 1984; Wilson 1992). Research also suggests that decision makers (i.e., negotiators) who are accountable for their actions are highly vigilant and tend to more carefully consider relevant information and alternatives than negotiators who are not accountable (Tetlock, 1992). Again we see that a motivated information search impacts negotiation behavior. We turn next to this latter form of motivation and consider its important role in negotiation.

Information-processing motives. The extent that negotiators search, encode, retrieve, and process information depends to a large extent on their epistemic motivation. This is the desire to develop and hold accurate and well-informed conclusions about the world (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Whether and to what degree an individual engages in systematic processing of information is largely due to the extent of cognitive resources they have to spare. When such resources are plentiful, negotiators respond to complexity and uncertainty in a thoughtful, systematic manner. When resources are scarce, however, this response is more likely to be driven by heuristic processing (Neale & Fragale, 2006). A negotiator’s cognitive resources and associated epistemic motivation are affected by both dispositional and situational factors.

Need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 1989; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) represents a key dispositional antecedent of epistemic motivation. This trait corresponds to a single dimension that is believed to underlie the desire for different kinds of knowledge. On the high end, it is characterized by cognitive impatience, basing judgments on inconclusive evidence, and

rigidity of thought. This is compared to individuals with a low need for closure who prefer to engage in a protracted and systematic information search (De Dreu et al., 2007). Research in negotiation indicates that negotiators who have a high dispositional need for closure rely more on the use of heuristics (De Dreu, Kroole, & Oldersma, 1999).

Epistemic motivation is also thought to vary as a function of situational cues such as time limits, noise, process accountability, task involvement, and one's power in a situation (De Dreu, 2004; De Dreu et al., 2007). For example, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) demonstrated that when time pressure is high, individuals are more motivated to achieve cognitive closure and process information more heuristically than under low time pressure. In negotiation contexts specifically, De Dreu (2003) found that negotiators who perceived a high level of time pressure took less time to propose counteroffers and to reach final agreements. These participants also reported less motivation to process information, made fewer compelling arguments, and used more heuristics than negotiators who perceived less time pressure. These findings held even though all negotiators had the same actual amount of time to complete their negotiations (Neale & Fragale, 2006).

Therefore, epistemic motivation plays a crucial role in negotiation by moderating a negotiator's tendency to rely on cognitive heuristics. When negotiators have low need for closure, are placed under low time pressure, or are stimulated to think about counterfactuals, they are less likely to be influenced by misleading anchors or stereotypical information about a counterpart (Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski, 2003; De Dreu, 2003; De Dreu et al., 1999; Golec & Federico, 2004). As we have already seen from research previously discussed in relation to cognitive heuristics, the systematic processing of information is a critical factor for achieving integrative negotiation agreements. Therefore, epistemic motivation also has implications for both strategic choice as well as negotiation outcomes, primarily because negotiators who carefully process information are more likely to ask good questions, actively listen, and uncover opportunities for mutually beneficial trade-offs (Neale & Fragale, 2006). As was demonstrated in De Dreu's (2003) study on epistemic motivation, differences in information processing affect the quality of outcomes such that negotiators who perceived high time pressure achieved agreements of significantly lower joint value.

De Dreu et al. (2007) label research findings associating higher levels of epistemic motivation with less reliance on cognitive heuristics, faster and more rigorous correction of inadequate assumptions and perceptions, and less ego defensiveness following self-threat, as the *deep thinking principle*. The impact of 'deep thinking' on how negotiators respond to complexity and uncertainty in the situation may represent a key training need (Neale & Fragale, 2006). As De Dreu et al. (2007) point out, individuals have two options for information processing strategies. One is via a relatively quick, effortless, and heuristics-based information search. The other entails engaging in a more effortful, deliberate, and systematic search. Which of these two mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty a negotiator selects depends upon their available cognitive resources (Neale & Fragale, 2006). The second mechanism is generally preferable since individuals are less, if at all, restricted by heuristics. But it does require more cognitive resources than does heuristic processing, which is relied upon when such resources are scarce. For example, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found that anchoring processes in negotiation can be eliminated when negotiators are stimulated to think carefully before proceeding to make

offers and counteroffers. Therefore, attempts to raise epistemic motivation may lead negotiators to engage in more thorough and systematic information processing. This can substantially minimize the often harmful impact of cognitive and other heuristics on negotiation processes and outcomes.

Before concluding this section on the motivational goals and associated biases in negotiation, De Dreu and colleagues' model of motivated information processing in negotiation (see Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) is worth noting. This model integrates past research on epistemic motivation and social motives and makes new predictions about their interplay. Specifically, the model proposes that negotiators are continually motivated to fill in gaps in information about both the negotiation at hand and their counterpart. It further assumes that the *kind* of information sought, provided, and considered is primarily driven by a negotiator's social motivation (e.g., cooperative or competitive). Primarily, the role of epistemic motivation is to determine how well information from the confirmatory search is processed and the extent to which cooperative or competitive information impacts strategic choice and the quality of the agreement (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006). Predictions based on this model have recently received initial support. De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, and Euwema (2006) found that pro-social (vs. pro-self) negotiators had better recall of cooperative information, developed more trust, engaged in more problem-solving, and reached more integrative agreements when they had high vs. low levels of epistemic motivation.

In sum, research supports the proposition that motivational mechanisms impact the negotiation process in a number of important ways. First, pro-self and pro-social motives appear to affect information processing: negotiators search, encode, and retrieve information consistent with their pro-self or pro-social motivation. Second, these motives have a direct impact on negotiator performance. Pro-self and pro-social motives determine whether a negotiator chooses to use competitive strategies such as threats, promises, and other coercive tactics, or more cooperative approaches such as problem solving. Third, these motives appear to affect how much a negotiator trusts the other negotiator, and the overall motivation to negotiate in a cooperative fashion. Similarly, certain identity motives, such as the self-serving bias, may affect information processing by leading negotiators to be more forgiving of their own competitive behavior, and certain accountability motives, such as evaluation apprehension, may affect negotiation performance directly by influencing whether a negotiator uses competitive or cooperative tactics. Finally, information processing motives, such as low or high need for closure, appear to have a direct effect on how accurately negotiation-related information is processed. These linkages between the motivational mechanisms and the negotiation process are captured in the negotiation process model. As illustrated in Figure 1, motivational mechanisms are hypothesized to directly affect negotiation performance, information processing, and trust in the other negotiator. The manner in which negotiation-related information is processed is further hypothesized to affect negotiation performance, and trust in the other negotiator is hypothesized to affect performance indirectly through its effect on motivation to negotiate with the other party.

As was indicated in the previous section, cognitive heuristics and other biases associated with decision-making and social perception represent barriers to attaining integrative negotiation outcomes. People rely on these suboptimal cognitive shortcuts as a way to make sense of the complexity and ambiguity inherent in negotiations. For example, they engage in confirmatory

information search, they make fixed-pie assumptions and lose opportunities to achieve joint gains, and they undervalue a counterpart's proposal. Moreover, they further simplify situations by relying on anchors or reference points, stereotypes, and salient information in memory. Motivation further affects what is attended to and recalled, as well as how deeply that information is processed. Growing evidence suggests, however, that negotiators can, to some extent, choose between either shallow/heuristic processing or deep/deliberate information processing. Epistemic motivation in particular increases the likelihood that systematic processing will take place, thereby reducing the harmful effects of cognitive heuristics and self and other social perception biases. To the extent that training can be developed to enhance negotiators' epistemic motivation, this likely represents a fruitful avenue for future research and development. Although initial support has been gathered for motivated information processing (De Dreu et al., 2006), no research to date has explicitly investigated whether epistemic motivation in negotiation can be enhanced via training intervention. We will return to this point in a later section when we address the issue of training more specifically.

Emotion

In much the same way that motivational biases direct negotiators' attention to certain aspects of a negotiation, so too do emotions. While research on emotions in negotiation has been somewhat neglected (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Thompson et al., 2004), a growing body of evidence suggests that mood and emotion both play a central role in negotiation. De Dreu et al. (2007) argue that much of the effects of emotions can be understood in terms of the motivated information processing principles linking epistemic motivation and social motives. Before examining this perspective further, it is important to define the key terms *emotion*, *mood*, and *affect*.

A review of the literature reveals that scholars can be careless in their use of these three terms, referring to them loosely and, worse still, interchangeably (Barry et al. 2004). It is important to distinguish between them because they have distinct meanings. *Affect* is the overarching construct that encompasses various types of "valenced states," of which both emotions and moods are primary examples (Gross, 1998, p. 273). As Barry, Fulmer, and Goates (2006) suggest, the main distinction between emotions and moods concerns differences in stimulus and pervasiveness. *Emotions* typically arise in response to an identifiable stimulus, which triggers them temporarily and causes them to last for only a short duration. In contrast, *moods* are less differentiated and cannot be easily tied to one or more triggering stimuli. By nature they are less intense and more sustained.

Research in negotiation has examined affect, mood, and emotion as both independent and dependent variables: (1) affective experience as a predictor of negotiation processes and/or outcome variables, (2) affective states as an outcome of the negotiation process, and (3) affect as a mediating variable. Affective expression, usually emotional, has also been examined as a negotiation tactic. The strategic use of emotions such as anger, guilt, and unhappiness was reviewed in an earlier section dealing with negotiation performance. The focus here, outlined in Table 5, breaks down empirical research on affect in negotiation and examines intrapersonal effects. These refer to instances in which a negotiator's experience of affect influences his or her own cognitive and motivational processes, as well as behavioral choices exhibited in the

negotiation. In contrast, the study of interpersonal affect highlights the fact that affect can be used strategically in negotiations to obtain wanted outcomes. In the current section, we restrict our inquiry to empirical research on intrapersonal affect of emotion, and the subsequent effect of these internal processes on other aspects of the negotiation process. According to De Dreu et al. (2007), emotions in particular convey information that has strategic implications for how the negotiation proceeds (e.g., as incentives or deterrents for other people’s behavior).

One caveat regarding this empirical work is that much of it has been conducted in lab settings in which neither the ‘high stakes’ of a real negotiation nor the genuine experience of emotion are easily reproducible. Further, the focus of much of this research has been on two emotions in particular: happiness and anger. This is especially true in regard to the interpersonal effects of emotions (De Dreu et al., 2007). Other negotiation relevant emotions such as disappointment, contempt, fear, and anxiety have yet to be studied in similar detail (Barry et al., 2004). Hence some caution should be used when interpreting findings due to the limited range of emotions studied as well as the intensity of experience that underlies and drives them.

Table 5. Emotion-Based Psychological Processes Relevant to Negotiation		
Psychological Process	Definition	Example Biases/Effects
<i>Intrapersonal Effects of Emotion</i>	Negotiators’ emotions have an effect on their own cognitive and motivational processes, as well as behavioral choices exhibited in the negotiation.	Felt affect impacts cognitive processes such as memory, information processing, and judgment
		Felt affect contributes to own behavior
		Overestimate intensity and duration of future emotional reactions
		Illusion of transparency

Intrapersonal effects of affective experience in negotiation. A debate exists in the social cognitive literature about whether emotion is visceral and experienced without cognitive mediation or whether it is also accompanied by cognitive processes (Barry et al., 2006). Purely visceral effects of emotion have recently been coined by Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and McGregor (2002) in the term ‘affect heuristic.’ As was mentioned in a previous section on information-processing motives, when cognitive resources are plentiful, negotiators respond to complexity and uncertainty in a thoughtful, systematic manner. When resources are scarce, however, this response is more likely to be driven by heuristic processing. Emotions can represent a huge load on cognitive capacity, which leaves people susceptible to more efficient but nevertheless error-prone heuristic processing. The affect heuristic proposed by Slovic et al. (2002) refers to the rapid and automatic feelings that precede cognition and that often determine behavior. This is based on the view that people bypass cognitive deliberation when a limited set of data prompts a particular affective response. As Bazerman & Chugh (2006) note, research suggests that ‘hot’

affective responses are immediate, powerful, and often lead to the failure to consider a broader set of information, which would be useful for rational assessment.

Emotions also take effect via some degree of cognitive mediation, which may or may not be biased. Researchers have identified intrapersonal effects of experienced affect on cognitive processes such as memory, information processing, and judgment (for reviews, see Forgas, 2001). Barry et al. (2006) highlight the following general patterns evidenced by this research: (1) affective experience impacts memory coding and later recall such that emotional impressions are often remembered more vividly than other aspects of social interactions. (2) Mood state during recall biases memory retrieval such that, for example, happy or sad memories are recalled more readily when people are in positive or negative moods, respectively. (3) Similarly, information processing is guided by mood state such that people seek out and pay more attention to mood-congruent information. (4) Creativity and flexible problem-solving increase when people are happy.

Broad social cognitive findings such as these have been explored within the context of negotiation specifically. Indeed, to date, negotiation research has attended primarily to these *intrapersonal* effects of affective experience (Barry et al., 2004). De Dreu et al. (2007) highlight these effects as demonstrating what they refer to as the *moody negotiator principle*. This principle is well-illustrated by empirical research which finds that negotiator emotion affects the making of offers and concessions (Baron, 1990; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), creative problem-solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), preferences for cooperation (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shaek, 1990), individual and joint outcomes (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993), and other tactical choices (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998). In summarizing research on intrapersonal effects, De Dreu and colleagues note that, broadly speaking, positive mood contributes to constructive behavior (e.g., happy negotiators are more inclined to think flexibly and make concessions), whereas negative mood contributes to more competitive behavior (e.g., angry negotiators are more likely to play tough and make small concessions).

Barry et al. (2006) point to the long-standing perspective of social psychologists that positive moods affect information processing in ways that may enhance negotiators' ability to deal with problems that arise in the negotiation. Findings from the studies cited above certainly substantiate this perspective and support the relationship between positive affective experience and more cooperative, integrative negotiating behaviors and outcomes. The one study to focus exclusively on negative emotion (Allred et al., 1997) found that angry participants had less regard for their counterpart's interests, which in turn distorted judgments about the other party's interests and, ultimately, reduced joint gains. Negative emotion also reduced desire for future interaction with the other party. Thompson et al. (2004) propose three mechanisms founded in empirical research findings that may explain the negative impact of feelings of anger on negotiation: (1) angry negotiators are less accurate in judging the interests of others, (2) negative emotions promote self-centered preferences, and (3) anger may provoke retaliation.

These three hypothesized mechanisms aside, the broader role of affective experience in negotiation remains unclear. A number of theoretical accounts seek to explain the role of affect as it relates to cognition (see Barry et al., 2006), but none so far stands out as definitive. More

research is needed to uncover the mechanisms by which emotion contributes to the negotiation process and outcomes. To date, psychological approaches to negotiation research have focused mostly on the effects of mood on the quality and depth of information processing as well as flexibility. But less is known, for example, about things like the relationship between affect and long-term memory in negotiation processes, which is highly relevant for real-world negotiations that can continue for some time (Barry et al., 2006).

Before we conclude this section on the intrapersonal effects of affective experience on negotiation, the handful of studies to have examined individuals' emotional reactions to the negotiation experience (i.e., emotion as a dependent variable) are worth noting. Clearly, much of what happens in a negotiation provokes emotions. O'Connor and Arnold (2001) found that negotiators who arrive at an impasse report more frustration and anger than do those who are able to reach an agreement. Hegtvold and Killian (1999) found that procedural justice enhances positive feelings about the negotiation and attenuates negative feelings, while distributive justice produces satisfaction and lowers disappointment and resentment. Similarly, perceptions of unfairness can trigger anger and spite (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). To a considerable degree, these emotional reactions to the negotiation process are captured in our set of social-psychological variables, which focus on feelings about the self, the negotiation process, and the other negotiator engendered by the interactions between parties. Comparisons between one's own and a counterpart's economic outcomes have also been studied. Thompson, Kramer, and Valley (1995) found that when people receive outcomes that are superior, this can induce happiness, whereas receiving inferior outcomes produces a variety of negative feelings. Gillespie, Brett, and Weingart (2000) have found this to be especially the case among negotiators with a pro-self versus a pro-social motivation. As traced in our process model, we suspect that these responses to economic outputs may have implications for a negotiator's willingness to be involved in future negotiations with that negotiation partner. However, to the best of our knowledge, these linkages have not been tested in the negotiation literature.

In summary, the modest empirical literature on the intrapersonal effects of affective experience in negotiation suggests that positive mood contributes to integrative behaviors and outcomes (e.g., creating value, reducing contentious behavior). Negative affect tends to have the opposite effect (Barry et al., 2004). Research has not yet fully uncovered the mechanisms that underlie these intrapersonal effects, but findings have been attributed to demonstrated links between positive affect and such things as creativity in problem-solving, flexible thinking, cooperative motives, information processing, confidence, and risk-taking behavior. In terms of our negotiation process model, intrapersonal emotions appear to directly affect information processing, such as which information is processed and remembered, but they also appear to have a direct impact on negotiation performance itself. The literature suggests that mood and felt emotion directly affect the number of offers and concessions, and the degree of cooperative behavior. These different influences are once again traced in our process model of negotiation.

Relationship between Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Emotion

Researchers have increasingly incorporated mood and emotions into the study of conflict and negotiation (Barry et al., 2004). The acknowledgement that affect plays an important role in negotiation processes and outcomes represents the latest departure from strict adherence to game

theory and models of rational decision making in negotiation. Affect has been examined at the individual level (i.e., an intrapersonal perspective) and within negotiator interactions (i.e., an interpersonal perspective). Research suggests that negotiators' emotion not only affects their own cognitive and motivational processes, but also their counterpart's cognition, motivation, and behavior (De Dreu et al., 2007). It appears that affect itself, as well as information about a counterpart's affect, can be used strategically, should a negotiator be motivated to do so.

Interestingly, research has yet to explore the relationship between the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions. In considering this interrelationship, some interesting questions arise. For instance, do the positive effects of happiness at the intrapersonal level (e.g., more creative problem-solving and flexible thinking) outweigh the negative effects at the interpersonal level (e.g., risk of exploitation)? Are the strategic advantages of expressing anger offset by the negative impact of anger on the interpersonal relationship? These questions need to be kept in mind when designing a training program to help trainees regulate both their intrapersonal experience of emotion and their interpersonal display of it.

Finally, the question of motivated information processing is again relevant and further reinforces that training to enhance epistemic motivation in negotiation could prove highly valuable. As research by Van Kleef et al. (2004b) indicates, to the extent that negotiators are motivated to employ their limited cognitive resources to pay attention to, scrutinize, and process emotion-based strategic information, they are better able to consider the strategic implications of the other's emotion. It is not clear, however, whether epistemic motivation can mitigate 'hot' affective responses that are immediate and powerful, and which blind people to broader information needed for more thoughtful assessment. Research into the interplay between affect and cognition is in its early stages and most certainly has a great deal more to contribute to our understanding of negotiation processes and outcomes.

Summary of Research on Psychological Influences on Negotiation

For all the research that has examined psychological influences on negotiation, there is still a considerable amount of research to do. As De Dreu et al. (2007) note, the analysis of negotiation in terms of its cognitive, motivational, and affective underpinnings has started to generate an understanding of when and why people achieve or fail to achieve mutually beneficial agreements. But there are many questions that remain unanswered. Perhaps this is why the extant literature has little to say about whether and how one can provide training to address the kinds of effects that have been observed thus far. From a training perspective, our broad review of this literature raises two important questions: (1) how can negotiators be trained to overcome the cognitive, social, and motivational biases that interfere with efficient processing of negotiation-related information, and (2) how can the intrapersonal experience of emotions, and the interpersonal display of them, be regulated, to improve overall negotiation performance? We will consider both of these questions in depth in a later section.

Before doing so, however, there remains one last set of distal antecedents to consider: context variables. A large number of context variables can be said to exist in any single negotiation. However, given that many Soldiers have recently found themselves engaged in

negotiations in SSTR operations, the goal of the next section will be to focus on culture as a primary context variable.

Negotiation in Context: The Role of Culture

The focus of this report is largely on the individual negotiator. In this vein we have thus far explored negotiator performance (i.e., the observable, measurable, negotiation-related behaviors negotiators engage in to achieve their goals), individual differences (cognitive ability, personality, and demographics), and psychological processes relating to cognition, motivation, and emotion. Yet it is hard to deny that context plays an important role in how a negotiation proceeds and what outcomes are achieved, an observation that is corroborated by the extant negotiation literature.

In recent years, scholars (e.g., Kramer & Messick, 1995) have noted a palpable shift in interest to topics examining the impact of social context on negotiations. Negotiations may be complicated by a variety of factors such as the number and diversity of the parties in the interaction, the constraints imposed by various stakeholders, the power dynamics in the context, and differences among the cultures of the various parties. Possibly the broadest of these context variables is culture (Carnevale, 1995). Intercultural negotiations can be especially challenging given that approaches to conflict resolution differ across cultures. Differences in the relationship between an individual and society in the culture, divergent expectations regarding the role of the parties involved, and distinct communication styles (e.g., direct versus indirect) are a few examples that illustrate challenges that must be considered during an intercultural negotiation. Working through these challenges is important to long-term success and building trusting relationships; doing so will ensure commitment to negotiation outcomes that maximize joint gains rather than distributive compromises. Certainly for SSTR operations, culture is a prevalent force that shapes negotiations on a daily basis. In such settings it may serve primarily to *create* social context (see Gelfand & Cai, 2004).

The purpose of this section of the report is to explore the negotiator *in context*. We believe it is useful to consider the complexities negotiators are likely to encounter, particularly in settings as taxing as those typical of SSTR operations. We begin first with a discussion of the role of culture as it relates to the existing science and practice of negotiation. As we will see, culture is an important contextual cue that affects which frames of reference dominate thoughts and behaviors in negotiation (Adair & Brett, 2004). Most cultures, for example, recognize negotiation as involving the distribution of resources. Yet, depending on cultural frame, negotiators from different cultures may view the negotiation quite differently. For example, some may adopt more of a task focus, while others are concerned with the relationship. Some negotiators may be motivated to seek distributive (win-lose) outcomes, while others seek more integrative outcomes (win-win). Lastly, culture can affect whether a negotiator's frame is dominated more by rationality or emotion.

We will explore in this section how culture affects negotiators' beliefs and cognitive representations of what negotiation is all about (Adair & Brett, 2004). We supplement this discussion with a review of findings from recent empirical research, which is still in its early stages as it relates to culture and negotiation. Following this we explore in greater detail what it means to negotiate in SSTR operational settings specifically. We highlight the findings of two recent reports, and compare them to our own set of interviews conducted on the topic.

SSTR operations are undeniably volatile and dangerous, as well as strategically important. The role of culture adds to the complexity of an already challenging matrix of circumstances. Yet because conditions change constantly and may never be the same from one engagement to the next, it is not necessarily beneficial to train Soldiers for negotiating in specific settings. Rather, we explore what it means to develop individual negotiators such that they are better prepared to conduct negotiations both in terms of fundamental skills as well as from a psychological perspective involving cognition, motivation, and emotion. Throughout this section we make note of evidence (empirical or anecdotal, depending on the source) that has implications for approaches to training and preparing the individual negotiator, making him or her more effective in the complex conditions of SSTR operations.

Understanding the Juncture of Culture and Negotiation

The question of the role of cultural context in negotiation is of emerging importance given the increase in interactions among people from different parts of the world. U.S. Army Soldiers in particular are involved in many more cross-cultural negotiations than they were 10 or 20 years ago. Yet despite the clear need for empirical and practice-based knowledge and guidelines about negotiating with other cultures, the field of negotiation remains largely explored from the Western perspective (Brett & Gelfand, 2006).

Avruch (2003) identifies several reasons to explain the apparent marginalization of culture in the negotiation process. He believes that it has its roots in the dominant literature, which is exemplified by works such as Ury and Fisher's book "Getting to Yes." This popular reference on negotiation offers a primarily prescriptive approach and there is little room for the analysis of schemas and frames of different negotiation parties. Avruch also notes that many authors themselves are part of an "expert system" that lacks diversity. As such, the practice of negotiation has overwhelmingly been culturally situated against a North American/European, male, white, and middle class backdrop.

This leaves open to inquiry the question of what is universal (etic) versus culture-specific (emic) about negotiation theory and practice? As Adair and Brett (2004) point out, it is possible that since Western models of negotiation have dominated the field thus far, other rich, emic processes have yet to be identified. At present, however, individuals engaged in intercultural negotiations have little in the way of theoretically-based knowledge to guide them (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). Indeed, as LeBaron (2003) acknowledges, much of the negotiation literature simply offers recommendations for conflict resolution that will be "culturally sensitive." This is a deficient response to the need for more and better research on intercultural negotiations. Moreover, attending only to cultural sensitivity overlooks that there are essentially two negotiations taking place simultaneously. One is about the original conflict over resources, while a second, meta-level negotiation exists about the meanings that should define the event (Morris & Gelfand, 2004). Culture plays an important role in how those meanings are formed and interpreted. It is culture's role in the sense-making that occurs in negotiation that we will explore further in this section.

Defining and measuring culture. Defining and measuring 'culture' presents its own challenge, which likely contributes to difficulties expanding the cultural perspective in

negotiation research and practice. Speaking to this issue, Gelfand and Brett (2004) observe that while culture is ubiquitous, it is not altogether obvious. This paradox is what leads people to have insights, by studying *other* cultures, into how their own beliefs are constituted through cultural practices, values, and norms.

Broadly speaking, culture may be considered a group construct, akin to the personalities that define individuals (Adair & Brett, 2004). As such, culture reflects group members' shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, and behaviors, as well as the group's social, political, economic, and religious institutional structures (Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsely, & Janssens, 1995). According to Brett and Gelfand (2006), the fundamental assumptions a culture has about social interactions are reflected in the *beliefs* people have about negotiation, the *values* or *goals* they try to validate in negotiation, the *normative behaviors* they exhibit in negotiation, and the *structures of the institutions* they develop to contain and direct negotiations.

As a means to operationalize cultural differences, several scholars have attempted to empirically identify and define dimensions of cultural variation (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1982). A great deal of work on culture and negotiation relies on Hofstede's (1991) distinction between individualism and collectivism (DeDreu et al., 2007). Individualistic societies are characterized by loose ties between individuals, and considerable importance is placed on independence and furthering personal interests and goals (e.g., countries in Western Europe and the United States). In contrast, collectivist societies integrate people into strong, cohesive in-groups, and importance is placed on interdependence and being embedded in tightly knit groups that promote group goals over those of the individual (e.g., countries in Southern Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America). Similar to Hofstede's dimensions, Schwartz (1994) developed and validated a circumplex structure of specific cultural value types. In the Schwartz framework, nations or national sub-groups can be characterized by differentiated profiles on the following values: conservatism, hierarchy, mastery, autonomy, egalitarian commitment, and harmony.

In a similar vein to Hofstede and Schwartz, Gelfand and Dyer (2000) introduce the notion that degree of variability is another useful way to characterize cultures. They observe that cultures can be differentiated along a continuum of *tightness-looseness*, which refers to the degree to which situational norms are clearly defined and reliably imposed across cultures (Chan, Gelfand, Triandis, & Tzeng, 1996). Japan and Germany represent so-called 'tight' cultural systems in which there is less variability in the perception of situational norms, and greater situation-based constraints determine appropriate patterns of behavior across a wide range of situations. USA and Thailand represent 'loose' cultural systems in which there is more variability in the perception of situational norms. As such, a greater range of behaviors is deemed appropriate across situations. Cultural assumptions such as individualism-collectivism and tightness-looseness form the building blocks of social interaction, providing the basis for interpreting social situations and organizing and structuring social interaction (Brett & Gelfand, 2006).

Faure (1999) summarized a variety of critical views on culture-based negotiation research. Focusing on research methods in particular, he points out that (1) culture is inconsistently and inadequately defined and measured, (2) distinct behaviors in negotiation

processes are not adequately related to independent cultural traits, (3) each person belongs to multiple cultures (e.g., national, ethnic, religious, professional, family), and (4) it is difficult to differentiate between cultural and individual personality variables. In terms of interpreting culture's influence on negotiation, he notes that culture is often a residual, default explanation for given events. Moreover, culture's effects on negotiation can be viewed as tautological, as many variables under study are tied to culture (e.g., does social structure determine culture or vice-versa?). Lastly, it is difficult enough to determine the effects of well-defined and measured variables on negotiation outcomes, let alone nebulous constructs such as culture. Adair and Brett (2004) echo this sentiment, commenting that the East-West divide, for example, is far from a dichotomy, and that culturally normative behaviors occur in degrees of more or less.

The challenges associated with cross-cultural research are manifold, yet the last 25 years has nevertheless seen burgeoning interest in trying to understand the impact of cultural context on negotiation. Much of the research, according to Gelfand and Dyer (2000), has examined two implicit models: (1) the influence of culture on negotiation tactics and outcomes, and (2) the interaction of culture and other proximal situational conditions on negotiation outcomes. While this research sheds lights on cultural differences in negotiation, most support for models and theories at this time comes from *post hoc* reinterpretation of past findings rather than from *a priori* tests (Morris & Gelfand, 2004). Additionally, Gelfand and Dyer's (2000) review reveals at least two more drawbacks that detract from emerging insights. First, although Western scholars have conducted considerable research on the psychological processes involved in negotiation (reviewed above), little is known about how cognition, motivation, and emotion mechanisms mediate cultural effects. As such, the *psychology of negotiation* in different cultures remains something of a "black box" (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000, p. 63). Second, geographical location is all too often used as a proxy for culture. This is problematic for a number of reasons, but particularly because using such a proxy makes it difficult to determine which aspects of culture contribute to observed differences. The result is a plethora of conflicting and unexpected patterns in the empirical literature, which makes it difficult to draw any firm generalizations (Morris & Gelfand, 2004).

With these two major caveats acknowledged, the following review briefly summarizes current thinking about culture and negotiation. It is worth noting that scholars have made more progress in terms of proposing theoretical frameworks to explain culture's role in intercultural negotiations than they have presenting empirical data to support these ideas. Therefore, the models described below should at present be considered tentative. Supporting evidence is mounting, but nevertheless limited. Still, scholarship in this area has advanced quite far in the last decade, and the bar has been raised on empirical efforts. As Morris and Gelfand (2004) comment, "the challenge is to find theoretically graceful ways of incorporating cultural variation into models of negotiation" (p. 46). Research is beginning to do so, and rather than inferring culture from geographic location and being satisfied with merely documenting differences, researchers are increasingly making *a priori* predictions from profiles of shared cultural values, and seeking to verify those differences using existing measures (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). To the extent possible, our review will focus primarily on this work in making statements about culture and negotiation processes and outcomes.

Theoretical Perspectives on Culture and Negotiation

A number of theoretical perspectives have been proposed to account for how cultural differences manifest themselves in negotiations and what impact this may have on outcomes. We outline several of these frameworks and models here, and then highlight empirical research that supports or disconfirms the predicted relationships.

Gelfand & Dyer (2000): A dynamic and psychological model of culture and negotiation. Gelfand and Dyer (2000) were among the first to draw attention to and summarize the multiple ways culture can exert an influence on the system of negotiation. They propose a “dynamic and psychological” model of culture and negotiation that encompasses theoretical accounts of culture, psychological processes, and a number of proximal situational conditions. Further, they expect culture to have both a main effect and play a moderating role. Specifically, in terms of the former, they see culture as directing negotiators’ attention to particular aspects of the self and the environment, thereby constraining how negotiators make sense of negotiations (e.g., implicit theories, judgments, and ways of reasoning), as well as how negotiators are motivated to action (e.g., goals and self-regulation). Similarly, Gelfand and Dyer believe that because cultural contexts differ in terms of how social practices and everyday situations are distributed, it is likely that the prevalence of certain types of proximal conditions that are characteristic of negotiations will vary across cultural contexts.

Beyond main effects, Gelfand and Dyer explore the different ways culture may interact with other key variables. In doing so, they propose that culture (1) moderates the influence of proximal situational conditions on negotiators’ psychological states, and (2) moderates the influence of negotiators’ psychological states on negotiators’ behaviors. Such a model, they argue, allows for a more sophisticated account of how and why culture affects negotiation. For example, the influence of proximal social conditions on negotiators’ psychological states is likely to vary depending on the cultural context. As such, the same ‘objective’ social conditions are expected to be *culturally contextualized* and given different meanings and evoke different behaviors across cultures (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). Similarly, Gelfand and Dyer argue that the same motivational or cognitive orientation may have differential effects on negotiator behavior, depending on the broader culture context of the interaction. This relationship is “predicated on the notion that cultures differ not only on prevailing motives and goals, but also on the *instrumentalities* of the behaviors that are necessary to achieve goals” (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000, p. 88).

Adair & Brett (2004): A model of culture and negotiation processes. A second, more recent model describing culture and negotiation is proposed by Adair and Brett (2004), who examine negotiation processes in terms of an East-West distinction with respect to norms, beliefs, and goals. They suggest that culture affects both the goals people have for negotiations (i.e., what they strive for and think is important), as well as the norms people have for negotiation (i.e., what they consider appropriate and inappropriate behavior). Fundamentally, Adair and Brett view culture as a mechanism that shapes peoples’ tendencies to think about negotiation as being primarily a process of (a) building, reconstructing, and maintaining relationships, or (b) distributing resources. The extent to which someone emphasizes relationships versus outcomes (or vice versa) in the course of negotiations is a cultural difference

that reflects underlying individualistic or collectivist cultural values. To this end, Adair and Brett predict that a *relationship frame* will be more salient for negotiators in Eastern cultures, while a *resource distribution frame* will be more salient for negotiators in Western cultures.

Another major difference between Eastern and Western cultures that Adair and Brett suggest may affect negotiation behavior is low- versus high-context communication (Triandis, 1989). Eastern cultures tend to be high-context, and meaning is communicated as much by the context in which words and acts take place as by the words and acts themselves. Information is shared indirectly and implicitly, and logic is somewhat fluid and requires the listener to infer the focus of the argument. In Western cultures, low-context communication predominates, and meaning is embedded solely in words or acts. Thus communication is fairly direct and familiarity with contexts is not necessary in order to understand the message being communicated. Information is shared explicitly and logic adheres to a linear, 'if-then' format.

Adair and Brett (2004) argue that different frames (relationship building vs. distribution of resources) and communication norms (high-context vs. low-context) should influence the kinds of goals and behaviors pursued by negotiators from Eastern, interdependent cultures versus Western, independent cultures. Although negotiators from both Eastern and Western cultures have both cooperative and competitive goals, the meaning of those goals is likely to be different depending on how negotiation is framed.

In their model, the authors propose that negotiators from the East are likely to have cooperative *trust* goals that are enacted through indirect information sharing behaviors, as well as competitive *dominance* goals enacted through affective influence behaviors. In combination, these goals and behaviors allow Eastern negotiators to create long-term relationships that have sufficient social distance to justify claiming value. In contrast, Adair and Brett propose that negotiators from the West have cooperative *joint-gain* goals that are enacted through direct information sharing behaviors, as well as competitive *claiming* goals that are enacted through rational influence behaviors. Again, in combination, these goals and behaviors allow Western negotiators to create joint gains and claim the largest possible portion of that gain. In sum, Adair and Brett's model predicts that frames (relationship vs. resource) and communication styles (high- vs. low-context) are critical cultural dimensions that explain normative behaviors in negotiation.

Morris & Gelfand (2004): Culture and cognition in negotiation. Morris and Gelfand (2004) explore cultural differences as a means to expand, specifically, the cognitive perspective on negotiation. They consider whether the judgment biases documented in the literature thus far are what they call "local habits" (i.e., characteristics of Western or Individualistic negotiators), or whether they indeed represent invariant, fundamental aspects of human nature. Given that the extant literature is dominated by Western researchers and practitioners, it seems appropriate to explore whether other biases exist that have so far been overlooked by focusing on a narrow range of cultural settings.

The authors distinguish between negotiators' *numerical* judgments and *social* judgments, arguing that the former likely arise from hardwired features of the perceptual system, while the latter arise from reliance on culturally derived knowledge structures, or constructs. As such,

numerical biases are expected to vary minimally across cultures. However, because social judgment biases are based on conceptions of the negotiation situation, self, and other people, these are expected to be more culturally variant. In support of this argument, the authors provide three examples of recent studies which illustrate that social judgment biases are not universal (fixed-pie, egocentric bias, and dispositionist biases).

The availability, accessibility, and/or activation of knowledge structures are central to Morris and Gelfand's explanation for cultural variation in social judgment biases. Specifically they propose that culture can influence whether a knowledge structure is *available* (i.e., possible to retrieve from memory), whether it is highly *accessible* (i.e., easy to retrieve), and whether it is *activated* (i.e., brought into working memory to guide one's current judgment). For example, the availability of a concept such as win-lose games could influence how a negotiation is framed such that a culture lacking this construct would not suffer from the resulting fixed-pie bias. As Morris and Gelfand stress, the key point is that cultural differences in judgment can arise because of differences in construct availability.

The notion of construct accessibility works in a similar way: high construct accessibility results from frequent use in a culture, and is a direct reflection of its predominance in cultural institutions, public discourse, and social structures. In contrast, when a construct or knowledge structure is low in accessibility, it is essentially "deeply buried" in memory. As such, it is less likely to be used as a guide in processing information and making judgments.

Lastly, construct activation refers to the factors (e.g., perceiver's social context, properties of the social stimulus or negotiation task, and properties of the individual perceiver-negotiator) that interact with differences in the chronic accessibility of knowledge structures and produce particular patterns of cultural variation. Recall that Gelfand and Dyer (2000) identified key proximal social context variables such as role expectations, accountability, and time pressure. According to their model, Morris and Gelfand (2004) argue that the impact of these context variables on knowledge activation may vary across cultures. For example, they highlight accountability as one variable that may activate negotiators' tendencies toward culturally normative behavior because it increases reliance on chronically accessible knowledge structures.

In sum, by addressing the issue of knowledge availability, accessibility, and activation, Morris and Gelfand's (2004) model makes predictions about when negotiators will and will not be influenced by their culture. When cultural differences are observed, it does not mean that a knowledge structure is present in one culture and unavailable in another. Rather, according to their model, differences can result from differences in the accessibility or activation of those structures.

Brett & Gelfand (2006): A cultural analysis of assumptions underlying negotiation theory. Instead of proposing a model of culture and negotiation, Brett and Gelfand (2006) conducted a cultural analysis of five assumptions about negotiations that are inherent to Western culture and have dominated the field. These assumptions concern: (1) persuasion, (2) motivation, (3) attributions for negotiators' behaviors, (4) communication, and (5) confrontation. The authors chose these five assumptions because they all address basic issues of social interaction to which cultures have developed a standard response.

For example, in the case of persuasion, the fundamental problem in negotiation is *how do I get the other party to make the concessions necessary to reach my desired endpoint?* According to Brett and Gelfand, this is an etic, or universal, problem faced by all negotiators regardless of culture. However, the solution to this problem (and those associated with the other four assumptions) is different depending on culture. For the question posed above, the major distinction is between rationality versus emotion.

The authors contend that each assumption reflects important values and norms that are cultivated in Western culture, but that different assumptions likely exist that are more congruent with other cultural contexts. Brett and Gelfand's analysis describes each of the aforementioned assumptions, and provides alternative assumptions that are more congruent with other cultural contexts.

Empirical Findings Related to Culture and Negotiation

As mentioned previously, cross-cultural research on negotiation has made frequent use of samples that differ with respect to Hofstede's (1991) collectivism-individualism construct. The research described in this section makes use of this dimension in conjunction with the notion of high- vs. low-context communication. Where possible, we will link empirical research findings to the models and frameworks described in the previous section.

Culture and negotiator cognition. We begin with the handful of studies that have examined culture and negotiator cognition. They largely explore whether and to what degree culture differentially affects how people frame events and process and represent information. Avruch and Black (1993) bring attention to the perceptual and cognitive features that can impact important aspects of negotiation. Frames in particular determine the perceptions by which the parties make sense of the negotiation or conflict, what it is, who is involved, how it should be resolved, and what is acceptable and unacceptable. Important to this concept is the impact that the frame has on the parties' ability to work through the conflict. Also important is the influence of frames on the parties' behaviors—how they strategize about the conflict—and their choice of action. Docherty (2001) warns that even though frames can be malleable, some are immutable and can either facilitate or impede the parties' ability to work through the issues and their ability to negotiate with one another.

Gelfand, Nishii, Dyer, Holcombe, Ohbuchi, and Fukuno (2001) conducted an empirical analysis of how negotiations are framed in public culture. They did so by examining public discourse as it appears in newspapers in Japan (collectivist) and America (individualistic), and comparing proportional frequencies of particular newspaper content. They found that American newspapers make more heavy use of war and sports metaphors, competition, and blaming one party. In contrast, Japanese newspapers reference cooperation and mutual blame relatively more frequently. Morris and Gelfand (2004) cite this research as supporting their theory of the chronic accessibility of knowledge structures. They argue that elements of public culture, such as the metaphors used in public discourse, play a role in how particular knowledge structures become chronically accessible in some cultures but not others. Metaphors such as war and sports in the West, for example, serve to sustain the heightened accessibility of certain knowledge structures

and function to differentially direct negotiators' attention to particular goals, scripts, and criteria in negotiations (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Gelfand et al., 2001). As such, the very way negotiators from different cultures fundamentally frame the negotiation encounter, including process, behaviors, and desired outcomes, can vary greatly.

Building on this, DeDreu et al. (2007) suggest that one key role culture plays in negotiation is in influencing the cognitive representations people have of conflict. The recent empirical literature provides several good examples of findings that support this position. For example, Gelfand, Higgins, et al. (2002) found that negotiators with a collectivist background report viewing conflict as more compromise-focused, whereas those with a more individualistic background view the same conflicts as being win-lose focused. The authors suggest that this may be at least a partial explanation of why some heuristics (e.g., equity rule) may be more prominent in some cultures than others. In related research, Gelfand, Nishii, et al. (1998) found that Japanese and American students have different cognitive interpretations of the very same conflict episode. Whereas Japanese students perceive conflicts to be more about violations of duties and obligations, American students regard conflicts as being linked to individual rights and autonomy. These findings are consistent with Gelfand and Dyer's (2000) model, which predicts that culture has a direct effect on perceptions of conflict and negotiation.

Also in support of Gelfand and Dyer's (2000) model, evidence further suggests that individualistic and collectivist aspects of culture may interact with proximal conditions in the negotiation setting and affect cognitions (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). Tinsley and Pillutla (1998) demonstrated that specific aspects of the same situation can be interpreted differently by negotiators, depending on their cultural background. In their study, identical cooperative instructions given to negotiators in the US and Hong Kong were found to activate different meanings. Specifically, for Hong Kong Chinese negotiators, cooperative instructions were interpreted as meaning they should strive for equality in outcomes. For Americans, however, the exact same instructions were interpreted as signaling the need to strive for joint gain. Similarly, Gelfand and Realo (1999) found that a manipulation of accountability magnified cultural differences in negotiation such that it cued culturally normative differences in framing. Under proximal conditions of high accountability, collectivists were observed to frame the negotiation in a win-win, cooperative manner, while individualistic counterparts framed the negotiation as more competitive and win-lose. The authors suggest that accountability increases reliance on norms. This produces different effects in more collectivist contexts, which value cooperative norms, compared to individualistic contexts in which such norms are much less prevalent. These findings provide support for Gelfand and Dyer's (2000) model, which proposes that the meaning of proximal situational conditions is culturally contextualized and experienced. The findings also support Brett and Gelfand's (2006) perspective that social context activates different cognitive construal's and, in turn, behaviors across cultures.

Culture and negotiator behavior. The aforementioned research tells us something about how culture affects peoples' cognitive representations of negotiations. But as Brett and Gelfand (2006) suggest, culture also shapes the normative strategies and behaviors people have for managing disputes and resolving conflict. DeDreu et al., (2007) argue that because individualism-collectivism has a lot in common with proself-prosocial motives, it makes sense that this culture dimension should be related to strategic choice in negotiation and conflict. For

example, Tjosvold, Huim Ding, and Hu (2003) found that collectivist Chinese participants were more motivated to engage in problem-solving, which led to greater team effectiveness. Similarly, another study found that collectivist negotiators were more inclined to make concessions, engage in problem-solving, or accept a 50-50 compromise (Carnevale & Leung, 2001).

Interestingly, much of the research informing differences in culture and negotiation behavior uses the high-low context culture continuum discussed previously. Recall from earlier that collectivist cultures engage in high-context communication, by which the intent of communications is implicit in the surrounding context and may include formalized or stylized rituals and telegraphing ideas without spelling them out. In contrast, individualist cultures engage in low-context communications, by which messages are communicated in specific and literal ways (LeBaron, 2003). Further, low-context culture negotiators make appeals to rationality (vs. emotion) to persuade their opponents. Drake (1995) conducted a content analysis of US-Taiwanese cross-cultural negotiation transcripts and found that negotiators from the US rely primarily on analogical reasoning to make a point or attempt to persuade their counterpart. Negotiators from Taiwan, on the other hand, rely more on normative statements, particularly referring to social roles and relationships. Adler, Brahm, and Graham (1992) observed that US negotiators, compared to Chinese negotiators, use more 'no's' (a direct form of information exchange) and commitments (a form of rational persuasion). In related research, US negotiators also made more promises, another form of rational persuasion, than Russian negotiators (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992).

More recently, Adair, Okamura, and Brett (2001) reported that US managers, relative to Japanese managers, are more likely to share information directly, less likely to share information indirectly, and less likely overall to use influence. Like Adler et al. (1992), Adair and colleagues found that negotiators from low-context cultures engage in more direct communication (e.g., saying "no") than those from high-context cultures. In an attempt to assemble a more inclusive picture of cultural negotiation differences, Adair, Brett, Lempereur, Okumura, Shiknirev, Tinsley, and Lytle (2004) compared negotiator behaviors across six cultures (US, Russia, France, Brazil, Japan, and Hong Kong). Using the low-high context culture continuum, they examined behavioral differences in negotiation and found that US negotiators used relatively more direct information sharing than negotiators from the other five countries. Russian, Japanese, and Hong Kong negotiators were more likely to use indirect information sharing than other negotiators. Russian and Japanese negotiators were more likely to use both rational and affective influence than negotiators from the other four countries.

Adair et al. (2001) suggest that their results support a relatively consistent low-high context continuum, with US negotiators being more low-context, Japan and Russian negotiators being more high-context, and French, Brazilian, and Hong Kong Chinese negotiators somewhere in the middle of the continuum (Adair & Brett, 2004). Findings from each of these studies (Adair et al., 2001; Adler et al, 1992; Drake, 1995) have been highlighted as providing key support for predictions stemming from high- and low-context communication theory (Hall, 1976; Adair & Brett, 2004). In particular, these studies lend support to the notion that negotiators from low-context cultures will use more direct forms of information-sharing to understand priorities, while negotiators from high-context cultures will engage in more indirect forms of information-sharing as a means to infer priorities.

Findings reported by Brett (2001), however, complicate this picture somewhat. Brett reanalyzed data previously collected from Adair et al.'s (2001) sample of Japanese negotiators and made comparisons about the relative use of negotiation strategies among them and executive MBA students from the US, Germany, Israel, and Hong Kong. Results suggest that culturally normative negotiation strategies differ across cultures *and* depend upon the specific type of communication (e.g., influence or information sharing). For example, German negotiators were found to be low-context in their use of information, but high-context in their use of influence. Japanese negotiators, on the other hand, were found to be high-context in their use of information, but low-context in their use of influence.

These findings, along with those reported by Adair et al. (2003), at least partially support Adair and Brett's (2004) predictions based on their model of culturally normative negotiation strategies in the East and West. Recall that the model predicted that negotiators from the East would have cooperative *trust* goals that are enacted through indirect information sharing behaviors, as well as competitive *dominance* goals enacted through affective influence behaviors. These goals and behaviors allow Eastern negotiators to create long-term relationships that have enough social distance to justify claiming value. Adair and Brett (2004) conclude that "Japan and Russia offer the clearest evidence of a high-context negotiation where negotiators use a more relational approach enacted with both cooperative, trust building behavior through indirect information sharing and competitive, dominance behavior through both affective and rational influence" (p. 167). In contrast, they proposed that negotiators from the West have cooperative *joint-gain* goals that are enacted through direct information sharing behaviors, as well as competitive *claiming* goals that are enacted through rational influence behaviors. These goals and behaviors allow Western negotiators to create joint gains and also claim the largest possible portion of that gain. Based on the empirical evidence to date, they conclude that "the US offers the clearest evidence of a low-context negotiation where negotiators seem to use a more outcome-oriented approach that is enacted with cooperative, direct information sharing to generate joint gains" (p. 167).

Adair and Brett (2004) further propose that high- and low-context negotiators differ in terms of the scope and flexibility of their negotiation behavior. Hall's (1976) high- and low-context communication theory also predicts that negotiators from high-context cultures have flexible use of *both* low- (i.e., direct) and high-context communication norms, and therefore may have greater facility to adapt in a cross-cultural encounter than low-context negotiators. For example, the Chinese use direct communication to manage very close relationships (i.e., family) and the most distant relationships (i.e., strangers), but use indirect communication to manage intermediate relationships (e.g., friends, neighbors, colleagues) where greater attention must be paid to face-saving and avoidance of conflict (Gelfand & Cai, 2004). Indeed, Adair and Brett (2004) reported that negotiators from high-context cultures are able to cycle between direct and indirect forms of information exchange more than negotiators from low-context cultures. Further, high-context negotiators cycle between indirect information sharing *and* affective influence more so than negotiators from low-context cultures.

Citing this research, Adair and Brett (2004) discuss the strategic or tactical tendencies related to high-context communication. First, high-context negotiators seem to demonstrate

greater strategic flexibility than low-context cultures, whereby the former appear to switch easily between integrative and distributive strategies. This may better equip them to balance the creating and claiming aspects of negotiation. In addition, high-context negotiators such as those from Japan and Russia use emotion and affect as ways to persuade opposing parties. Adair and Brett (2004) speculate that such findings help explain Brett, Shapiro, and Lytle's (1998) observation that in the US the reciprocation of distributive strategies can lead to conflict spirals, but this is not the case in Japan (Adair, 1999). It is possible that because of their high-context communication style, Japanese negotiators are more skilled at shifting the sequence of influence attempts to also include productive, informational exchange strategies.

Whether, to what degree, and how negotiation behaviors are reciprocated is another interesting cross-cultural difference, about which researchers are just beginning to learn more. Adair (2003) studied negotiators from four low-context cultures (US, Israel, Sweden, and Germany), four high-context cultures (Hong Kong, Japan, Russia, and Thailand), and two mixed-culture samples (US-Hong Kong and US-Japan). She reported that, as expected, negotiators from high-context cultures reciprocated indirect information exchange more and reciprocated direct information exchange less than negotiators from low-context cultures. Interestingly, negotiators from high-context cultures reciprocated rational forms of influence more than negotiators from low-context cultures, and there were no cultural differences for reciprocating affective influences (Adair, 2000). Adair and Brett (2004) suggest that these results indicate that within cultures, negotiators tend to match culturally normative *information-sharing* behaviors, but the picture of *influence* behaviors is less apparent. This is because negotiators from high-context cultures were found to use and reciprocate all forms of influence (i.e., both direct, rational appeals and indirect, affective appeals) more than negotiators from low-context cultures. This finding lends further support to the emerging picture of Eastern negotiators having more facility with different negotiation approaches.

Culture and negotiation outcomes. A pertinent question is what implications do such findings as those described above have for achieving joint gains in negotiation? Brett and Okamura (1998) examined culture, negotiation, and joint gain in a sample of same-culture Japanese and US dyads. They found that similar levels of joint gain were achieved for both sets of same-culture dyads. As might be expected based on the preceding discussion, subsequent research (Adair et al., 2001) indicates that gains are achieved using different negotiation behaviors. Specifically, US same-culture dyads achieved higher joint gain by sharing more information directly, whereas same-culture Japanese dyads achieved higher joint gain when information was shared indirectly and in conjunction with influence.

Gelfand and Dyer (2000) highlight additional findings from this study as demonstrating that cultural differences in cognition have important consequences for negotiation outcomes. Brett and Okamura measured two cultural dimensions in both samples: Individualism-Collectivism and Hierarchy-Egalitarianism. Both were linked in the study to negotiators' scripts and schemas in relation to self-interest, power, and information-sharing. Findings suggest that in *intercultural*, as opposed to *intracultural* negotiations, having incompatible scripts and schemas made it more difficult to achieve integrative outcomes. These results again suggest that culture may lead people to have different cognitive interpretations of identical conflict episodes.

Moreover, such differing perceptions can have very real consequences for negotiation behavior and outcomes achieved.

Summary

This review of the empirical literature is by no means comprehensive, but it is representative of current methods and samples, and gives some indication of the state of knowledge with respect to cross-cultural negotiation research. As this brief review suggests, there remains a considerable amount of research yet to be conducted to address how culture affects negotiators' cognitions (e.g., reasoning processes, judgment biases, and implicit theories), goals and motivation, as well as emotion, which is so nascent a field we did not touch on it here. Research findings to date suggest that when negotiations are conducted cross-culturally, different parties may be construing the same situations in different ways, may be processing information differently, and may be pursuing different goals. Moreover, aspects of culture interact with proximal negotiation conditions to affect cognitions, which can further affect negotiation tactics and strategies used (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). All of these differences represent hurdles to achieving integrative agreements. Because research on the effects of culture on the negotiation process is in its infancy, our process model of negotiation focuses only on the strongest empirical findings to date. Culture appears to have two well-supported effects on the negotiation process. First, cultural affiliation appears to affect negotiator cognition by affecting the way negotiators frame the negotiation process, and view the conflict. For instance, collectivist negotiators may view the negotiation as an opportunity for compromise, and "win-win" behavior, whereas negotiators from more individualistic cultures may view negotiations as inherently more competitive or "win-lose." Second, cultural affiliation affects negotiation performance by affecting the choice between more integrative or distributive behaviors. These linkages between culture and psychological processes, and culture and negotiation performance, are captured in our process model.

From this brief review it is evident that research into cross-cultural negotiations is in its early stages. Certainly, much has been learned in recent years, but a great deal more work has yet to be conducted. With this noted, we turn in the next section to a discussion of the kinds of cross-cultural experiences U.S. Army Soldiers have with respect to negotiation. This shift in focus is both interesting and informative, as it sheds light on the very real challenges Soldiers face in negotiation situations with host nation personnel as well as counterparts and contractors from other cultures. We begin by describing two recent efforts to document these kinds of experiences, and compare and contrast their findings to focus groups conducted specifically for the current project. These findings, along with insights gathered from the entire literature review, will help inform a set of training recommendations we offer in the final section of this report.

Documenting Soldier Negotiations in Cross-Cultural Settings

Negotiation is an activity that takes place on a daily basis in a wide variety of situations. For U.S. Soldiers, negotiation skills have become a critical element to the success of SSTR operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. While negotiations are always a challenging endeavor, the negotiations that are required on SSTR missions are even more challenging as they often involve the participation of a number of culturally diverse parties within a complicated broader context (e.g., social, political, and economic). In the past two years (2007-2009) two different reports have been published that explore and document recent negotiation experiences encountered by U.S. Soldiers in these cross-cultural settings (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). These reports are Tressler (2007) of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and Ben-Yoav Nobel, Wortinger, and Hannah (2007) of West Point. We summarize their findings here, and draw together themes where appropriate. We supplement their findings with those gathered from focus groups conducted for the current project. These involved a series of interviews with small groups of military officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the spring and summer of 2009.

Tressler (2007)

Even a passing read of this report sharply highlights the increased importance of negotiation activities on a daily basis in the missions conducted by U.S. Soldiers in Iraq. Whether in terms of securing neighborhoods, gathering information, or other tasks related to governance and capacity building, Soldiers find that negotiation skills and practices are crucial to their missions' success. As Tressler observes, "U.S. Soldiers in Iraq – from junior to senior leaders – conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country" (p. vii). Tressler's report seeks to fill a perceived gap in knowledge about Soldiers' negotiation experiences and lessons learned over the course of multiple tours in Iraq or Afghanistan. Interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers (indeterminate *n*) recount scores of negotiations with local civilian and military leaders in Iraq's SSTR operation. These interviews serve to augment our understanding of the kinds of experiences encountered and lessons drawn.

Tressler (2007) identifies three key elements inherent in these SSTR negotiations that bear further discussion. His report makes the case that: (1) the *context* in which the negotiations take place makes them particularly unique and demanding, (2) *cultural differences* exist and can significantly affect the conduct and outcome of a negotiation; however, such differences are a 'relative' factor and can just as equally have little to no effect on the negotiation, and (3) the *power* inherent in these negotiations is shaped by several factors unique to military SSTR and counterinsurgency operations. We briefly discuss each element, noting the kinds of negotiation tactics and techniques that Tressler recommends for improving Soldier effectiveness in these settings.

According to Tressler (2007), it is the specific *context* of SSTR operations that distinguishes them from other types of negotiations in different, less volatile and complex settings. By 'context' Tressler is referring to the socio-economic and political landscape in which negotiations take place, and which typically places Soldiers outside their area of expertise and training. For example, the context of most business and contractual negotiations involves the

local economy, prices, and structure of local business. However, Soldiers often find themselves ill-prepared for negotiations in which these situational factors are important, if not instrumental, to their success. This highlights the importance of content-specific declarative knowledge for negotiations. Culture is an important context variable; for several reasons it stands apart from the rest and will be discussed separately.

Although the fundamental principles of negotiation seem to generalize to SSTR settings, certain aspects of the context make it more challenging to apply what might be considered ‘standard negotiation theory.’ Tressler reports that officers negotiating in Iraq tend to treat all negotiations the same, overlooking crucial contextual differences between these negotiations and ones they may have encountered previously (e.g., in non-SSTR settings). However, by recognizing where differences exist, Tressler asserts that Soldiers can undertake different and better negotiation preparation. Interviews highlighted three contextual factors in particular as wielding the most influence on how Soldiers and local civilians (e.g., sheiks) conduct negotiations together: cultural differences, power dynamics, and relationships. Taking these into consideration when developing negotiation intent, desired end-state, and goals appears crucial to ensuring the planning process fits the tactical demands of the negotiation, which are manifest in the greater number of factors and variables that define SSTR compared to more traditional negotiations.

Tressler (2007) highlights cultural differences as a specific element of context that deserves further attention. All of the officers he interviewed underscored that being aware of cultural differences between U.S. Soldiers and Iraqis is essential. Many officers even suggested that an understanding of a counterpart’s culture is the *most important* variable in negotiating successfully. Tressler’s interviews suggest that, while clearly a dominant force in shaping the negotiations described, the influence of cultural differences is anything but straightforward and depends greatly on the presence (or absence) of other context factors. These include: parties’ interests, power, constituency demands, potential to apply force, history, politics, psychology, and even personality. Therefore, while culture is important and can impact the outcome of a negotiation, it does not impact every negotiation. As such, culture is not uniformly the most important factor – or even an important factor at all. Its influence depends on how the aforementioned factors also influence the parties involved by either triggering culture-specific responses or overriding cultural differences (see Gelfand & Dyer, 2000).

This is not to say the role of culture and associated differences should be overlooked. Echoing the research on cross-cultural negotiation reviewed above, Tressler suggests that differing cultural values, norms, institutions, and ideologies that parties bring to the negotiation cause them to pay varying levels of attention to the issues involved and to each other’s interests. In essence, culture is akin to a filter through which situations are interpreted and appropriate behaviors defined. Our brief review of cross-cultural negotiation research certainly substantiates this perspective. More anecdotally, Tressler’s interviews with officers provide multiple examples of how different ways of communicating and relating may cause statements and the meanings attributed to them to be interpreted differently. For example, Iraqis may be more likely to understand some statements made by U.S. officers to be promises, even though the original intent was not to promise anything at all.

To this end, having an acute awareness of the many contextual factors involved, particularly those related to culture, can permit skilled negotiators to control or manage the negotiation in effective ways. Tressler (2007) mentions several benefits of how the tactical application of such awareness can actually serve to diminish the importance of cultural differences between two or more parties in a negotiation. First, cultural awareness heightens situational awareness, and alerts Soldiers to elements of the context that could potentially bring culture into play as a key variable. Second, Soldiers with a deep understanding of cultural differences can ensure that their own behavior does not activate any culturally variable factors that might derail the negotiation. Tressler suggests that this requires “a thorough understanding of the other’s culture, an ability to *reflect on one’s own cultural and cognitive biases, and skill at controlling them* [italics added]” (p. 32). If Soldiers are unable to either monitor the contextual landscape of the negotiation setting or their own biases stemming from flawed psychological processes, poor negotiation outcomes could result. We will return to this point in greater detail in a later section. Suffice it to say, however, that improving Soldiers’ metacognitive skills in negotiation as they relate to controlling the biases associated with cognitive, motivational, and emotional psychological processes represents a key area for negotiation training. This is especially the case for Soldiers operating in cross-cultural settings, where a keen awareness of one’s own biases is just as, if not more, important than awareness of the contextual landscape. To the extent that Soldiers can use their understanding and awareness of themselves and the situation to control such things as atmosphere and pace, they may be able to avoid activating culturally-derived and possibly counterproductive responses from a counterpart (Tressler, 2007).

It was noted previously that culture interacts with other contextual factors, which may ‘neutralize’ its influence in certain cases. One key contextual factor with which culture was routinely noted to interact is power, which is the third element of negotiations in SSTR settings Tressler discusses. Interestingly, cultural differences were observed to have *less effect* in a negotiation when power increased in importance. According to Tressler, this occurs when the relative power (or perception of such) between two parties is asymmetrical. This is because the stronger party is in a position to ignore or violate the cultural norms of the weaker party with little immediate consequence, although the consequence for the more distal outcomes of willingness to implement the agreement and success in the future may be greater. Even more interesting is the observation that each party’s power in a negotiation is fairly dependent on the context in which it is exercised. While SSTR negotiations occur in militarized environments saturated with power, Tressler characterizes power as nevertheless being “slippery.” He contrasts the U.S. military’s relatively overwhelming power with the fact that it is “far from absolute, a reality that complicates the relationships between U.S. military and Iraqi military and civilian leaders.” Tressler goes on to observe that “this is why so many military-civilian interactions in Iraq are negotiations, instead of one-way communications” (p. 34). Based on officer interviews, Tressler concludes that most Soldiers lack an appreciation for how power impacts negotiations. Further, this lack of understanding about power and associated techniques (e.g., assertion) renders negotiators relatively ineffective; they have difficulty recognizing power plays and miss opportunities to use their own power effectively. This highlights additional declarative knowledge areas that could be beneficial aspects of training. Tressler recommends that Soldiers should strive to combine power moves with interest-based problem solving, cycling between the two as necessary to avoid negative conflict spirals, unintended consequences, and counterproductive negotiation outcomes.

In sum, Tressler's analysis of negotiations between U.S. military officers and local civilian and military leaders in Iraq's SSTR operation is a compelling account of how such interactions have tactical and operational significance. These negotiations are pervasive and play an important role in a variety of non-kinetic operations, such as upholding local government and gathering information and intelligence. In multiple ways, negotiations is a tool that "can contribute to accomplishing stated U.S. objectives in Iraq: supporting Iraqis in creating, establishing, legitimizing, and running their own government and security, as well as reducing the risks to American soldiers" (p. 4). In using this 'tool', however, Tressler's interviews reveal that Soldiers must contend with a unique and demanding context, cultural differences that shift in their relative importance, and power that is deceptively tricky to put into action. Further, his report identifies several areas that have implications for training recommendations, highlighting the importance of: (1) knowledge relevant to the content or topic of the negotiation at hand (e.g. reasonable price of commodities if you are purchasing something), (2) metacognitive skills required for controlling bias, and (3) knowledge of the functioning of power in negotiations and implications for proximal and distal outcomes.

Ben-Yoav Nobel et al. (2007)

A second set of in-depth officer interviews was conducted by Ben-Yoav Nobel et al. (2007), who spoke with 30 Lieutenants and 16 Captains who had recently returned from deployments to Iraq. A structured interview protocol was used, comprised of questions pertaining to such topics as the context and situations in which negotiations took place, issues negotiated, location and safety considerations, language and cultural differences experienced, level of trust, type and timing of concession-making, degree of openness and information exchange, advanced preparation, and type of influence techniques. The researchers content-analyzed the interviews and reported findings related to: (1) issues involved in officers' negotiations with Iraqi civilians, (2) negotiation challenges, and (3) Iraqi negotiation techniques. Another goal of the report was to provide a preliminary analysis of how different cultural assumptions (U.S. and Iraqi) about negotiations may have impacted the kinds of challenges reported, as well as Soldiers' interpretation of Iraqi influence techniques.

Interviews indicated that officers encountered a wide range of issues in SSTR negotiations with Iraqi military personnel and local civilians. Three main negotiation topics were: (1) neighborhood and institutional improvement projects (e.g., selecting and managing contractors and allocating funds and resources), (2) security matters (e.g., traffic control checkpoints, negotiating regarding compensation or benefits in exchange for information), and (3) civil affairs issues (e.g., compensation for loss of residential or commercial property). Like the officers interviewed by Tressler, many officers in this study reported that in terms of prior professional or educational training they were ill-prepared for handling such issues.

Given the dual goals of achieving satisfying agreements and fostering collaborative relationships, a range of challenges were highlighted (Ben-Yoav Nobel et al., 2007). A content analysis suggested that these challenges fall into five main categories: (1) negotiation and mediation of ethnic strife, (2) ethical judgments in the face of conflicting cultural values and norms, (3) negotiating work agreements in the face of diverse cultural values and norms, (4)

negotiating in the face of threat and volatility and balancing the use of power and collaborative gestures, and (5) personal self-regulation and adaptability during negotiations. Like Tressler's (2007) interviews, these speak to the important role played by a variety of contextual factors, including culture and power. They further highlight the importance of Soldier knowledge and understanding of these variables and how they interact with one another as well as understanding the negotiation process as a whole. Increased cross-cultural awareness especially can help inform what is appropriate behavior, and also provide useful parameters for how, where, when, and with whom a negotiation should proceed.

Ben-Yoav Nobel et al.'s (2007) third set of observations are derived from the kinds of negotiation tactics used by Iraqi's, as reported by U.S. Soldiers. They accompany this with an analysis of associated non-Western expectations, values, and norms to which such tactics might be attributed. Example tactics include things like emphasizing personal status, power, and influence in the community, expanding the agenda in surprising ways, indirect expressions of anger and frustration, and fostering collaboration through exchange of offers and limited direct information exchange. Several of these tactics are consistent with negotiation behaviors previously discussed in relation to collectivist, high-context cultures, of which Iraq is an example.

The authors conclude their report, like Tressler (2007), with several recommendations for improving pre-deployment negotiation training. In addition to teaching Soldiers the fundamental principles of negotiation (e.g., the two central paradigms of distributive and integrative bargaining), they also recommend additional topics that likely impact the negotiation process and outcomes. Consistent with Tressler (2007), they urge that more pre-deployment training go beyond the mechanics of bargaining and include a broader set of topics and related skills that can be especially useful in SSTR environments. In particular, they mention the influence of cognition and emotion, suggesting that officers should learn techniques associated with emotional regulation and self-reflection.

Both Tressler (2007) and Ben-Yoav Nobel et al. (2007), in related but different examinations of Soldier negotiation experiences, at once acknowledge the important role of context and yet call also for a focus on the individual negotiator within that context. The role of the individual is an important one, and can serve to mitigate even the most extreme conditions, as described by Soldiers in both sets of interviews. Negotiation settings, especially those inherent to SSTR operations, are necessarily complex and involve innumerable contextual variables. By being appropriately prepared, a skilled negotiator can manage the potential obstacles these variables represent. Preparing for negotiations in any setting, but especially for SSTR operations, requires an awareness of context and demands certain skills of the negotiator. In a traditional sense, these skills involve knowledge of negotiation tactics and strategies (e.g., distributive and integrative bargaining techniques, power, interests, goals, etc.). Consistent with this project's focus on psychological processes related to negotiation, however, important skills to be trained and developed should also include those of a metacognitive, self-regulatory nature. Both Tressler and Ben-Yoav Nobel draw similar conclusions based on their own research. Next we will discuss the findings of focus groups conducted specifically for the purposes of the current project.

Focus Groups for Current Project

For the purposes of the current project, interviews were conducted with 35 military officers (primarily Captains and Majors) and 20 senior NCOs (primarily Master Sergeants/First Sergeants). Interviews were conducted mostly in small group settings of 2-6 Soldiers, with a couple of exceptions comprising single person and larger group interviews. A semi-structured interview protocol was used to explore the following topics: negotiation situations in which Soldiers had learned something, kinds of pre-negotiation planning, tactics and strategies used, results of these negotiations, and lessons learned. We were also interested to find out what types of negotiations Soldiers engage in most commonly, as well as what they believe are the most difficult aspects of negotiation and what makes a good negotiator. From a training perspective we asked whether and what kind of pre-deployment negotiation training the officers received, including what was valuable as well as any aspects that could be improved. Findings related to training will be discussed in the next section, which focuses primarily on training recommendations.

The following discussion summarizes themes gathered across the interviews, as well as comparisons to findings from both the Strategic Studies Institute and West Point reports. It is important to note that whereas the Soldiers interviewed for these latter reports had returned from their deployments in 2006 and 2007, many of those interviewed for the current project had returned more recently (mostly 2008, but some as recently as early 2009). As such, their negotiation experiences reflect a longer U.S. presence in Iraq, as well as the occurrence of specific events and passing of important milestones (e.g., troop surge in early 2007, rearmament of Iraqi forces and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq in 2008, and lead up to Iraqi sovereignty and U.S. forces withdrawal from urban areas in 2009). To the extent that differences exist between the experiences reported by Soldiers in our interviews and those reported in Tressler's (2007) and Ben-Yoav Nobel et al.'s (2007) interviews, it is possible that some are due to changes in overall conditions. Yet, perhaps not surprisingly given the overall nature of SSTR operations, several of the main themes captured from our interviews resemble those discussed by Tressler (2007) and Ben-Yoav Noble et al. (2007). The themes we highlight are not identical, however, and include the following: (1) working with an interpreter, (2) building trust, rapport, and relationships, (3) knowledge as power, (4) tenuous transitions, (5) knowing the parameters of leverage, (6) power in flux, and (7) conditions for clouded judgments.

Getting started: talking about negotiations. It should be noted that while many of the negotiation experiences described during the interviews occurred in Iraq, we did not explicitly seek to limit discussion to this setting only – or even to SSTR operations in general. Indeed, upon first learning about the purpose of our interviews with them, many Soldiers' initially had the reaction that they would have no negotiation experiences to share (e.g., “we only work with Green Suiters – we don't negotiate”). In response, we explained that by ‘negotiation’ we mean *situations in which two or more parties have a conflict of interest (or different goals) but voluntarily choose to engage in communication in order to divide or exchange resources and find a compromise*. Further, we suggested that these kinds of interactions can take place in a wide range of settings, including in garrison or during deployment. Similarly wide-ranging are the counterparts with whom negotiations can occur, including host nation personnel, Soldiers in other units, personnel in the other services, and contractors.

Defined as such, many Soldiers we spoke to were able to share some experiences related to negotiation. Many acknowledged that negotiation occurs regularly and is not reserved for SSTR operations. We heard that negotiation-relevant skills come into play all the time, especially in the course of typical day-to-day “horse trading” that takes place within and between units to accomplish tasks and missions. Soldiers spoke about keeping tally around the exchange of goods and resources, and this informal negotiation facilitates routine work, particularly in garrison. Nevertheless, we found that officers and NCOs most vividly recalled experiences from deployments in Iraq, with a handful of stories from deployments in Afghanistan as well. Possibly it is the recency and nature of these settings, including their inherent and multifaceted challenges, that makes deployment experiences stand out in Soldiers’ minds. SSTR negotiations are, therefore, the focus of the ensuing discussion.

In the course of their deployments in the Middle East, most officers and NCOs we interviewed reported at least some negotiation experience. Many in fact reported that negotiation-type activities occurred on a daily basis, especially with the local civilian population if they had the opportunity to interact with them (not always the case). To a lesser extent, they reported negotiating with the Iraqi Army and security forces, as well as contractors and the U.S. State Department. Interestingly, while cultural differences were acknowledged as implicit and often representing an obstacle to effective negotiation, such differences were not on the whole cited as a ‘stand out’ factor in recollections of experiences. A number of Soldiers referred to the fact that by the time of their most recent deployments in the Middle East, and Iraq in particular, both Iraqis and U.S. military personnel had become well-acquainted with one another. Therefore, while differences certainly existed between the two cultures, Iraqis (for whom the U.S. presence had been a constant for several years) had become accustomed to U.S. policies, procedures, and general mode of operations. As such, cultural differences for the more recently deployed Soldiers seem to represent less of a gulf than was perhaps the case previously.

Working with an interpreter. By all accounts, Soldiers cited their interpreters as the best source of cultural information. Soldiers can end up working with these individuals very closely and for fairly long periods of time. They are either regarded as a trusted and valuable asset in SSTR negotiations, or not trusted and viewed as potentially a source of misinformation. Soldiers described both, although there were more examples with positive experiences than those without. When an interpreter can be trusted to communicate information, meaning, and intent reliably, Soldiers indicated that they are especially helpful in an after action review (AAR) situation in terms of sharing their perception of what happened, whether the other party was lying or telling the truth, and what cultural differences might have contributed to a negotiation taking a particular course, etc. Interestingly, Soldiers also reported relying on their interpreters to help read body language.

Negotiations that happen through an interpreter are more complex than those conducted with direct communication. Even under the best of circumstances, with a highly trained, experienced interpreter who has excellent role comprehension, the process is slower and the opportunities for misunderstanding are greater. Indeed, there are many challenges and potential pitfalls that can hinder a negotiation. For example, issues pertaining to the quality of professional training of the interpreter and his/her ability to fulfill the role abound; someone may be an

excellent interpreter for everyday conversation, but may not have the understanding to correctly convey technical terminology, idiomatic expression, or nuanced statements that are inevitably a part of a negotiation. Further, an interpreter who has no experience with negotiations may not be able to stay calm and neutral in tense or emotional situations. This is even more of a concern in volatile, fraught, SSTR operational settings. An interpreter's ability to demonstrate professionalism is also a concern. Soldiers expect that an interpreter will not include personal testimony about a topic, even if s/he has firsthand accounts to share about the situation or conflict under discussion. Soldiers also need to trust that their interpreter is committed to professional ethics pertaining to confidentiality, impartiality, and accuracy. This means that they fully understand implications of omission, false fluency, and substitution.

For many Soldiers, the language competency and cultural fluency of their interpreter is both assumed and highly valued. Knowledge of dialects, metaphors, and overall ability to communicate with accuracy is a major asset interpreters bring to each and every interaction that requires translation. Equally valued, however, is an interpreter's appreciation for the core perspectives and values of *both* the parties involved. Interpreters have to be trusted to communicate the negotiation adequately and appropriately, as well as neutrally (e.g., free from personal ideological beliefs and ties to existing political parties). They must not influence the negotiation through evaluative or interpretative gestures in the translation, which is something Soldiers reported having to watch out for until an interpreter could be fully trusted. This can be quite challenging because issues can arise from seemingly hidden or unconscious agendas and goals related to the topic under discussion. Ideally there would be full disclosure by the interpreter, but that person may be blind to (or unwilling to admit to) particular emotional ties to or dislike of the issue under discussion. Or the interpreter may have conscious or unconscious motivations to influence discussions and direction of negotiations.

The issue of trust was brought up multiple times in the context of working with an interpreter. Whether truly trusted or not, Soldiers conceded that the input from an interpreter is generally taken with a "grain of salt." Learning even a few words of the local language was mentioned repeatedly as a way to crudely check the accuracy of an interpreter's translation. Equally, demonstrating even modest language skills was seen to go a long way toward building rapport with host nation personnel, a topic discussed further below.

The preceding paragraphs are by no means a comprehensive discussion of negotiations involving interpreters. However, they bear witness to some of the many challenges involved in cross-cultural negotiation where language presents a significant barrier. Bringing another individual into the situation, one who may or may not be trusted to convey a message with neutrality and poise, only adds to the complexity of SSTR negotiations – a point underscored in several of our interviews.

Building trust, rapport, and relationships. In multiple respects, SSTR negotiations can be considered non-traditional. For example, Soldiers consistently reported that many negotiations largely lay outside their primary areas of expertise and training (e.g., an engineer engaged in business contracting, a chemical officer matching linguists with units). Further, the SSTR operations setting involves some fairly protracted negotiations between different parties. A good and frequently cited example of these is what might be called 'information operations' in which

U.S. Soldiers solicit information from the local population over an extended timeframe. Equally, however, Soldiers found themselves in one-off type negotiations in which no prior relationship existed between them and the other party (e.g., land lease negotiations with local civilians). Establishing sufficient trust and rapport on this temporary basis was, therefore, also important.

A consistent theme we heard across many interviews is the importance of building rapport, trust, and, where possible, lasting relationships with negotiation counterparts. As one officer humorously noted, “no-one wants to give a jerk anything,” an insight that in its essence applies equally to negotiations in most settings. Therefore, the cultivation of relationships through trust and rapport is an essential building-block in any negotiation. Whether it is the kind of rapport that is gradually fostered over time through repeated interactions, or the clear message sent by meeting with a local host nation leader for the first time without full body armor and a weapon, the importance of the *interpersonal* interaction is evident. We recorded multiple examples of Soldiers finding innovative ways to build bridges with host nation personnel, from taking pictures of families and printing them in color; to giving an Iraqi battalion wood scraps from a U.S. Army installation; to sharing knowledge of how to read scale lines on a map. All are examples of building good will and the interpersonal foundation on which negotiations over resources, which could not be given away for free, could take place.

Particularly in non-Western cultures, the development of relational capital is essential and facilitates the process of negotiation. We heard repeatedly that ensuring sufficient ‘face time’ with members of the local population is important (e.g., sharing meals and drinking tea with local sheik). By strategically talking to counterparts and building credibility and rapport, ideas and goals can be discussed or ‘aired’ in a more abstract manner instead of couched in a formal request. Similarly, a good relationship enables a Soldier to problem solve and approach issues from multiple angles. Soldiers reported that this sets the stage for later meetings during which a more specific issue might be negotiated.

Knowledge as power. In addition, successful interactions and subsequent negotiations with the local population require building an intricate knowledge of the local landscape, ranging from things as varied as leadership (both positions and people), where people live and for how long, and routes different vehicles take throughout the neighborhood (e.g., taxis). Especially for Soldiers interacting with the local community, they reported that over time they built up a good picture of the places they patrolled and the people living there, as well as the relationships among people and between groups (e.g., tribes). This ‘information power’ is crucial since knowledge of the area of operations (AO) can be used in subsequent specific negotiations.

Interestingly, the notion that knowledge is power came up just as frequently for even the more ‘mundane’ negotiations that take place in garrison, for example. Soldiers reported that one of the most helpful things they can do in a negotiation is to convey self-confidence and competence. A maintenance or logistics Soldier dealing with multiple requests for equipment or products often negotiates about things like timing and prioritization. They reported that displays of competence through knowledge, recommendations, and problem-solving make them more influential and able to build a compelling case for their position on a matter. Competence also leads others to trust and respect a Soldier, which further bolsters their position in a negotiation.

Soldiers reported several other characteristics they had observed in successful negotiators. Possibly the most frequently mentioned was the ability to engage in active listening. Someone with lots of knowledge and expertise, but no willingness to listen to others, is likely to be a less effective negotiator. Although knowledge can promote lots of ideas and solutions, failing to hear the actual wants and needs of the other party is counterproductive to a mutually satisfactory agreement. Similarly, an expert who does not take the extra step to “sell” his or her idea may also fall short in a negotiation. Interestingly, several Soldiers drew comparisons between skills needed for successful negotiation and those demonstrated by good sales people. The commonality seems to be that both require elements of influence, of which negotiation represents a specific kind, as well as people skills. The set of skills that comprise “people skills” was also mentioned repeatedly. When prompted further, it was clear that this means different things to different people. However, such skills in the context of negotiation appear to coalesce around being able to build rapport, elicit trust, and accurately judge character and assess motivations. Getting along well with others is also an asset when it comes to being able to demonstrate authority or say “no”, but in such a way that relationships are undamaged (see below). Flexibility, patience, and persistence were mentioned as being helpful in dynamic situations replete with setbacks and potential triggers that knock negotiations off-track, a description that seems especially characteristic of SSTR operations. Lastly, Soldiers reported that while temperament is important, the ability to see the end-state and be able to work back and plan a negotiation from that point is essential. It is easy to lose sight of the broader mission amongst the daily challenges and setbacks of typical deployments.

Tenuous unit transitions. Soldiers reported that building sufficient relational capital and information power – both key to negotiations – can take quite a while, from several weeks to even a few months. They consistently indicated that negotiations conducted in the first few weeks of a deployment were much more challenging, and not nearly as effective, as those conducted later. A few Soldiers even suggested that these latter interactions didn’t really resemble negotiations since both parties were so much more familiar with one another. In these cases there was considerably less ‘posturing’, with each side knowing what to expect from the other. Over time, Iraqis and U.S. military personnel learned to work together and realized the alignment of goals. Yet each unit starting out new in an AO has to build their own knowledge of the local area as well as form new relationships.

Units are understandably limited in how much information can feasibly be transitioned in a short period of time. Yet the transition between units is instrumental to the subsequent short-term effectiveness of the deploying unit. Moreover, how effectively Soldiers in a unit can get things done is in part a function of how things were done by the unit they are replacing. Therefore, having a robust transition in which situational awareness is established is crucial (e.g., short- and long-term goals of the mission, circumstances on the ground, cultural customs and norms, connections in the local community, key players and their motivations, etc.). This permits deploying Soldiers to build on the successes of the past or modify how things are done in the future.

Soldiers reported a mix of experiences transitioning with another unit upon initial deployment. Many, however, indicated that this start-up time seemed like “wasted time” during which they could have otherwise been conducting more effective negotiations. Soldiers almost

equally underscored that while the learning curve was steep, frustrating, and at times an obstacle to negotiations early in a deployment, there are few good substitutions for it. Moreover, Soldiers cautioned that information expires quickly in SSTR settings, and even well-delivered transitions can involve passing along information about people and places that is outdated before too long. Further, it is precisely the length of time it takes to build a picture of and get to know the local population that contributes to successfully establishing rapport and trust. Building sufficient confidence in the local population that information, for example, can be reliably shared with U.S. forces, takes time. Therefore, while challenging, the first 4-6 months of ‘learning the ropes’ appears to be essential to successful negotiations in SSTR settings.

Knowing the parameters of leverage. The steep learning curve referenced in the previous section concerns not just getting to know people and places, but also becoming familiar with the parameters of the negotiation itself. A number of Soldiers indicated that it took them a while to learn what they could and could not offer in a negotiation, and what limits defined their points of leverage.

For example, Soldiers in our interviews reported being routinely confronted with the Iraqi perception that the U.S. has unlimited resources to offer as part of a negotiation (e.g., Commanders’ Emergency Relief Funds). In the early days especially, Soldiers had to be careful not to over-promise for things out of their control. Soldiers recalled numerous mistakes that resulted in either inadvertently under-delivering and damaging relationships, or being compelled to deliver on a promise simply to maintain a relationship.

We heard too that part of knowing the parameters of leverage is understanding a commander’s intent for a particular situation. Soldiers who spoke of successful negotiations referenced that their commander not only had empowered them to do the job well, but had also clearly communicated intent such that the parameters for a negotiation were well-defined ahead of time. It appears equally incumbent upon a commander to ensure adequate communication as well as on a subordinate to seek out and confirm correct understanding of their intent.

Power in flux. Although U.S. resources overall are available in the region, the reality is that they are neither infinite in number nor necessarily readily available to leverage in a given negotiation; in some cases, policies and procedures exist that specify where, when, and how resources can be deployed. This observation supports another consistent theme captured in these interviews, which is that of the changing nature of leverage and power. The military officers in Tressler’s (2007) interviews viewed negotiation power in particular as being somewhat narrow and tied largely to force, or the threat of it. Certainly, the power U.S. Soldiers can exert militarily is impressive, but in the context of negotiation, power is constituted by a complex interaction of factors. The Soldiers we spoke with seemed to express a better appreciation for this fact, as evidenced by their many examples of striving to solidify leverage in negotiation beyond guns and money – both of which have become less potent in Iraq in recent years.

Several Soldiers we spoke to had deployed to Iraq more than once and had witnessed a change in the fundamentals of power and leverage during the past six years. For example, Soldiers negotiating with Iraqi nationals (civilian and military) early on had both “money and guns” to call upon, as one Soldier put it. As the length of time the U.S. presence in Iraq

increased, however, the leverage attributed to these assets has diminished considerably. Soldiers seem to be finding more and more that they cannot rely on their traditional military power, and they have less to offer in the way of money and/or material goods. As one officer is quoted as saying: “When the money ran out, negotiating with Iraqis became a lot more difficult,” a sentiment that was widely shared. Many Soldiers found themselves asking with greater frequency and some frustration, “*What do I have to offer?*” In other words, what leverage can they bring to the negotiation to keep the other party engaged in a dialogue and motivated to achieve particular goals? Increasingly, leverage is defined by things such as protection, honor, saving face, prestige, status, and access to information. As such, Soldiers underscored the importance of “knowing your audience” to be able to negotiate specifically with their wants, needs, and agendas in mind.

This situation is compounded by that fact that many of the more recent negotiation experiences reflect the fact that Iraq, and the U.S. presence there, is undergoing significant transition. The focus of much activity has been to transition governance back to the local population. Whereas in earlier deployments negotiations involved getting things done by “giving them what they want,” more recent deployments were characterized by Soldiers as finding ways to reward/punish actions toward independence. For example, if a constituency requested gas in the stability and security phases of the SSTR operation, Soldiers would fulfill the request and ask very little in return. Over time, however, an exchange strategy has been adopted and a lot of negotiation involves incrementally working with the local population towards bigger and bigger goals. As such, if the ultimate goal is to improve security in an area, for example, settling for the appearance of security might at first be deemed an acceptable goal. Over time, Soldiers will work with a community to actually make the area safer in real terms, not just give the appearance of such. What this means, according to the Soldiers we spoke to, is having to tolerate a lot of “petty” negotiations, especially in the beginning. But figuring out what can be offered in a negotiation to move the other party towards a higher value goal (e.g., security, self-sufficiency) helps ensure progress is made toward transition.

As such, coercive power – the ability to leave the negotiation or deprive the opposing party of something it needs or wants – is rather tenuous. As Tressler (2007) found in his interviews, power in negotiation is complex, and how it is constituted and exercised is subject to change. The fact that the U.S. has overwhelming coercive power is hard to deny. Just the threat of potential military force (e.g., lethal force, arrest, detention, raids, and searches) is ubiquitous in most negotiations. However, this power is necessarily constrained by various political and organizational structures. The Soldiers we spoke with reported that the balance of power shifted a great deal depending on situation and context. Despite having the ability to rely on direct force from their greater military power, most Soldiers indicated that the direct use or threat of force was fairly uncommon. This may be largely due to the fact that this kind of action would run counter to and even destroy all prior attempts at building trust and relationships. Several Soldiers mentioned that rapport and friendship is indeed a useful point of leverage for getting things done, especially now when there are fewer formal incentives in place. To the extent that power is exercised at all, therefore, it seems to be more about the latent *potential* to apply force rather than the actual use of legitimate power.

This is not to say, however, that Soldiers were not firm or withheld displays of authority; far from it in fact. Many reported that it was important to “come in strong” giving a clear indication of expectations for what was needed. Similarly, understanding that “no” is an appropriate response at certain times is an important lesson learned that we heard from more than one Soldier. A number of Soldiers learned through mistakes that appearing weak left them open to being taken advantage of. Therefore, initiating a negotiation by being very clear about what a Soldier can and cannot do or offer is essential to negotiating successfully. Tressler (2007) makes an interesting point about parties’ perceptions playing a critical role in the relationship between military force and negotiating power. Specifically, he argues that there is considerable potential for cognitive biases to influence peoples’ perceptions in these SSTR negotiations.

Conditions for clouded judgments. As we reviewed in a previous section of this report, not only cognitive but also motivational and emotional psychological processes are associated with various effects that have been tied to errors relating to memory, informational processing, social judgment, and problem-solving, to name but a few. Both Tressler’s (2007) interviews as well as the ones conducted for this report suggest that Soldiers may overestimate their negotiating power and mistake their ability to apply force, which is substantial, for the power to demand concessions in a negotiation, which may vary (Tressler, 2007). To this end, Tressler advises, and our interviews substantiate, that “in negotiations laced with the kinds of opportunities for cognitive bias that both cultural differences and military power present...an awareness of the existence, challenges, and effects of cognitive bias may be especially important to those U.S. military negotiators or trainers interested in improving their negotiating effectiveness and success” (pp. 42-43).

Based on our review of psychological processes in negotiation, we would not limit promoting heightened awareness about biases to just those of a cognitive nature. Rather, finding ways to generate insight into these as well as the biases and effects associated with motivational and emotional processes is important too. The complexity and volatility of SSTR negotiations paired with the vast amounts of new information (cultural, political, social, and economic) inherent in such environments creates the perfect conditions for clouded judgments of all sorts. Reducing negotiator susceptibility to these represents a key concern, one that is potentially amenable to a training intervention.

In the next and final section, we end this report by offering a set of recommendations for training negotiation knowledge and skills. The basis for these recommendations rests on the preceding literature review and associated model, as well as our understanding of the kinds of negotiation situations for which Soldiers must be prepared when operating in SSTR settings. We consider training interventions that focus on the skills that will allow Soldiers to adapt to a variety of negotiation contexts, particularly intercultural negotiations, and which are important to the long-term success of many current U.S. military operations. Taking steps to provide efficient and effective training to junior Army leaders will ensure that they are prepared to deal with the challenging interpersonal situations they face when deployed.

Recommendations for Training Negotiation Skills

Prior sections of this report reviewed the empirical and theoretical grounding for the process model of negotiation performance antecedents and outcomes in mixed-motive negotiations (Figure 1). In this section, our goal is to create a set of training recommendations in relation to this model.

Given the complexity of this performance domain and the many different knowledge and skill areas that combine to create successful performance, we believe the most effective approach to building negotiation capability in Army leaders is to create a comprehensive career development program that builds leader capability both across the years of their career as well as across the three pillars of leader development – institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development. In this section we will describe the general concepts and discuss important training considerations. The development of a comprehensive roadmap for a negotiations career development program, however, will need to be created through an interactive process with Army SMEs and a skills gap analysis.

We will first provide more specific information regarding important training design issues, including: (1) the training needs for the negotiation training program to be developed, (2) the relative importance of those training needs, (3) the training objectives, (4) the development of training content, (5) training method selection, and (6) strategies for enhancing transfer (Campbell, 1988, Campbell & Kuncel, 2002). In the review that follows, we first consider these training design issues as they relate to the model of negotiation performance antecedents and outcomes illustrated in Figure 1. Subsequently, we summarize this discussion in the form of an overall set of training recommendations. Our goal in this section is to present a set of recommendations that maximizes the likelihood the negotiation training program developed will promote all relevant learning outcomes, including short- and long-term acquisition, retention and transfer of all of the trainable declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and attitudes in our model of negotiation performance antecedents and outcomes.

Training Needs

The first step in developing any training program is to determine the training needs. In the current context, training needs can be understood as the determinants of negotiation performance that are capable of being trained (Campbell, 1988; Campbell & Kuncel, 2002). Typically, these trainable elements include declarative knowledge (i.e., knowledge of how to do something), procedural knowledge (i.e., skill in applying declarative knowledge), abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs) (Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993). As Figure 1 indicates, the pool of potentially trainable KSAOs includes a set of distal and proximal determinants of negotiation performance. The set of distal determinants includes three clusters of KSAOs: (I) person variables (e.g., cognitive ability, personality), (II) context variables (e.g., structure of the negotiation situation, the cultural affiliation of the other negotiators), and (III) psychological processes (e.g., cognitive biases, motivational biases, emotional processes). The set of proximal determinants also includes three clusters of KSAOs: (IV) declarative knowledge (e.g., negotiation terms, principles, and concepts), (V) procedural knowledge (e.g., analytical skills, communication skills, problem solving skills) and (VI) motivation to negotiate. As this

model illustrates, the proximal determinants are posited to have a direct effect on negotiation performance, while the distal determinants are posited to have either a direct effect on negotiation performance, or an indirect effect on performance through their effect on the proximal determinants.

Some of these KSAOs are clearly capable of being trained. For instance, countless studies have demonstrated that negotiation-related declarative and procedural knowledge are capable of being trained. To provide one example from the meta-analytic literature, Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) review the findings of 21 studies that successfully taught negotiation knowledge and skill. In like fashion, it seems clear that the context variables can be trained, since many of these variables reflect a very specialized type of declarative knowledge. For instance, context variables include knowledge of the negotiation structure, and knowledge of the other negotiator's culture that impacts negotiation performance. There is little doubt that this type of knowledge can be trained. Finally, there is little doubt that motivation to negotiate can be enhanced through a training intervention. One of the most powerful training tools for enhancing motivation in any performance domain is goal setting. In goal setting research, the consistent finding in work settings is that inducing employees to have specific, difficult, and achievable goals leads to superior effort, investment, and performance in comparison to simply asking employees to do their best (Locke & Latham, 1990). In our final set of training recommendations, we will recommend the inclusion of a goal setting intervention to help motivate Army leaders to achieve their negotiation goals.

Standing in marked contrast to that set of KSAOs that is clearly capable of being trained is a set of KSAOs we believe would be very difficult, if not impossible, to train in the current context. These KSAOs include the relatively stable person characteristics in our negotiation model, such as cognitive ability and personality traits. Theoretically, it is possible that an educational intervention could influence the development of these traits. Behavioral genetic research suggests that approximately 50% of the variance in cognitive ability and personality is heritable, and that very little of the variance is due to environmental features shared with other family members (Plomin & Caspi, 1999). Accordingly, non-shared environmental factors play an important role in shaping personality and cognitive ability, and one of these environmental factors could potentially involve a training intervention. However, in our view, any training intervention that could develop these kinds of traits would be a highly specialized program of very long duration. Accordingly, while we concede it is possible the person variables in our negotiation model can be developed, we do not view such a training intervention as particularly useful in the context of the current project.

The final KSAOs to consider are the cognitive, motivational and emotional processes relevant to negotiation performance. As Figure 1 illustrates, these processes are conceptualized as distal determinants of negotiation performance. As previously indicated, the cognitive and motivational biases are characterized by a set of simplifying heuristics which are frequently adaptive and lead to correct decisions, but which occasionally lead to inappropriate assumptions that can negatively affect negotiation-related judgment. Presumably, a training intervention involving these biases would need to accomplish three things. First, such a program would need to make trainees *aware* of the cognitive and motivational biases that can interfere with effective negotiation performance. Second, the program would need to help trainees recognize *when* they

may be falling prey to biases that may negatively affect the decision making process. Finally, such a training program would need to provide strategies for *overcoming* the effects of these biases during the negotiation process, thereby improving overall negotiation performance. With regard to the emotional processes in our model, as previously discussed, both interpersonally experienced emotions and interpersonal emotional displays can have important implications for negotiation performance and negotiation outcomes. In the case of emotional processes, therefore, a training intervention would need to provide trainees a means to self regulate emotions as necessary to improve negotiation performance.

In our view, it is not obvious that a training program can accomplish all of these objectives for the cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes in our negotiation model. Accordingly, we review the evidence in support of the proposition that (1) trainees can be taught to overcome the biases that may negatively affect negotiation-related judgments, and (2) trainees can be taught to regulate emotions during the negotiation process in such a manner that negotiation performance is improved. The purpose of the review is to determine whether such processes are amenable to a training intervention such that they should be viewed as training needs for a negotiation training program.

Debiasing Training

There appears to be widespread agreement that many of the cognitive and motivational biases at play in negotiation and other decision making contexts operate beneath the level of conscious awareness. This is implied by Stanovich and West's (2002) model of decision making, which classifies cognitive processes into "System 1" intuitive processes, and "System 2" reasoning processes. According to that model, System 1 processes are fast, automatic, and effortless, and are largely composed of a set of unconscious heuristic-based processes such as those negotiators experience when making their negotiation-related judgments. In contrast, System 2 reasoning processes are slower, serial, effortful, and conscious. Although the function of System 2 is to monitor the quality of the intuitive judgments made by System 1, countless experiments have demonstrated that the monitoring exercise by System 2 is quite lax, allowing many intuitive System 1 judgments, some of which are erroneous, to be expressed. As indicated in our earlier review, the erroneous judgments caused by System 1 biases and heuristics can negatively impact negotiation performance and negotiation outcomes.

Because most cognitive and motivational biases exist below the level of conscious awareness, an important initial training task is to bring these biases to conscious awareness. Once negotiators are aware that they experience these biases, and that they affect decision making, a training program can potentially be created to help trainees overcome these biases. Broadly speaking, the task of bringing unconscious System 1 processes into awareness involves enhancing trainee metacognition, which can be defined as awareness and monitoring of one's own cognitive processing (Flavell, 1979;). Early approaches for enhancing such metacognition involved a straightforward process of telling decision makers they possessed these unconscious biases, and warning them not to fall prey to them (Fischhoff, 1975). This approach assumed people can access their unconscious thoughts through sheer will, and was largely unsuccessful. More recently, researchers have attempted to bring these processes to conscious awareness by forcing trainees to participate in a dialogue about them. For instance, in the training realm,

diversity trainers have used self-report questionnaires, interviews with dissimilar others, group discussions, or presentations of racial and ethnic group development to raise conscious awareness of negative out-group and positive in-group biases (Cox & Beale, 1997). Similarly, in the clinical realm, psychologists have created “metacognitive training programs” to raise awareness of some of the cognitive biases thought to be implicated in the maintenance or evolution of a specific psychological disorder. For instance, not unlike negotiators in an intense negotiation, patients with schizophrenia are particularly prone to making strong judgments on the basis of little evidence, having overconfidence in judgments, possessing limited capacity to consider and acknowledge counter-arguments for their inferences, and withdrawing from strongly held-positions. To bring these biases to conscious awareness, Moritz and Woodward (2007) developed an eight-module metacognitive training program to help patients understand the nature of self-serving biases, tendencies to jump to conclusions, biases against disconfirmatory evidence, and overcoming errors. Each module consisted of a set of exercises patients complete that are specifically designed to increase awareness of these decision making biases. Feedback from study participants indicated these modules are largely successful at accomplishing their objective.

Experimental social psychologists tend to assume that unconscious biases can be brought to conscious awareness through an appropriate instructional dialogue, and focus their attention on how to *counteract* the judgment errors caused by these biases. At least three different sets of “debiasing” strategies have been tested. The first strategy involves providing incentives for recognizing and countering the biases. The assumption underlying this strategy is that incentives will induce people to expend more effort recognizing errors caused by simplifying heuristics, and more effort correcting them. On the whole, research has not supported the utility of this debiasing strategy. This is probably due to the fact that for such incentives to work, decision makers must already possess effective strategies for countering cognitive biases, and recognizing when to use them (Larrick, 2004). Without knowledge of the correct strategies, incentives may simply lead the decision-maker to apply more effort to ineffective strategies. A second, similar debiasing approach involves holding decision makers accountable for their decisions. The mechanism through which this debiasing approach is thought to work is “pre-emptive criticism.” The idea behind pre-emptive criticism is that, in order to make a favorable impression or avoid embarrassment, decision makers will scrutinize the basis for their decisions more carefully, uncovering and correcting biases prior to making their decisions public. Research involving this strategy indicates that greater effort to detect and correct the source of decision errors has some limited success in debiasing decision makers, but only when the decision maker is already aware of the appropriate strategy for countering the bias (Huber & Seiser, 2001).

The third and most effective technique has been to provide individuals with specific debiasing strategies. Many of the biases at issue in negotiations (e.g., representativeness bias, availability bias, hindsight bias, overconfidence bias) are association-related judgment biases, or biases stemming from the association of related, though not situationally appropriate, concepts in semantic memory. The chief feature of this class of biases is that they involve a failure to consider alternatives and a tendency to focus on a focal hypothesis (Koehler, 1991). Accordingly, most debiasing strategies have focused on ways to counter this tendency. One of the most effective techniques has been to ask decision makers to “consider the opposite” of the focal hypothesis. This simple strategy has been shown to be effective in reducing the

overconfidence effect, hindsight biases, and anchoring effects (Arkes, 1991; Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). Larrick (2004) suggests that this technique is successful because it “directly counteracts the bias problem with association-based biases – an overly narrow sample of evidence – by expanding the sample and making it more representative” (p. 323).

A variant of this approach involves asking decision makers to explicitly consider alternatives to their focal hypothesis, perhaps by generating a list of alternatives to that hypothesis. This simple strategy has been shown to reduce the hindsight bias (Sanna & Schwartz, 2003; Sanna, Schwartz, and Stocker, 2002), the explanation effect (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Lord, Lepper, and Preston, 1984), and overconfidence effect (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). In one representative study, Hirt and Markman (1995) initially asked participants to explain a division championship by a favored team, and then asked them to explain the attainment of that same championship by another (1) plausible or (2) implausible team. Results indicated that counter explanations of the plausible alternative debiased probability judgments that the favorite would win, but counter explanations of the implausible alternative did not. Thus, the Hirt and Markman (1995) study pointed out an important limitation of the utility of generating alternative explanations to debias judgments. Although listing a small number of alternatives to a focal hypothesis is useful when it is *easy* to list the alternatives (listing reasons a plausible contender might win rather than the favorite), it does not work as well when generating the alternatives is *difficult* (listing reasons an implausible contender might win). In like fashion, the debiasing technique of listing alternatives does not work as well when decision makers are asked to generate a large number of alternatives to their focal hypothesis, rather than just a few alternatives. The danger seems to be that if decision makers cannot generate the last few alternatives in a long set of alternatives, they may give up and conclude that their initial judgment was right after all (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Sanna et al., 2002).

Another debiasing strategy that focuses on creating alternatives to a focal hypothesis is generating counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are thoughts of what might have been and represent alternative realities for past events (Kray & Galinsky, 2003). Typically, counterfactuals are activated when events almost occurred, or the antecedents of the event are noticed for some reason. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) argue that exposure to counterfactuals, like generating alternatives, works because it heightens awareness of the possibility that alternative explanations to a focal hypothesis exist. Theoretically, counterfactuals may be more powerful than generating alternatives to a focal hypothesis because they may be more likely to induce mental simulations of alternative versions of reality. Once activated, such mental simulations increase the propensity of decision makers to attend to and consider alternative possibilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Hirt & Markman, 1995). In one intriguing study, Galinsky and Moskewicz (2000) demonstrated the power of counterfactual thinking for reducing the confirmation bias, the tendency to seek out evidence that confirms one’s initial hypothesis and ignore evidence that disconfirms it. They investigated the power of counterfactuals for this bias in relation to the question of discerning the traits an individual possesses. To induce the counterfactual mindset, participants were given a list of 25 questions to explore the hypothesis an interview applicant was an extravert. Ten of the questions were designed to elicit hypothesis-confirming answers (e.g., what do you like about parties), ten other questions were designed to elicit hypothesis-disconfirming answers (e.g., what factors make it hard for you to open up to people) and five questions were neutral in their tendency to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. Results

indicated that exposure to this counterfactual mindset in an earlier context increased the selection of hypothesis-disconfirming questions in a subsequent context.

One issue that is garnering increasing attention in the debiasing literature is whether debiasing strategies transfer to completely new contexts. The study by Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000), referred to earlier, provided some initial evidence that inducing a counterfactual mindset in one situation can transfer to a new context. In one condition in that study, participants read a scenario in which a target person almost won a trip to Hawaii by switching seats at a rock concert (counterfactual prime condition) or won or lost without switching seats (no counterfactual condition). Participants that had had the counterfactual mindset induced subsequently performed better than their counterparts in the non-counterfactual condition on an unrelated problem in which participants needed to recognize that an object can serve multiple purposes. A more direct test of the transferability of debiasing techniques to new situations was recently conducted by Hirt, Kardes, & Markman (2004). These researchers gave participants a focal outcome to explain concerning a divisional championship by a professional basketball team, and then asked participants to complete an alternative generation procedure in the context of a focal outcome for either a related (football) or unrelated (TV) domain. As expected, results indicated that so long as the alternative generation task was easy, it induced a mental simulation mindset that debiased judgments in the same domain (football or TV). However, it also resulted in a debiasing of judgments in the unrelated domain (the basketball championship).

On the whole, studies to date have demonstrated that debiasing techniques can have measurable effects in reducing the effects of cognitive biases after interventions of relatively short duration. However, little research has demonstrated the staying capacity of these techniques. Theoretical considerations suggest such debiasing techniques will be lasting only if they have become more-or-less automatic. For lasting effect, debiasing techniques need to become automatic enough that System 2 can immediately recognize when a System 1 judgment requires modification due to bias, and what type of modification must be made (Larrick, 2004). To date, very little attention has been paid to whether, and how, debiasing techniques can be trained to automaticity. From the perspective of negotiation training, the issue is a crucial one since the negotiation process is often a fast-moving process with many parts. For debiasing techniques to be useful in this context, negotiators will need to know how to 1) recognize when their judgment is susceptible to a bias, 2) recognize which biases may be in play, and 3) counter the bias by the appropriate amount very quickly. In addition, these techniques must be capable of being trained so that accessing and using them does not interfere with negotiation performance more generally.

The question of whether such debiasing techniques can be trained to near-automaticity so that they can be effectively accessed and utilized without otherwise interfering with performance has not been clearly addressed in the debiasing literature. However, the self-regulation literature has examined this question in some detail. We therefore take up this question in the context of how to train individuals to regulate their emotions during the negotiation process.

Training Self-Regulation of Emotions

As indicated previously, emotional displays convey information that has strategic implications for how the negotiation proceeds. For instance, with respect to intrapersonal affective processes, a positive mood induces cooperative behavior. With respect to interpersonal affective processes, the use of anger may lead to lower demands and higher concessions, and displays of positive affect may induce cooperative behavior. With respect to the emotional processes in Figure 1, therefore, a training intervention would ideally provide trainees a means to self-regulate both felt and displayed emotions as necessary to improve negotiation performance.

Emotional regulation can be defined as all of the conscious and unconscious strategies we use to increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an emotional response. Tice and Bratslavsky (2000) proposed that at its most basic level, emotion regulation involves overriding a response set with an incompatible response set, such as relaxing in order to control anxiety. Potentially, such regulation could involve increasing positive feelings, decreasing positive feelings, increasing negative feelings, and decreasing negative feelings (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gross, 1998).

According to one influential process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), the self-regulation of emotion involves the processes by which individuals influence *which* emotions they have, *when* they have them, and *how* they experience and express those emotions. According to this model, emotional cues are evaluated first and these evaluations lead to a coordinated set of behavioral, physiological, and experiential emotional response tendencies. The regulation of emotions then occurs by manipulating inputs or outputs.

According to Gross' model, emotional regulation strategies can be distinguished from each other on the basis of when they occur in the emotion-regulation process. *Antecedent*-focused strategies refer to strategies an individual invokes before response tendencies have become activated. Such strategies involve changing one's *perception* of an emotion-generating event prior to the event occurring so that the emotion that is normally associated with the event does not occur. Strategies for emotion regulation abound (see Parrot, 1993, for a review). Examples include viewing an admission interview at a school you have applied to as an opportunity to see how much you like the school, rather than as a test of your worth, or construing a remark as helpful rather than hurtful (Gross, 2001; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). *Response*-focused strategies, in contrast, occur after an emotion has occurred. The purpose of response-based strategies, therefore, is not to prevent the internal experience of the emotion, but to suppress its expression. For instance, an individual may attempt to hide an expression of sadness after not being invited to a party she wanted to attend.

Several more specific strategies can be located within this broad scheme of antecedent- and response-based emotion regulation strategies. Specific antecedent-based strategies include (1) situation modification, (2) attentional deployment, and (3) cognitive reappraisal. Situation modification involves selectively avoiding emotion-invoking places, persons, or objects. An example of situation modification might be to go to a comedy club the night before a big exam rather than studying with other nervous students. Attentional deployment involves deciding in advance of an emotion-infused event which aspects of a situation to focus on. Thus, a person

who frequently has a hard time getting to sleep because she replays the day's events in her mind might learn to focus attention on a peaceful image prior to replaying those events. Finally, the strategy of cognitive reappraisal involves construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its emotional impact (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). An example of such a cognitive *reappraisal* strategy would be for an employee undergoing a performance review to re-construe the event as an opportunity for personal growth rather than as a time for a boss to catalogue a long list of deficiencies. The primary response-focused strategy is response modulation. With response modulation, individuals attempt to influence the expression of emotion once it has already occurred. Primarily, this response modulation involves suppressing an emotion.

Research into the effects of these emotion regulation strategies can be organized by their affective and cognitive consequences. With regard to the affective outcomes of emotion regulation, one well-replicated finding is that the antecedent-based strategies are effective in changing both the inner experience of the emotion and the expression of the emotion, but response-based strategies typically only affect the expression of the emotion. In one representative study, Gross and Levinson (1995) asked participants to watch a film of an arm amputation. In the cognitive reappraisal condition, participants were asked to think of the film in such a way that they would not experience it emotionally. For instance, they could think of the film as a medical teaching film. In the response modulation condition, participants were asked to suppress their emotional response to the film. In the control condition, participants were not given any instructions concerning their emotions. Results indicated that while suppression of disgust reduced its expression, it actually increased physiological activation relative to participants in the control condition, as measured through the level of constriction in blood vessels. In contrast, participants in the reappraisal condition did not have any observable physiological consequences, suggesting they did not experience the emotion of disgust internally. Because they did not experience the emotion of disgust, they did not express it either. These results have been replicated in other settings when participants have been asked to reappraise and suppress feelings of sadness and amusement (Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997).

Results such as these prompted researchers to consider the cognitive consequences of antecedent- and response based strategies for emotion regulation. One question was whether the use of either of these strategies interfered with the ability of individuals to perform other concurrent tasks. Interestingly, the question has a long history in the self regulation literature. According to Kanfer and Ackerman's resource allocation model for goal setting (1989), attentional resources are an undifferentiated pool representing the limited capacity of the informational processing system. One consequence of this fact, according to their model, is that any cognitive activity that taps this pool, such as self regulatory activity, depletes that pool such that there may not be enough attentional resources available for task performance. Kanfer and Ackerman theorized that the key determinant of whether self regulatory activities would interfere with task performance was the complexity or novelty of the task. They speculated that because well-learned tasks require few attentional resources for completion, self regulatory behaviors are not likely to interfere with smooth task performance. In contrast, novel or complex tasks require virtually all available attentional resources. Accordingly, attempts at self regulation during complex task performance should fail. Kanfer and Ackerman's theory parallels similar theories voiced by researchers of emotion regulation. For instance, Baumeister and colleagues' ego-depletion model (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, &

Baumeister, 1998) contends that any type of emotional regulation depletes mental resources available for other tasks.

This discussion of the feasibility of self regulation during concurrent task performance has clear implications in the current project. The implementation of negotiation-related knowledge and skill in mixed-motive settings is likely to be a very complex task, as partners, goals, and objectives shift from one situation to the next, and over time. Consequently, if Kanfer and Ackerman's model applies to emotional regulation, or other self regulatory behaviors such as using debiasing techniques, leaders' negotiation prowess may suffer as a consequence of trying to self-regulate emotions, or use debiasing strategies, during that process. However, there has been considerable debate about the evidence in support of this model. For instance, DeShon, Brown, and Greenis (1996) criticized the methodology of the studies supporting Kanfer and Ackerman's model, noting that attentional resources had not been directly manipulated in any of the supporting studies. This critique also applies to many of the studies in the emotion regulation literature which are cited as support for the idea that emotion regulation depletes cognitive resources. As Richards and Gross (2000) note, many of those studies used emotion regulation as a dependent variable, showing for example that success in emotion regulation was reduced by cognitive load. While this research demonstrates that emotion regulation consumes cognitive resources, it does not show that emotion regulation affects performance on concurrent tasks. In their own study, which was focused on self regulation of goal setting activity, DeShon et al. (1996) found that self regulation can become automated so that it does not necessarily require attentional resources. More importantly, in a more recent elaboration of their resource allocation model, Kanfer and Ackerman (1996) suggested that emotional control is a trainable process, implying that it can be trained and therefore automated.

Emotion regulation researchers have also investigated this issue empirically, and have noted an interesting difference concerning the ability to automate different categories of emotion regulation processes. In general, researchers have found that antecedent-based, but not response-based, emotion regulation occurs without affecting the attentional resources that otherwise are needed for task performance. Theoretically, response-based strategies, such as suppression, may be expected to require substantial attentional resources because they require a high degree of monitoring and self-corrective action throughout the emotional episode. In contrast, because reappraisal occurs prior to the emotion-activating event occurring, it should not require an extensive outlay of self regulatory effort during the emotional event itself. Several studies testing the accessibility of memory following emotion regulation have confirmed these expectations. In one representative study, study participants viewed slides depicting injured men in reappraisal, suppression, and control conditions. Suppression led to worse performance on a subsequent memory test but reappraisal did not (Richards & Gross, 2000). Identical results were obtained in a follow-up study to determine whether these effects generalized to everyday life. Participants in the suppression condition reported having lower task-related memory on the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross, John, & Richards, 2000) than individuals in the reappraisal condition.

An important emerging stream of research is investigating whether emotion regulation can become automated by using "implementation intentions" (Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2009). Implementation intentions are if-then plans that spell out when, where, and how to set a goal for emotion regulation. For instance, an implementation intention

might be “if I anticipate experiencing unwanted emotion X, I will do Y.” Importantly, therefore, implementation intentions are not simply goal intentions to use a specific emotion regulation strategy. They are commitments to respond to a specified critical situational cue in a planned, goal-directed manner. Most importantly for present purposes, the chief benefit of implementation intentions as a strategy is that they are theorized to lead to automated as opposed to conscious and effortful emotion regulation (Gollwitzer & Sherran, 2006). There are at least two reasons it may be possible to automate implementation intentions for emotion regulation. First, because forming an implementation intention requires selecting a future situational cue, a strong mental model of that future situation is created, increasing its accessibility in memory (Gollwitzer, 1999). Second, the accessibility of the cue is increased because such intentions create a strong association between the specified opportunity and specified response (Webb & Sheeran, 2007). As Gallo et al. (2009) indicate, the upshot of these strong associations is that the if-then associations exhibit “features of automaticity, including immediacy, efficiency, and redundancy of conscious intent.” (p.13).

In two recent studies, Gallo et al. (2009) tested the efficacy of implementation intentions for the two main strategies of emotion regulation. In the first study, these researchers presented participants with disgust and fear-eliciting pictures. They asked participants in a *response-based* emotion regulation condition to form an implementation intention to suppress emotion when presented with the pictures (i.e., “...then I will remain calm”). In the second study, the researchers presented spider-fearful participants with pictures of spiders. They asked participants in the *antecedent-based* emotion regulation condition to form an implementation intention to cognitively reappraise their reaction to the pictures (i.e., “...then I will ignore it!). Results indicated that in both studies, self-report ratings of arousal and fear were reduced in the experimental condition relative to a condition in which participants were asked to form a more general goal intention to suppress or cognitively reappraise emotion or to form no goal intention to regulate emotion at all.

In sum, results from the emotion regulation literature support the contention that individuals can be trained to regulate their emotions using both antecedent-based and response-based strategies. In addition, the evidence suggests it may be possible to automate this self-regulatory process, and other self-regulatory processes, such as debiasing, so that it does not interfere with concurrent tasks performed during the negotiation process.

Accordingly, we conclude that debiasing and emotional self-regulation strategies are capable of being trained, and that the full set of training needs for this project is the following: (1) negotiation-related declarative knowledge, (2) negotiation-related procedural knowledge, (3) motivation to negotiate, (4) declarative and procedural knowledge of debiasing techniques for negotiation-relevant cognitive and motivational biases, and (5) declarative and procedural knowledge of techniques for regulating emotion during the negotiation process. To this set of training needs we also add declarative knowledge of the entire negotiation process (as modeled in Figure 1), which is broader than knowledge of distributive and integrative bargaining principles.

Relative Importance of Training Needs

Having determined the training needs for the model of negotiation antecedents and outcomes, it is important to consider whether more time should be spent in the training program addressing a subset of these needs. Determining the relative importance of training needs involves a variety of considerations, including 1) which of the trainable KSAOs are the *most* trainable, and 2) which ones are likely to have the greatest impact on negotiation performance. Consideration of both of these issues will help inform decisions about how much training program time should be allocated to training specific KSAOs.

We believe the easiest KSAOs to train will be the proximal determinants of negotiation performance in Figure 1, as well as the context variables. The negotiation-related declarative and procedural knowledge to be taught are not appreciably different from declarative and procedural knowledge that has been successfully taught in many other interpersonal skills training programs (Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003). According to Arthur et al. (2003), the estimated population effect size for training programs attempting to train interpersonal declarative and procedural knowledge is $d = .68$ for learning criteria, suggesting such knowledge is highly trainable. Few studies have assessed whether goal setting itself is a trainable motivational tool. However, its trainability can be inferred from the effect it has on performance in studies that pit an experimental goal setting condition against a no goal setting control condition. A recent meta-analysis by Zetik and Stuhlmacher (2002) indicates that negotiators who hold optimal goals outperform those with suboptimal or no goals, suggesting that in the context of interpersonal skills training, goal setting is a highly trainable motivational technique. In contrast, although the debiasing and emotion regulation studies we reviewed suggest it is possible to train specific debiasing and emotional regulation techniques in specific contexts, research in this area is limited and results, though promising, are restricted to the narrow contexts studied. On logical grounds, we believe the largely unconscious nature of many of the biases and emotional responses targeted for training in the negotiation performance model will make implementation of relevant debiasing and emotion regulation techniques the most challenging part of the negotiation training program developed.

According to the model of negotiation performance antecedents and outcomes in Figure 1, the proximal determinants of negotiation performance are hypothesized to have a direct effect on performance, while the distal determinants are hypothesized to have either a direct or indirect effect on performance. In the abstract, this model suggests the proximal determinants are likely to have a greater overall effect on negotiation performance than the distal determinants. However, as this model has not been tested empirically, and path-analytic estimates for hypothesized relationships have not been obtained, we urge caution in drawing this conclusion. Accordingly, although it makes intuitive sense that negotiation-relevant declarative and procedural knowledge will have a greater impact on overall negotiation performance than a goal setting intervention, or training in debiasing techniques and emotion regulation, we reserve judgment on which of these interventions will have the greatest impact on negotiation performance.

Another consideration in determining the relative importance of training needs may be the extent to which the trainable KSAOs are currently being trained within the Army. For instance, based on our interviews with SMEs and prior studies on negotiation training, it appears that Army leaders are only receiving very cursory pre-deployment training in negotiation-related knowledge and skill (Beckno, 2006). Rather, the focus is on the substance of the issues that may arise in civil-military negotiations. As Tressler (2007) has noted, the assumption appears to be that preparation regarding the substance of these issues will translate into effective negotiation (Tressler, 2007). The relative paucity of negotiation training for even basic negotiation knowledge and skill suggests the need for training which covers the full range of trainable KSAOs in our negotiation model.

Training Objectives

Having considered the relative importance of the training needs, the next step is to translate these fairly general training needs into more specific training objectives. The purpose of articulating training objectives is to specify what the learner should know or be able to do following training that he or she did not know or could not do prior to training (Gagne, Briggs, & Wager, 1988). Ideally, the training objectives should (a) be stated in observable terms; (b) incorporate the correct capability (e.g., the development of knowledge or an observable skill such as a psychomotor, physical, or interpersonal skill); (c) indicate the conditions under which trainees should be able to exhibit the capability; and (d) specify the level of proficiency to be attained (Campbell, 1988; Campbell & Kuncel, 2002).

An important goal in designing training objectives is to ensure they are framed in such a manner that it is possible to determine whether or not they have been attained following training. According to the model of training evaluation developed by Kirkpatrick (1959, 1996), relevant training outcomes can include reaction, learning, behavioral, and results criteria. Usually, learning is the criterion of interest because it is the outcome most proximal to training and the one least affected by extraneous influences. For instance, behavioral criteria are usually measures of on-the-job performance, and results measures are frequently operationalized using utility analysis estimates (Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003). As such, these criteria may be affected by learning, but they may also be affected by environmental variables beyond the control of the learner.

Learning criteria itself can be broken down into cognitive, skill-based, and affective components (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993). In Table 6, we list a set of training objectives aligned with what we believe are the most important cognitive, skill-based and affective outcomes for a program of leader development in negotiation. Table 6 specifies, at a general level, the key training objectives for each training need. These will need elaboration as the program is developed. The concept would be to work with Army SMEs to create a roadmap that would package these objectives in training modules that could then be provided to the leader in institutional training or available for the leader's self-development over the course of his/her career.

Note in Table 6 that we have listed knowledge of the overall negotiation process model itself as the first training need. In our view, an important part of any training program will be to

orient trainees to the process model of negotiation in Figure 1. For trainees to become competent negotiators, it will be important for them to understand how all of the pieces of the negotiation process fit together, and the full range of outcomes that may be of interest in a particular negotiation. As Figure 1 indicates, those outcomes include economic outcomes, numerous social-psychological outcomes and success in future negotiations. For the remainder of the training needs, note that the training objectives often involve more than one affective, cognitive, and/or skill-based objective.

Table 6. Training Objectives for a Leader Development Program in Negotiation	
Training Need 1: Declarative Knowledge of Negotiation Process Depicted in Figure 1.	
Cognitive Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and retain knowledge of negotiation process from start to finish, such that this knowledge is readily accessible to trainees when called upon to use it during actual negotiations.
Affective objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased motivation to think about the negotiation process holistically during actual negotiations, such that trainees have an increased desire to consider the full range of desired outcomes in advance of negotiations, and the full range of factors affecting the likelihood of achieving those outcomes.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased self-efficacy about how to conduct a successful negotiation from start to finish, such that trainees display increased confidence about how they would conduct a negotiation from start to finish.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire a mastery-orientation towards the negotiation process, such that trainees have an increased and ongoing desire to continue to learn about all aspects of the negotiation process.
Training Need 2: Declarative Knowledge of Negotiation-Relevant Facts, Concepts, Principles, and Contextual Elements	
Cognitive Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and retain knowledge of effective negotiation facts, principles, and concepts, such that this knowledge is readily accessible to trainees when called upon to apply it during actual negotiations.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and retain knowledge of contextual factors affecting the negotiation process, including culture, negotiation structure, and expected length of relationship, such that this knowledge is readily accessible to trainees when called upon to use it during actual negotiations.
Affective Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased self-efficacy about how basic negotiation facts, principles, concepts, and context variables apply to different stages of the negotiation process.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire a mastery-orientation towards negotiation declarative knowledge, such that trainees have an increased desire to learn about negotiation facts, principles, concepts and context variables, and how they affect the negotiation process.
Training Need 3: Procedural Knowledge of How to Apply Negotiation-Relevant Knowledge and Skill	
Skill-Based Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During actual negotiations, effectively apply negotiation knowledge and skill, such that effective negotiation behaviors are performed.
Affective Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased self-efficacy about how to negotiate effectively.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire a mastery-orientation towards negotiating, such that trainees have an increased desire to become more highly-skilled negotiators.
Training Need 4: Motivation to Negotiate	
Affective Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased motivation to negotiate, such that trainees have an increased desire to negotiate, and in fact negotiate more often than they did prior to training.
Training Need 5: Declarative and Procedural Knowledge of Techniques for Debiasing Cognitive and Motivational Biases	
Cognitive Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and retain knowledge of debiasing strategies, such that this knowledge is readily accessible to trainees when called upon to apply it during

	actual negotiations.
Skill-Based Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recognize when a specific biasing technique should be used.
Table 6. Training Objectives for a Leader Development Program in Negotiation (Continued)	
Training Need 5: Declarative and Procedural Knowledge of Techniques for Debiasing Cognitive and Motivational Biases	
Skill-Based Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During actual negotiations, apply the correct debiasing technique such that negotiation-related judgments are improved.
Affective Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain self-awareness of the cognitive and motivational biases at play in negotiation contexts, such that the existence of these biases is readily accessible to trainees during actual negotiations.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased self-efficacy about recognizing when to apply a specific debiasing technique.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain a mastery-orientation towards using debiasing techniques, such that trainees have an increased and ongoing desire to learn about ways to use debiasing techniques during negotiations.
Training Need 6: Declarative and Procedural Knowledge of Techniques for Self Regulation of Emotion	
Cognitive Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and retain knowledge of emotion regulation techniques, such that this knowledge is readily accessible to trainees when called upon to apply it during actual negotiations.
Skill-Based Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During actual negotiations, recognize when a specific emotion regulation technique should be used in the negotiation process.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During actual negotiations, apply the correct emotion regulation technique such that negotiation performance is improved.
Affective Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire and maintain increased self-efficacy about recognizing when to use a specific emotion regulation technique.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire a mastery-orientation towards using emotion regulation techniques, such that trainees have an increased and ongoing desire to continue to learn about ways to use emotion regulation techniques during negotiations.

Training Content Development

Development of the training content involves specifying, for each of the training objectives, the specific facts, concepts, principles, skills, and patterns of choice behavior to be trained. At this stage, the likely content of the negotiation training program is clearer for the training objectives related to (1) knowledge of the overall negotiation process (2) negotiation-related declarative knowledge, (3) negotiation-related procedural knowledge and (4) motivation to negotiate than for the training objectives related to (1) debiasing cognitive and motivational biases, and (2) self-regulation of emotions.

To help leaders acquire and retain knowledge of the negotiation process, we anticipate that the main stimulus material will be the process model of negotiation antecedents and outcomes in Figure 1. The training content will include much of the negotiation-related declarative knowledge contained in Table 1, which summarizes many of the relevant negotiation terms, concepts, and processes within mixed-motive negotiations, including knowledge of terms such as bargaining surplus, BATNA, concessions, limits, reservation prices, resistance points and the like.

For leaders to acquire the skill-based objective of learning *how* to negotiate effectively, we anticipate that they will need to learn most of the skills contained in Table 2. Some of the important distributive and integrative skills to be learned include: (1) analytical skills, such as analyzing your own and the other party's negotiation position, (2) persuasive skills, such as using persuasive argument, making positional commitments, and using time pressure, (3) communication skills, such as using information exchange to learn about the other party's interests, and conveying emotions to achieve various objectives, (4) problem solving skills, such as expanding the resource pie and using concession exchange, heuristic trial and error, non-specific compensation, logrolling, cost-cutting and bridging to achieve mutually beneficial solutions (5) ingratiation skills, such as influencing the perceptions of the other party so that he or she perceives both parties have common preferences, and (6) resisting competitive tactics, such as resisting threats and ploys, and the other party's attempts at persuasion.

In order for leaders to acquire the affective objectives for many of these training objectives, including increased negotiation-related self-efficacy, a mastery orientation towards learning, and more generally, an increased desire to negotiate, we recommend that (1) a goal-setting intervention, and (2) a mastery-orientation intervention be incorporated in the training program. As mentioned earlier, the consistent finding in work settings is that inducing employees to have specific, difficult, and achievable goals leads to superior effort, investment, and performance than simply asking employees to do their best (Locke & Latham, 1990). Thus, we recommend the creation of goal setting exercises to force leaders to set specific, difficult, but achievable negotiation-related goals. As an example, such a goal-setting exercise might involve asking leaders to set specific goals for how they would implement negotiation techniques in the months to come following training. In a recent negotiation training program developed by Cullen, Muros, Rasch, and Sackett (2009), trainees were asked to think of at least five individuals on whom they could use negotiation strategies in the next month, and to note which strategies deserved special emphasis for a given person. Next, they were asked to identify the obstacles to success in using the strategies with each person. Finally, they were asked to consider how they would overcome those difficulties. The intervention was apparently very successful, since 78% of trainees who had the opportunity to use the negotiation strategies in the month following training used the strategies.

The purpose of a mastery-orientation intervention is to influence leaders to *want* to process the negotiation training content deeply and for a sustained length of time. A mastery-orientation towards training stands in contrast to a performance-orientation in which trainees focus on learning material so that they can obtain a good score on the training evaluation, rather than on learning for its own sake. To create such an intervention, we recommend a very active training program that encourages exploration, emphasizes practice, frames errors as natural occurrences that are instrumental for learning, frames task ability as an acquirable skill, and provides mastery rather than performance-based goals (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008).

In the preceding sections, we have attempted to provide some indication of what we believe the core content of the negotiation program of development should be. However, the content for this program can only be specified at a somewhat general level at this point. Further specification of the training content would need to be a core task of the program development process and will require help from SMEs. This will be particularly important for the debiasing

and emotion regulation training objectives. The content that must be created for meeting the debiasing objectives includes, at a minimum, specification of (1) all of the negotiation-relevant cognitive and motivational biases capable of being counteracted through debiasing techniques, (2) the debiasing techniques themselves, and (3) principles for recognizing how and when to use these techniques in the course of a mixed-motive negotiation. The required content for meeting the emotion self-regulation objectives includes, at a minimum, specification of (1) all of the negotiation-relevant emotions to be regulated in the course of mixed-motive negotiations, (2) relevant emotion regulation techniques, and (3) principles for recognizing how and when to use these regulation techniques in the course of a negotiation.

Sequencing of training content. Organization of the training content involves specifying the sequence in which the declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and attitudinal components should be taught (Campbell, 1988; Campbell & Kuncel, 2002). Ideally, the content should be sequenced in a manner that fosters optimal learning, retention, and transfer of all of the content to be learned.

We share Kraiger et al.'s (1993) belief that the development of declarative knowledge should precede higher order development of skill or attitudinal change. This approach to sequencing training content also comports with Anderson's ACT model of learning (Anderson, 1989). Anderson's ACT theory of learning suggests that learning proceeds through a series of stages, including the declarative, knowledge compilation, and procedural stages. In the declarative stage, learners spend most of their time encoding and storing basic task rules and strategies through rehearsal. During knowledge compilation, learners no longer need to verbalize training content. Instead, they focus on establishing associations between stimulus inputs and the responses required for effective performance. During the final stage, procedural knowledge is encoded in terms of condition-action pairs. In this final stage, task performance becomes fast and effortless, and is not easily affected by additional information-processing demands (Ackerman, 1987).

Accordingly, we recommend facilitating encoding and storing of basic information during the initial declarative stage by teaching basic declarative knowledge first. Subsequently, we recommend the development of procedural knowledge by providing exercises that force trainees to practice using the negotiation strategies and behaviors. Once trainees have acquired the relevant declarative and procedural knowledge, we recommend the goal-setting and mastery-orientation exercises to increase trainee motivation to use what they have learned. We propose that content be sequenced through the creation of separate training modules generally aligned with beginner, intermediate, and advanced negotiation requirements. In our final summary of training recommendations, we provide a review of the training objectives.

Selection of training method. Having decided on the training needs, objectives, content, and sequencing, another important consideration is which training method, or combination of training methods, should be used to address the training objectives in Table 6. At the most abstract level, a training *method* represents a structural relationship between instructor, learning and the material to be learned that dictates *how* the content of instruction is to be taught (Reigeluth, 1999). The major training methods include information presentation (frequently in a lecture format), modeling, discovery, cooperative, tutorial, and independent learning. Each of

these basic methods encapsulates a host of secondary methods, and each is premised on a different theory of learning. A given training method may employ a variety of training media, such as videotapes, workbooks, the Internet, or multimedia (Campbell & Kuncel, 2002). Figure 2 provides a high-level summary of primary training methods, secondary training methods, and media. Although explanation of the details of these training methods is beyond the scope of this report, Figure 2 illustrates, at a structural level, how instructors, learners, and learning-related resources are interconnected in the application of various training methods. For instance, as Figure 2 illustrates, when a “pure” lecture method is utilized, the instructor is responsible for disseminating information to learners, and learners do not participate directly in the learning activity. In contrast, when a discovery method is utilized, the instructor’s involvement is minimal. Rather, much of the learning takes place as a result of group learning activities initiated by the learners. The result is a new “discovery” by the group that is related to the content to be taught. Figure 2 illustrates that a variety of training media can be applied to the application of any and all training methods.

In choosing a training method, two considerations are paramount: (a) the instructional events that comprise the method should support or be consistent with the cognitive, physical, or psychomotor processes that lead to mastery; and (b) the capability incorporated in the training objective should be reflected as closely as possible in the training method (Campbell, 1988; Campbell & Kuncel, 2002). In the review that follows, we examine which training methods are optimal for training interpersonal skills such as negotiation. Although very few studies have examined the efficacy of different training methods for training negotiation knowledge and skill specifically, many studies have examined the effectiveness of different training methods for training the broader class of interpersonal skills to which negotiation belongs. We rely heavily on these studies in making a recommendation concerning training method selection.

Like leadership, communication, and team-building, negotiation is a distinctly interpersonal skill because it requires great facility working with others (Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003). Behavioral modeling training (BMT – referred to as “Modeling” in Figure 2) has long been the most popular method of training interpersonal skills such as negotiation. Literally millions of managers have been taught supervisory and teamwork communication skills using BMT (Wexley & Latham, 2002). Behavioral modeling has its roots in social learning theory, which posits that learning can take place by virtue of watching others perform a behavior (Bandura, 1965). Typically, individuals receiving behavioral modeling instruction are taught by a trainer in a group setting. In that group, trainees i) receive an introduction to a topic, ii) watch a model perform the desired behaviors, iii) discuss what the model did right and wrong, iv) practice the desired behaviors via role playing, and v) receive feedback about their performance. Learning is hypothesized to take place as a result of attentional, retentional, and motivational processes invoked by the procedure. Introducing an individual to a topic invokes attentional processes. Similarly, watching, discussing and practicing the relevant behaviors invokes retentional processes. Finally, the provision of feedback invokes a motivational process (Bandura, 1969).

The popularity of BMT for training interpersonal skills is due in large part to a series of early studies suggesting its efficacy (e.g., Latham & Saari, 1979; Meyer & Raich, 1983) and recent meta-analyses supporting its use in training these skills (Burke & Day, 1986; Falcone,

1985; Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Chan, 2005). In their recent meta-analysis of BMT, Taylor, Russ-Eft, and Chan (2005) found large effect sizes for BMT on interpersonal knowledge and skill outcomes. Among studies employing control groups, the mean population effect size estimate was slightly more than 1.0 SD, which is comparable to those found in earlier meta-analyses for similar criteria (Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003; Burke & Day, 1986). The mean population effect size estimate for attitudes was smaller, but still substantial, with an average change of one third of a standard deviation. Finally, the estimated population effect size for on-the-job performance behavior was approximately one quarter of a standard deviation. This effect is smaller than the results reported in other meta-analyses for this criterion (Arthur et al., 2003; Burke & Day, 1986; Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985), which the authors attribute to the inclusion







Basic Methods	Structural Attributes	Secondary Methods	Training Media
Lecture		Discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workbooks • Videotapes • Audiotapes • CBT • CD-ROM • Videoconferencing
Modeling		Role Playing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multimedia • Audio conferencing • Videodisks • EPSS • Internet • Intranet
Discovery <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual • Group 		Constructivist Inquiry Learning Problem-Based Learning Error	
Cooperative		Team Training Jigsaw Reciprocal Questioning Scripted Conversation	
Tutorial		Cognitive Apprenticeships Instructional Conversations	
Independent		Programmed Instruction Computer-Based Instruction	

Figure 2. Instructional Methods and Structural Attributes of Methods. Note: I=Instructor; L=Learner; La=Learning Activity; Ri=Resource (Instructional); Rr=Resource (Raw); P=Problem; --- = indirect involvement; solid arrow = direction of control.

of more recent studies showing smaller BMT effects on behavioral outcomes (May & Kahnweiler, 2000; Russell, Wexley, & Hunter, 1984; Werner, O'Leary, Baldwin, & Wexley, 1994), and the inclusion of a greater number of unpublished studies than previous meta-analyses.

Although BMT has predominated as a method for training interpersonal skills such as negotiation, other methods have been used. For instance, interpersonal skills have been taught using the lecture method, programmed instruction, discussion, and various combinations of these methods. In their meta-analysis of the effectiveness of different training methods for teaching different categories of skills, Arthur et al. (2003) found a wide range of effect sizes for these training methods and combinations of methods for teaching interpersonal skills. The effect sizes varied considerably (i.e., from $d = .22$ to $d = 1.44$) depending on whether reaction, learning, or behavioral criteria were employed.

Another method for training interpersonal skills that holds promise is error management training (EMT). Error management training is a relatively new approach to skill acquisition pioneered by cognitive psychologists, primarily in the educational domain (e.g. Brooks, 1990; Fosnot, 1996). The central premise of EMT is that the learning of complex, cognitively-laden skills is best accomplished in an environment in which trainees actively engage in exploration, problem solving, hypothesis testing, making mistakes and learning how to recover from mistakes (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996).

In contrast to a behavioral modeling approach, therefore, in which the focus is on guiding learners in an errorless, step-by-step fashion through a pre-established set of training material, the focus in an error-based approach is on reducing training content, increasing participant involvement, and encouraging errors. Theoretically, EMT is believed to lead to increased depth of processing of information in training and improved encoding, retention, and recall of information later on (Chandler & Sweller, 1991; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). In particular, by forcing trainees to interrupt training and reflect, errors are hypothesized to lead to the construction of better mental models of the material to be learned, and also to increased practice of behaviors that are the source of the error. Finally, EMT may lead trainees to practice error-recovery strategies, which may increase performance (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1996; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag & Keith, 2003).

In general, recent studies have supported the efficacy of EMT in fostering learning. For instance, several studies have reported medium to large effect sizes for EMT relative to other proceduralized training methods that advocate step-by-step instructions and the avoidance of errors (Frese, 1995; Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000). In addition, in a recent meta-analysis of EMT, Keith and Frese (2008) found that deliberately incorporating errors into training can be an effective means of promoting learning. Importantly, however, the training tasks included in these early studies, and in the meta-analysis, were confined to a very narrow range of tasks. In most cases, the training involved using a new computer software package. None of the studies in the Keith and Frese (2008) meta-analysis examined the effectiveness of EMT for training a complex interpersonal skill such as negotiation.

Recently, Cullen, Muros, Rasch, and Sackett (2009) investigated the relative effectiveness of BMT and EMT for developing the complex interpersonal skill of negotiation for junior Army leaders. Results indicated that neither method was superior to the other in promoting near- or far-term declarative or procedural knowledge acquisition, retention, or transfer. However, the study revealed two sets of disordinal interactions. For several learning outcomes, the performance of highly conscientious and extraverted individuals was superior in the EMT condition, while the performance of less conscientious and introverted individuals was superior in the BMT condition.

From a theoretical perspective, the Cullen et al. (2009) research suggested that the function of errors in interpersonal skill acquisition is a complex one. The avoidance of errors in the BMT program did not appear to either help or hurt learning relative to the EMT program which explicitly relied on the occurrence of errors to promote learning. Thus, at least for the complex interpersonal skill of negotiation, this research does not appear to fully vindicate reinforcement theory or social learning theory in the case of BMT, or a cognitive perspective in the case of EMT. From a practical perspective, the research suggests that both methods may be fruitfully used for training complex interpersonal skills such as negotiation.

On balance, we believe that BMT is the best training method for addressing the specific training objectives in Table 6. Not only has BMT been demonstrated to be a very effective training method for training interpersonal declarative and procedural knowledge, we believe it will be an effective method for training the somewhat novel debiasing and self regulation techniques. We anticipate that having individuals model effective and ineffective debiasing and self regulation techniques, and having trainees intensively practice using these techniques themselves in realistic mock negotiation settings, will be highly effective because it directly incorporates the “capability” to be trained. In the case of the debiasing and emotion regulation strategies, that capability is the ability to effectively implement debiasing and emotion regulation strategies in real-world negotiation contexts. As mentioned earlier, to meet the affective training objectives for the training needs articulated in Table 6, we recommend the inclusion of goal setting and mastery-oriented training modules in the BMT intervention.

Enhancing transfer. Finally, we consider ways to optimize the transfer of all negotiation-relevant knowledge and skill to be taught in the negotiation training program to be developed. Especially within the current SSTR context, transfer of negotiation-relevant declarative and procedural knowledge is a key concern. In order to achieve tactical and strategic success through negotiation, Army leaders need to be able to know how to use the knowledge and skills learned in constantly changing, asymmetrical negotiation contexts.

Conceptually, two types of transfer can be distinguished from each other. Analogical transfer refers to situations where the problem is familiar or analogous to those of the training tasks. In contrast, adaptive transfer involves using what has been learned for a new problem that is structurally different than the one presented in training (Keith & Frese, 2008; Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996).

Ideally, to enhance both types of transfer, a training method will include opportunities for goal setting, guided practice, and informational feedback (Locke & Latham, 1990; Ericsson &

Charness, 1994; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Whenever possible, it should also foster the development of self-efficacy, a mastery-oriented approach to learning, and interest in the material. Such characteristics have been demonstrated to positively affect various learning processes, such as motivation to learn, information processing, and the use of metacognitive strategies, which in turn positively affect both short and long-term learning (e.g., Ford, Smith, Weissbein, Gully, & Salas, 1998; Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 1991; Mathieu, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 1992; May & Kahnweiler, 2000; Noe & Schmitt, 1986). Incorporating opportunities for active learning via intensive exploration of material has been shown to play an important role in fostering adaptive transfer in particular (Keith & Frese, 2008)

Consequently, we advocate the construction of a BMT program that contains multiple opportunities for (1) active engagement with and exploration of the material, (2) practice using the skills learned, (3) feedback, (4) enhancement of learner self-efficacy, (5) goal-setting, and (6) development of a mastery orientation towards learning. Together, these instructional events will help leaders process information deeply, feel confident about their ability to negotiate, and develop a sustained and continuing interest in developing their negotiations skills.

Summary of Training Recommendations

The foregoing review identified six specific training needs linked to the model of negotiation performance antecedents and outcomes in mixed-motive negotiations in Figure 1. The training needs are the proximal and distal determinants of negotiation performance in Figure 1 that are capable of being trained. These training needs include the following: (1) Declarative knowledge of the negotiation process depicted in Figure 1, (2) Declarative knowledge of negotiation-relevant facts, concepts, principles, and contextual elements (see Table 1), (3) Procedural knowledge of how to apply negotiation-relevant knowledge and skill (see Table 2), (4) Motivation to negotiate, (5) Declarative and procedural knowledge of techniques for debiasing cognitive and motivational biases, and (6) Declarative and procedural knowledge of techniques for regulating emotion. We recommend that the leader development program for negotiation address all of these training needs over the leader development lifecycle.

As indicated in the review, an important first step in creating the training program will be to translate these fairly general training needs into more specific training objectives that are capable of being evaluated. We have made a first attempt at specifying these training objectives in Table 6. We recommend that the training program be oriented towards achieving all of the cognitive, skill-based, and affective objectives listed in this table. As the program concept is developed, we expect that each one of these primary training objectives will be expanded to include a subset of more specific objectives.

The training program content will largely be determined by the specification of the full range of training objectives. As mentioned earlier, some of the content for the more basic declarative knowledge and procedural skill to be trained is contained in Tables 1 and 2. However, much of the specific training content is yet to be determined and will require working interactively with SMEs.

To deliver the training content, and meet the training objectives, we recommend that the training be delivered primarily through a behavioral modeling method. However, that method will likely include information presentation components. For instance, many of the training objectives related to declarative knowledge acquisition and retention can be met through information presentation. However, the skill-based training objectives will be best taught using a BMT approach which allows leaders to model effective and ineffective negotiation behaviors, practice employing those behaviors, and receive constructive feedback to hone negotiation skill. We recommend the delineation of a roadmap for a comprehensive career development program for building negotiation capability in Army leaders. Training modules would be developed based on the recommendations of this report, and Army SMEs would help sequence and integrate the modules throughout the leader development process, with some modules presented during institutional training, and others available on the web for self-development purposes.

I. Level I Modules:

The first set of modules would focus on attaining the basic cognitive training objectives in Table 6. They would introduce trainees to the negotiation process model, explain key elements of the model, and define key negotiation terms, principles and concepts. In addition, they would begin to familiarize trainees with basic debiasing and emotion regulation strategies. We envision that large parts of these modules could be taught using an information presentation format.

II. Level II Modules:

The second set of modules would focus on attaining the skill-based objective of learning how to *apply* the declarative knowledge gained in the introductory module. Much of this module would be taught using a BMT method, in which models demonstrate effective and ineffective negotiation behaviors, trainees practice using these behaviors in realistic mock negotiation settings, and receive corrective feedback about how to improve performance. These could also contain goal-setting and mastery-orientation interventions to enhance the desire to negotiate and hone negotiation skill.

III. Level III Modules:

The third set of modules would address skill-based objectives for recognizing when to use debiasing and emotion regulation techniques, and how to use them effectively in the course of mixed-motive negotiations. We recommend using a BMT approach for training these skills as well. We expect that learning how to implement debiasing and emotion regulation strategies will be the most difficult for trainees. As such, before trainees are introduced to this content, they should already have automated the basic negotiation content covered in Levels I and II.

To ensure trainees have automated the content in Levels I and II prior to entering Level III, we recommend that the content in these first two modules be trained to mastery (May and Kahnweiler, 2001). Training content to mastery may involve providing distributed opportunities for reviewing and practicing the training content in Levels I and II. It may also involve requiring leaders to demonstrate they have mastered the content by successfully completing a set of training performance measures created for that purpose.

We recommend that all three levels incorporate as many features as possible to maximize retention and transfer. Accordingly, we recommend making the BMT program as active a learning process as possible, with multiple opportunities for actively exploring the material, practice, and feedback. We recommend the inclusion of goal setting and mastery-orientation interventions to increase leaders' desire to use the negotiations behaviors learned and to inspire them to continue to improve their negotiation knowledge and skill.

Finally, we advocate a formal evaluation of the training program created. We recommend modeling the assessment process on the one employed by Cullen et al. (2009) in their negotiation study. In that study, Cullen et al. assessed four different measures of learning, spread out over time, as follows: (1) declarative knowledge acquisition, (2) task performance, (3) declarative knowledge retention, and (4) transfer performance. Their measures of declarative knowledge acquisition and task performance were administered immediately following training, and their measures of declarative knowledge retention and transfer performance were administered about one month after training had concluded. The declarative knowledge measures were traditional paper-and-pencil measures of how well negotiation strategies and behaviors had been learned and retained, but the procedural knowledge measures were actual negotiation simulations that required trainees to display their knowledge of how to apply the strategies and behaviors in mock negotiation scenarios. We recommend using measures that allow all of these learning outcomes to be assessed.

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